Monthly Archives: March 2010

LETTER FROM EXILE: # 14

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

THE DISINTEGRATION CONTINUES.

Another Jersey Politician Doesn’t Agree with The Leader;

So Let’s Unlawfully Oppress Him.

In Secret.

“I have never made but one prayer to God, a very short one: ‘O Lord, make my enemies ridiculous.’ And God granted it!”

Voltaire.

Though its genesis is disputed, the following quote is also famously attributed to Voltaire:

“I do not agree with what you have to say, but I’ll defend to the death your right to say it.”

Just as is this observation:

“It is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong.”

I was reminded of these famous bon mot when observing the startling juxtaposition of the newly published report of the Commons Justice Committee – with the brazenly simultaneous conduct of the Jersey oligarchy.

Some people are of the view that the island of Jersey possesses political and judicial safeguards that make it a modern, functioning democracy.

It grieves me to say of Jersey that that is not so; that most of its incumbents in power possess neither the wisdom nor knowledge to recognise just how extraordinarily dysfunctional their habits have become.

You see – in all functioning democracies – well, at least all those I have considered – it is recognised that being the dominant grouping, does not confer upon you the right to then oppress and harass the minority grouping.

Most of us would recognise that democracies require opposition, of some description. And if the dominant group has no opposition – then your democracy is no democracy at all – but rather, a chimera; a simulacrum.

A sham.

And that is what we have in the British Channel Island of Jersey.

Because in Jersey – so ignorant – so backwards – so wholly unused to that necessary function of alternative views; of challenge – is the traditionally dominant oligarchy – that they regard it as quite normal and acceptable for the majority grouping to use and abuse its powers – to intimidate, harass and oppress the minority grouping; the de facto ‘opposition’.

And we have had yet another example of such ignorant and dysfunctional behaviour these last few days.

One Jersey politician – Establishment Party member, Senator Ben Shenton – didn’t like the fact that another politician, independently-minded Deputy Bob Hill – had expressed disapproval and distrust of Jersey’s political leader, Chief Minister Terry Le Sueur.

Deputy Hill – like most islanders – does not agree with the frankly extraordinary conduct that has seen Jersey’s highly respected, decorated Chief of Police, Graham Power, QPM, improperly driven from his post – because the political establishment didn’t like him investigating their decades of failure to protect vulnerable children.

So, Senator Shenton reported this unacceptable “dissident” opinion of Deputy Hill’s to the ‘disciplinary’ body of the Jersey parliament – the Privileges and Procedures Committee, which then proceeded to summon Deputy Hill to appear before it – to answer for his heinous offence of expressing a disrespectful opinion towards Jersey’s Glorious Leader.

The States of Jersey’s Privileges and Procedures Committee is, to all practical purposes, a puppet-body of Jersey’s Crown Officers – the Attorney General in particular, who has an automatic right of attendance at the committee’s meetings. And, as though that were not bad enough, the committee, its Chair and the secretariat of the Jersey parliament all have to take any necessary “legal guidance” – from the Crown Officers – usually, the Attorney General himself.

The unelected and unaccountable, London-appointed head of the infamous “Government within a Government”.

The former Attorney General – only recently appointed to the post of Deputy Bailiff – being largely the driving-force behind the unlawful suspension of Chief Constable Graham Power – and a whole load of other obstructions of justice, too.

However, we must add to this that so archaic and decadent are the habits of power in Jersey, that PPC always insists upon holding its ‘disciplinary’ hearings in secret.

An utterly contemptible and preposterous state of affairs.

So Deputy Bob Hill – to his great credit – had the good sense and courage to dismiss this farrago, and treat it with the contempt it deserves – by refusing to participate in its secret hearings.

In response to the absolute refusal of PPC to embrace transparency and accountability, Deputy Hill issued this statement:

“STATEMENT BY DEPUTY BOB HILL

“Justice must not only be done, but seen to be done” is an important principle. It is enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights that anyone facing a determination of “civil rights or obligations” or a criminal charge has a right to an independent and impartial tribunal, established by law, sitting in public.

Connétable Gallichan has written to me to say that “PPC has consistently taken the view that out of fairness to all parties and to avoid unwarranted speculation, complaints should be dealt with in private until the Committee has come to a decision”. I believe that this is wrong and not in accordance with Members’ rights under Article 6 of the Convention. The evidence-taking part of an investigation should be held in public and the Member against whom a complaint has been made must have the right to call his or her own witnesses and to cross-examine anyone who gives evidence to PPC.

Standing Order 157 does not state that investigations by PPC have to be carried out in private. PPC therefore has discretion as to whether to take evidence in public or private. In order to comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR, it is in my view necessary for PPC to take evidence in public. Even elected politicians have human rights! It is especially important that an elected politician should have any allegations of misconduct determined in an open way. The right to open justice protects not only the individuals whose rights are being determined but also the rights of others (including the news media) to be present to see the proceedings.

The Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000 states that “functions in connection with proceedings in the States Assembly” are not covered by our local human rights law. For the purposes of this morning’s hearing I accept that this means that the 2000 Law does not apply to the investigation of this complaint by PPC.

This does not, however, mean that Article 6 of the ECHR itself does not apply.

Two all-party parliamentary committees in the UK have concluded in recent years that Article 6 applies to disciplinary investigations against MPs and Members of the House of Lords, even though the UK Human Rights Act 1998 has a provision similar to the one in the Jersey law (that “functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament” are not covered by the British human rights legislation).

In 1999, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, chaired by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, a law lord, stated:

“Although proceedings in Parliament are excluded from the Human Rights Act 1998 and from the jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts, they may nevertheless be within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The existence of this jurisdiction is a salutary reminder that, if the procedures adopted by Parliament when exercising its disciplinary powers are not fair, the proceedings may be challenged by those prejudiced. It is in the interests of Parliament as well as justice that Parliament should adopt at least the minimum requirements of fairness.”

In 2009, the Joint Committee on Human Rights accepted that Article 6 applies to disciplinary investigations against Members of the UK Parliament. The Joint Committee concluded that the following basic rights of procedural fairness should be followed by a parliamentary committee hearing a complaint against a Member:

a prompt and clear statement of the precise allegations against the Member;

adequate opportunity to take legal advice and have legal assistance throughout;

the opportunity to be heard in person;

the opportunity to call relevant witnesses at the relevant time;

the opportunity to examine other witnesses;

the opportunity to attend meetings at which evidence is given, and to receive transcripts of evidence.

In 2002, the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that “evidence-taking aspects of the disciplinary proceedings” in the UK Parliament should be carried out in public. I understand that this practice is followed in the Scottish Parliament, where the Standards Committee of that legislature holds evidence-taking sessions in public.

It is legally and politically unattractive for a committee of the States of Jersey to claim immunity from the European Convention on Human Rights, while expecting courts and tribunals and other public authorities to follow the spirit and letter of the human rights law. Everyone, including States’ Members, should be entitled to the basic human right of a fair hearing in public.

To conclude: in order to ensure that the investigation of the compliant made against me by Senator Shenton is carried out in a way that complies with Convention rights, the evidence-taking part of the investigation must be held in public and I must be allowed the basic rights of a fair hearing that I have just listed.

Deputy Bob Hill.”

But Deputy Hill is not alone in having to take a stand against such Kafkaesque conduct by PPC.

I, too, have suffered various examples of tyranny-by-the-majority at the hands of this States of Jersey body. And I too have also rejected its non-justice – its secrecy.

In early 2007 PPC sought to oppress me for expressing a public opinion which the ruling, de facto party did not like. It, apparently, being unacceptable to engage in satire. And I responded to the anti-democratic, anti-justice, secret conduct of PPC in a similar way to Deputy Hill. I’m not certain of the exact draft of the statement I issued to PPC and subsequently published, having attended the committee – only to be told the hearing would be in secret, but I believe it was this:

“STATEMENT TO THE PRIVILEGES AND PROCEDURES COMMITTEE

BY SENATOR STUART SYVRET

The Privileges and Procedures Committee, having decided that this hearing shall take place in secret, and having done so without any prior warning to me, has forfeited any claim of criticism against me for my decision to decline to take part in this meeting.

In any event, PPC has no power or justification in respect of attempting to interfere with free expression by the elected representatives of the people, at least when such expression takes place in the public sphere and outside the bounds of, and protection of, parliamentary privilege.

PPC, when involving itself in events which have taken place outside the bounds of parliamentary privilege, is bound by the same rule of law as the rest of society. Thus PPC has no locus standi to disregard human rights, natural justice, freedom of expression and the right to a fair hearing when examining events that take place in the public sphere.

Therefore this procedure has no credibility, is illegitimate, and is unlawful.

My presence here in no way grants or implies acceptance on my part of the vires of this procedure.

My presence here in no way grants or implies the assigning of my human rights.

PPC has, inter alia:

1: Repeatedly refused to explain precisely what is under investigation.

2: Resiled from a previous commitment to explain the precise issues it wished to focus upon, thus again leaving me unable to mount a defence.

3: Has repeatedly refused to tell me who the anonymous complainants are.

4: Has committed a prima facie breach of Standing Orders itself, by acting on such anonymous “approaches”.

5: Denied me a proper period of time to prepare a defence.

The actions of PPC are not compatible with democracy, human rights, natural justice and freedom of expression.

I therefore reject any claim that PPC’s conduct, and specifically this procedure is legitimate.

Senator Stuart Syvret”

So – here we are – three years down the road – and still the very body that should be defending the rights and freedoms of the electorate – by protecting the electorate’s representatives – instead continues to oppress and harass politicians.

Perhaps if many more independently-minded members defy the Jersey oligarchy – they too will end-up being raided by ten-strong police squads – and be locked-up in tiny, windowless police-cells for seven and a half hours – whilst having their homes turned over from top to bottom – without a search-warrant – under the orders of the unelected, unaccountable Crown Officers?

At this rate – we may be able to form a ‘Government in Exile’?

By another curious juxtaposition – the Jersey oligarchy – in order to avoid a real review – recently appointed another Ourchap body – to examine the laughably incredible and unsustainable conflicts of interest that beset and hedge-about Jersey’s Crown Officers.

As though the concept of a separation of powers still required arguing about.

As though the last 200 years simply hadn’t happened.

And – you know – in the Jersey context, perhaps they didn’t?

What’s the betting that the latest Ourchap exercise also concludes that ‘everything in the garden is rosy’?

In straight defiance of all evidence and history?

Stuart.

LETTER FROM EXILE: # 13

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

A.C.P.O 2

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE QUALITY OF

GRAHAM POWER’S LEADERSHIP.

“7: The recommendations from the initial visit have been acted upon, some within a very short period following delivery of the initial report. The States of Jersey Police are to be commended for their positive reception of the report and for their extremely prompt response in implementing the recommendations.”

There is no Substitute for Facts.

Yet the Jersey Oligarchy has Produced None.

When time and circumstances used to permit, I would occasionally write about the various propaganda and spin-doctoring devices routinely used by the powerful and the rich. The best, all-encompassing term I have discovered to describe such activity being “opinion-management”.

We all want to ‘manage the opinions’ of other people – be they friends, family, work-colleagues, customers, clients, businesses, voters, investors – the list is endless.

And we – in turn – regardless of whether we care to admit it, have our opinions ‘managed’ by the efforts of others.

It isn’t the purpose of this post to delve into such a broad and deep subject at length; another day, perhaps?

But a quick consideration of one or two of the key factors in ‘opinion-management’ does help to contextualise the document I reproduce below – the second report by the Association of Chief Police Officers.

Managing public opinion – manipulating a large swath of people into believing what you want them to believe, and thinking the way you want them to think – is a dramatically easier task – if you have big money behind you. Big money, in the sense that you can ‘own’ – in all senses of the word – a large part of the mass-media. If you happen to possess such huge economic power, you can ensure that your ‘message’ – your propaganda – is repeated at length, and in high-profile – and in a manner that is consistent across several media outlets.

You will have succeeded in “framing” the debate in such a way as to have “normalised” the ‘opinion’ you wish the average person to hold.

That ‘opinion’ you will have imparted to many people could be right – or wrong – or somewhere in between. The fact remains, you will have succeeded in your objective of ‘managing’ public opinion.

And once public opinion is established in that way – is “framed” – is normalised – anyone who wishes to change that public opinion faces a dramatically difficult task. Especially if they are poor and powerless.

I have always believed that we should all have a good understanding of ‘opinion-management’; that its various devices and mechanisms should be taught in schools. Not so that we all become spin-doctors – but rather, so ubiquitous and powerful is the day-to-day impact upon us of hundreds of attempts to manage our opinions – that we should all learn to recognise such manipulations, and develop what I might term our capacity for ‘intellectual self-defence’.

And one of those key methods of defending yourself from being manipulated into believing nonsense, is a requirement to see the facts.

Facts – as opposed to mere assertions; evidence – as opposed to claims.

As Chomsky has said, when it comes to trying to gain an accurate understanding of an issue, there is no substitute for facts.

But – of course – there are different facts – of different relevance. And there are different interpretations that can be made of such facts.

So, to be sure, the bald facts alone won’t always lead us to enlightenment.

But – such facts as are available, are most certainly a very good place to start.

And, in respect of trying to make sense of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – and, in particular, the controversy of the last 16 months – we do, actually, have a tremendous quantity of facts – of evidential items – at our disposal.

A consideration of those facts, I would suggest, helps us to form a reasonable opinion as to which side in the Jersey child abuse controversy is more likely to be right; more likely to have an intellectually sustainable position.

Whilst this does risk over-simplifying the argument, there are two broad views of the question of concealed child abuse in Jersey.

The first, in which I would place myself, includes people like the survivors, whistle-blowers, straight cops, competent journalists, Graham Power, many families, Lenny Harper and various campaigners and members of the public around the world.

This first group could be categorised as broadly having the view that Jersey’s various public authorities have systemically failed, over a period of decades, to properly protect children from abuse; that therefore such abuse has gone on largely unchecked and unpunished; that the abuses committed have caused awful suffering and have been immensely destructive to the lives of the survivors; that it is possible there might have even been child deaths; that certain highly-placed individuals in Jersey, including current and former senior public employees, ether committed abuse or knew of abuse but concealed it; and that such is the gravity of the many decades of systemic failure to protect children, the Jersey establishment has a vested interest in concealing the full truth, and that even today, the island’s public authorities have attempted to disguise the facts by sabotaging the investigation.

The second group includes such people as Jersey’s Crown Officers, its judiciary, the establishment politicians, the Chief Minister, Home Affairs Minister and the rest of the cabinet, most of the very senior level of Jersey’s civil servants, all Jersey’s news editors and most of the island’s journalist.

This second group might be described as being broadly of the view that, OK, there were some examples of child abuse, but only a few – absolutely nothing like the quantity suggested; that child abuse happens in all societies, and that Jersey has been no different; that, over the decades, the island’s authorities have performed no worse than similar authorities in the UK in dealing with these issues; that a lot of the survivors who came forward were just exaggerating or making it up; that even the possibility of unexplained child deaths has been evidentially virtually eliminated; that it is not true that over the decades and up to the present day, senior civil servants have abused children or concealed the abuse of children; that there was no need for the bad publicity; that the police investigation was not politically suppressed; that Graham Power’s suspension was justified; and that Jersey does have effective and functioning checks and balances.

Let us describe those two camps as ‘Group 1’ and ‘Group 2’.

Imagine – you’re an objective, impartial person – who wants to try and form a reasonably robust and intellectually-sound opinion – as to which of those two groups is more likely to be broadly correct in their view.

Of course, any fact-based opinion has to be revisable – because it wouldn’t be intellectually cogent to remain wedded to a particular opinion, if new evidence emerged that weakened the opinion one had previously held.

So – none of us are yet in a position to come to a rock-solidly evidenced, definitive, final opinion on the controversy – because events are yet to run their full course.

And I can assure readers there is more yet to emerge.

But we can form an ‘interim’ opinion; one based upon the evidence – the facts – so far available to us at this stage.

So we consider the contrasting positions of Group 1 and of Group 2 – and we ask ourselves – which of those two opinions is supported by the most actual evidence; the most facts?

To-date – which side in the dispute is most strongly supported by evidence presently in the public domain?

It is Group 1.

And not only is it Group 1 – by some marginal weighing of considerations.

It is Group 1 by a crushing, overwhelming advantage of published, hard, documented evidence.

Indeed, when considering the “success” the Jersey oligarchy Group 2 has had in manipulating – or ‘managing’ – the opinions of many people in Jersey, we see demonstrated all over again – the immense importance of facts – if you wish to avoid being conned.

Look back over the last 16 months, and consider the relentless barrage of propaganda from the Jersey oligarchy – the sheer, relentless saturation coverage based upon nothing more than un-evidenced assertions and repeated claims that Group 1 “has-no-evidence”.

During that time – what “evidence” has Group 2 actually adduced?

A totally un-evidenced claim – a mere assertion – that a supposed “interim report” by the Metropolitan Police, received in November 2008, justified the unprecedented political condemnation of, and sabotaging of, the abuse investigation – and the supposed “emergency” suspension of a decorated Chief Constable, Graham Power QPM.

Amazing – when one thinks about it – that all the propaganda of the Jersey oligarchy and their media – propaganda to be seen in JEP editorial comments, BBC Jersey bias, and absurdly slanted reports by CTV – is based – when you get down to it – on nothing more than that supposed Metropolitan Police report – and the second-hand claims made for it by David Warcup, Mick Gradwell, Frank Walker, Andrew Lewis, Ian Le Marquand and Terry Le Sueur.

But, worse; we now know that the alleged report of the Metropolitan Police – if any document worthy of description as a ‘report’ existed at that time in November 2008 – has long-since been disowned by the Metropolitan Police.

So even that one single nebulous item of alleged “evidence” – has been disowned by those who produced it.

Group 2 simply has no published evidence – at all – to substantiate any of its claims.

But what, then, of Group 1?

Group 1 is broadly of the view that child abuse has occurred in Jersey over a period of decades; that what distinguishes Jersey from elsewhere is that there has been a persistent and consistent Culture of Concealment on the part of all of Jersey’s authorities, who have colluded in various cover-ups; that people guilty of abuse and the unlawful concealment of abuse have been repeatedly protected from prosecution; that many of them occupied or continue to occupy high public sector posts; that this is evidenced in the clear failure of any of the normal checks and balances of societies to stop, expose and punish such conduct; and that the Jersey establishment has conspired to unlawfully sabotage the investigation and prevent the truth emerging.

Today sees the publication of yet more evidence that supports the view of Group 1.

Two further documents – to add to the significant number already published.

Below, you can read the second report of the Association of Chief Police Officers.

And – on the Voice for Children site – you can read the second of the suspension review meeting transcripts, in which the Home Affairs Minister, Ian Le Marquand, was “reviewing” the unlawful suspension of Chief Constable Graham Power QPM.

And what of the other published, hard evidence that supports the view of Group 1?

I’m conscious of the fact that this is a long blog posting, so I won’t list every single item; instead I list here some of the key documents that are published – and which – tragically in so many ways – prove the accuracy of the fact-based opinion of Group 1:

The Sharp report.

The e-mail of Anton Cornelissen.

The Dylan Southern Report.

The so-called “Grand-Prix” policy of unlawful solitary confinement against children.

The employment tribunal testimony of Simon Bellwood.

The legal opinion of Chris Callander of the Howard League, one of Britain’s leading child protection lawyers.

The report of the Howard League for Penal Reform.

Graham Power’s July 2007 file-note.

Graham Power’s e-mail reply to me of the 21st November, 2007.

Bill Ogley’s lying file-note to Simon Crowcroft.

The Council of Minister’s minutes of 26th July 2007.

Lenny Harper’s affidavit.

Lenny Harper’s guest posting on this blog.

Graham Power’s affidavit.

The evidence obtained by Graham Power from the electronic data, which shows the letters written to inform him of his “emergency” suspension had, in fact, been worked on for days prior to the event.

ACPO 1.

Suspension review transcript 1.

ACPO 2.

Suspension review Transcript 2.

And – there is yet more evidence to emerge. The case is made. At the present time, the broad, general opinion of Group 1 is based upon at least 19 items of published, key evidence.

That is 19 more than the opinion of Group 2 is based upon.

If you wish to be reasonably confident that your opinion is based upon facts – as opposed to the empty, yet relentless propaganda of the Jersey oligarchy – until and unless Group 2 begin to ‘produce the goods’ – to ‘put up or shut up’ – it is the opinion of Group 1 you must side with.

Before turning to the latest item of evidence – the second ACPO report published below – a few observations.

I’m not superstitious – but I can’t resist pointing out that – by serendipity – this happens to be the 13th Letter from Exile – and it is published on the 13th – and that amongst the many disasters for the Jersey oligarchy evidenced in this ACPO report – is Recommendation 13 and associated finding – which provides yet more compelling evidence that the Chief Constable, Graham Power QPM was carrying out his duties absolutely correctly:

“Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations.”

Incidentally, the point concerning the complaints of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice is made again at paragraph 20:

“20: The team are aware that a Member of Parliament in Jersey has made a statement alleging conspiracies, destruction of evidence and perverting the course of justice. This has been discussed with the Chief of Police in Jersey and he is to obtain legal advice regarding the allegations and will ensure that any investigation is undertaken by a different SIO than the SIO for Operation Rectangle.”

Those formal criminal complaints of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences, were made by me. I gave many lengthy and detailed statements to police officers; statements that were carefully written and formally signed and filed.

Under the leadership of Graham Power, the investigation was being handled entirely properly.

What a contrast with David Warcup. I long since gave up asking – but Warcup repeatedly refused to even tell me what has become of those complaints.

The crimes complained of, have been buried – like so many other crimes in Jersey.

As the evidence shows.

Stuart.

A.C.P.O 2

Report of the Association of Chief Police Officers, prepared for the States of Jersey Police in respect of the Historical Child Abuse Investigation.

Operation Rectangle: Haut de la Garenne, Jersey – Historical Child Abuse Investigation and possible homicide case.

Andy Baker (SOCA), Anne Harrison and John Mooney (NPIA).

1. Between the 29th February and 2nd March 2008, representatives from the Association of Chief Police Officers Homicide Working Group visited Jersey to review and advise the historical child abuse investigation and possible homicide case at Haut de la Garenne children’s home in the island. The team were appointed by Jon Stoddart, Chief Constable Durham Constabulary and Chair of the ACPO HWG. The team worked to terms of reference signed by Graham Power. Chief Officer States of Jersey Police and Andy Baker on behalf of the ACPO HWG.

2. The Senior Investigating Officer for Operation Rectangle is Deputy Chief Officer Lenny Harper. A strategic report based on the team’s findings was presented to The States of Jersey Police on the 4th March 2008; the report included 27 recommendations.

3. Mentoring – since the original visit, Andy Baker has continued to mentor Lenny Harper, Anne Harrison has continued to mentor Detective Inspector Keith Bray and John Mooney has continued to mentor Detective Sergeant Dave Hill.

4. On 7th March 2008, at the request of the Chief Minister, Frank Walker, Andy Baker and Anne Harrison visited the island and met with Mr. Walker, Wendy Kinnard (the Home Affairs Minister), Andrew Lewis (deputy to Ms Kinnard) and Bill Ogley (Chief Executive Officer in the States of Jersey). The two briefed the group and candidly answered questions they raised. A written record of the meeting is available.

5. On the 13th March 2008, Andy Baker and John Mooney visited the island. They observed the Independent Advisory Group’s first meeting, visited the Major Incident Room to assess progress therein and discussed the Investigations with a number of the team.

6. It was agreed that the team return to Jersey to monitor the 27 recommendations, to maintain the role of mentors and to identify any further work. This follow up visit took place between the 25th and 27th March 2008.

7. The recommendations from the initial visit have been acted upon, some within a very short period following delivery of the initial report. The States of Jersey Police are to be commended for their positive reception of the report and for their extremely prompt response in implementing the recommendations.

8. Action taken with the timeframes on recommendations from the initial visit.

Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and other meetings) and a minute taker of records the salient points and any decisions.

From the 4th March 2008, Vickie Ellis has been appointed minute taker and every meeting has an agenda and a record is maintained. Copies of the minutes are not yet retained on the Holmes account. This should be addressed and the deputy SIO has been reminded of this requirement.

Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.

DI Bray attends the management meetings and provides a current situation report. This is also provided to both the outside enquiry team and the MIR; a copy of all reports are held on Holmes as “other documents”.

Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting debris.

On the 4th March 2008, a mechanical sifter was borrowed from the Counter Terrorist Command at New Scotland Yard. It was in place on the 5th March in one of the sifting areas at Haut de la Garenne. The team saw this being used and it has speeded up the process.

Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. “these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.”

The SIO officer has entered a policy decision on the 13th March. The exhibits at Haut de la Garenne are retained at a secure area and the Scene Manger retains an exhibit book and log. She will provide a full statement giving account of control and movement. The Exhibits Officer retains control of all other exhibits and retains a record of movement on Holmes. The documents and files in “the cage” are exhibited in batches. When specific papers are removed, they are sub-exhibited as required with a full record on Holmes.

Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and, through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).

On the 20th March Duncan McGarry visited the MIR. He was apprised of the FLO policy from DS Dave Hill (the Office Manager). He gave advice on an FLO strategy, best practice and exit policy for victims.

Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be reviewed (or not)?

On the 18th March, the SIO recorded the policy that not all victims will be interviewed as a matter of course. They will only be interviewed if they come forward and are victims or witnesses of material evidence.

Recommendation 8: The SIO should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.

See above.

Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.

On the 15 March the SIO met with the Force legal advisor, Lawrence O’Donnell. They discussed Wateridge. He is to be re-interviewed week commencing the 24th March regarding other allegations and offences. All parties are content with this way forward.

Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.

On 19th March, the SIO detailed his arrest strategy in his policy/decision log.

Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).

The head of Social Services, Tony Le Seuer, provides full access to any files required. The enquiry team has immediate access to the files and can remove any on receipt. This process is intelligence led; in that, as the intelligence cell identifies a former worker of interest a call is made and the files searched for and recovered against receipt.

Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.

All victims and suspects are risk assessed by the officer who has the action to deal with the individual. On 25th March, the deputy SIO has provided Special Branch with details of all suspects for tracking of movement if they attempt to leave Jersey.

Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations.

Recommendation 14: That the key members of Investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from his team.

This is on-going and the key members of the enquiry have welcomed and taken the opportunity to seek advice from their respective mentors.

Recommendations 15: That the SIO, deputy SIO and Office Manager have clear demarcation of their roles and adhere to them.

As of the 10th March, when PNICC provided additional resources on mutual aid, the three key members of the enquiry work to their specific roles detailed within MIRSAP.

Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.

On 10th March, Sean Du Val was appointed temporary Deputy Chief Officer. He undertakes all the functions within that rank leaving the SIO to concentrate on Operation Rectangle.

Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents at this home, could include advisors from NSPCC or Community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.

On 19th March, a Community Impact Assessment was completed. The first meeting of the Independent Advisory Group was held on the 13th March 2008.

Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

On 7th March, an internal document was drawn up and made available to all staff.

Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader / OM / Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.

On 10th March, the MIR took over the two rooms of the MIR and the outside enquiry team moved into separate accommodation on the second floor of police headquarters. In three or four week’s time a new MIR will be made available in Broadcasting House – a nearby police rented building.

Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a “relevant” number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering message for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.

On 17th March, a dedicated Call-Centre with two staff, one a member of the enquiry team and the other a member of the NSPCC was located in the enquiry team’s office.

Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to the MIR.

From 10th March, a Receiver, Action Manager, two Readers and additional typists were dedicated to the MIR.

Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SIO to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to “For Referral” or “referred”. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to “clear the ground” from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.

The Deputy SIO and Office Manager now have a regular QA system in place (see recommendation 42)

Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be “living documents” on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence / update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.

This is now in place and the SIO is updated at management meetings regarding this action.

It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattersall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.

On 17th March Andy Tattersall visited the enquiry and met with key members of the team.

Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account.

The policy files were already on the Holmes and are available for the team to see.

Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

See recommendation 12 above.

Recommendation 26: Consideration should be give to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

A report has been submitted to the Home Affairs Minister.

Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to revisit any recommendations, the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.

This recommendation is complete.

9. Advice from Andy Tattersall – The review suggested that an SIO, experienced in a similar type of enquiry, should visit the investigation team, see how matters are being progressed and make suggestions as to how to manage the next phases of the investigation – that if there is no evidence of homicide it will then be a complex historical child abuse investigation against a number of individuals. The team acknowledges that the SIO has already prioritised the intended arrests; the team feels, however, that a structured and transparent approach will allow the Holmes account to be amended to meet the needs of the investigation and assist in the presentation of prosecution files.

10. Andy Tattersall presented a scoring matrix to prioritise and manage multiple charges against individuals at separate trials. The team have considered his comments and amended his suggestions to address the specific requirements of Operation Rectangle. This proposal allows the SIO to prioritise and manage his strategy for arrests and prosecutions. We base this on a scale of one to ten (with the higher figure being of higher value) and in four categories, being: suspect; victim(s); offence(s); and other considerations. Any category hitting a 30 – 40 figure will be the highest priority, a 20 – 30 figure the next and so on through 10 – 20 and 1 – 10. The SIO must be allowed flexibility as there may be a high number for offender yet a low number in the other categories and the risk may be too great to allow the suspect, for example, to be allowed to continue to work with children. The matrix therefore is a foundation for risk management of defendants once charged and victims / witnesses once they make their statement.

11. For suspect – working with children and access to children = 10 points; likely to escape or evade prosecution = 8 points; their status, at the time of the offence or subsequently, in the community = 6 points; their previous criminality = 4 points; and their age, health and circumstances = 2 points.

12. For victim(s) – that their account has corroboration = 10; credibility of their allegation(s) = 8; directly came to police = 6 points; third party involvement adds weight to their account, e.g. have reported what happened to a third party = 4 points; and have sought long term assistance = 2 points. There are obviously some negative aspects for victims, viz: – inconsistencies in accounts have been abused and become abusers themselves and speaking to the media (for money or otherwise).

13. For offence(s) – serious sexual assault = 10 points; serious assault (GBH) or evidence of regular abuse or systematic abuse or emotional abuse = 8 points; indecent assault = 6 points; assault occasioning ABH = 4 points; and minor assault = 2 points. Evidence of torture must be considered as an equivalent of (at least) 8 points.

14. For other considerations – legal advice to charge = 10 points; corroboration of the allegation = 8 points; independent evidence of grooming = 6 points; two or more victims making allegations against a specific suspect; and third party or media reporting that the offence took place = 2 points.

Recommendation 28: That the SIO considers a scoring matrix to manage and prioritise the arrests of any suspects.

15. As suggested by Andy Tattersall the team agrees that the SIO considers appointing a lead officer to manage each suspect, maintaining an investigation log to report progress. However, everything undertaken in this way must be recorded on Holmes for the SIO to direct and co-ordinate the strategy and way forward.

16. Andy Tattersall also recommended that the Holmes Account be sub divided to manage the prosecution against a number of defendants. See below at recommendation 39 below.

Recommendation 29: That the SIO considers appointing lead officers for each suspect and they maintain a structured investigative log for each of their designated suspects.

17. Advice from Duncan McGarry – Detective Constable Duncan McGarry, the NPIA national family liaison advisor has visited the enquiry team. He feels that the current practice of the first contact officer fulfilling the family liaison role is unsustainable in the long term. He gives reasons that a turn-over of staff (particularly from the UK) will not maintain the same liaison officer throughout the enquiry. Whilst FLOs move on and a handover does take place in many enquiries, it is more than likely that the current FLO strategy in Operation Rectangle would mean this occurring on a much more regular basis.

18. Additionally, in the absence of a coherent family liaison strategy, there is significant potential for inconsistent practice from victim to victim.

Recommendation 30: That Detective Inspector Alan Williamson or other trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator, creates and implements a family liaison strategy in accordance with the advice from DC McGarry

19. The team has asked the SIO to define the parameters of the investigation. He has confirmed that it includes: the homicide investigation at Haut de la Garenne; the historical child abuse allegations at Haut de la Garenne; a confidential allegation in respect of a high profile member of the community; any suspect who worked at Haut de la Garenne who then went on to work in child care and allegations relate to that subsequent role; any victim at Haut de la Garenne who was relocated into alternative child care and further abused; and any offence that occurred with a connection to Haut de la Garenne, e.g. day trip boat rides. It does not include any allegations of cover up, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by a public official or any other unrelated homicide or allegation of child abuse.

20. The team are aware that a Member of Parliament in Jersey has made a statement alleging conspiracies, destruction of evidence and perverting the course of justice. This has been discussed with the Chief of Police in Jersey and he is to obtain legal advice regarding the allegations and will ensure that any investigation is undertaken by a different SIO than the SIO for Operation Rectangle.

21. The homicide investigation – the piece of skull has yet to be carbon dated by LGC or their sub-contractors. It is understood that the delay has been caused by faulty machinery. A breakdown in communication obviously occurred as the SIO was unaware of this issue. LGC should be asked to note this comment and ensure that any delays in their work are brought to the attention of the SIO.

Recommendation 31: That the Crime Scene Manager and SOCO ensures that this issue has been brought to the attention of LGS management.

22. As soon as the piece of skull has been dated and forensically examined and, subject to any other intelligence that a homicide has occurred at the home, the SIO must decision log the continuance of a homicide investigation as part of Operation Rectangle or not.

Recommendation 32: That once the provenance of the piece of skull is known, the SIO decides and decision logs the continuance or not of the homicide investigation.

23. If Operation Rectangle ceases to be a homicide, the SIO should take advice to treat the piece of skull with the dignity of a religious ceremony or not. The IAG could assist him on this aspect.

Recommendation 33: If not a homicide, the SIO seeks advice from the Deputy Viscount’s office how to deal with the piece of bone.

24. The whole incident was originally declared a critical incident on the 9th December 2007. If however there is no homicide, the matter reverts to a complex historical child abuse investigation. The SIO must then reconsider declaring it a critical incident again – with IAG support, family liaison strategies and other strategies to meet that need.

Recommendation 34: If there is no homicide at Haut de la Garenne the case remains a complex historical child abuse investigation, the SIO should then reconsider declaring it a critical incident and instigate police supporting that decision.

25. Scene Management – the search has identified two further basement or cellar rooms at the home. The SIO and Crime Scene Manager are devising their strategy to search these two rooms and the courtyard. The two rooms will be dealt with in a similar fashion as the first two rooms. That is the correct course of action as this is based on victims’ allegations of abuse within the confines of those rooms. The courtyard will be searched based on indications from the blood dogs used on the site. Again, this is the correct course of action as there is no other intelligence or evidence indicating that offences were committed in these areas.

26. Forensic strategy – comment has already been made regarding the piece of skull. The search of the scene is yielding a number of exhibits – hair, blood, condom wrapper and a used condom. A forensic strategy needs to be devised to, not only examine these exhibits but to compare any DNA from victims at the home and the UK National DNA database against them. This should also include victims’ DNA comparison against the blood recovered from the scene.

Recommendation 35: A forensic strategy must be drawn up to cover all exhibits that have been recovered for comparison against victims and the UK database.

27. Bones including some scorched ones have been recovered from the home. The team should seek expert advice on how best to examine the bones and what forensic opportunities may exist, including dating when they were burnt.

Recommendation 36: The SIO must obtain expert forensic advice regarding the recovered bones from the scene.

28. Victims – There are 150 victims that have come forward and made allegations of abuse at the home. Some have expressed their confidence in the investigation; they base this on what they have seen on TV and in newspapers. However, the team fear that victims of extreme physical or sexual abuse, who may still be severely traumatised by their experience, will be reluctant to step forward. Specialist advice from a clinical psychologist with regard to construction of a sensitive media appeal may aid them in making a decision.

Recommendation 37: Through Theresa Russell, NPIA, the SIO seeks the advice of Adrian West with regard to a sensitive media appeal for reluctant victims to come forward and report crimes.

29. If severely traumatised victims do come forward, additional specialist resources may be required to receive them and arrange for their long term care.

30. The Prosecution authorities in Jersey have appointed two advocates to advise on legal issues of the investigation. The SIO is to meet with them on the 28th March 2008. This will include aspects on Wateridge and other suspects.

31. Witnesses – There may well be a number of adults who worked at the home who are not suspected of any criminal offence. These can be identified through records. The SIO should consider a strategy to encourage such potential witnesses to come forward.

Recommendation 38: That the SIO considers a strategy to encourage workers at the home to provide evidence.

32. Risk Assessments – The update of recommendation 12 was that the staff are risk assessing the victims and suspects. These must quality assured and supervised.

Recommendation 39: All risk assessments must be quality assured and supervised by the deputy SIO.

33. The Major incident Room – The receiver has returned to his home force. This creates a break in the experienced continuity within the MIR for a vital role. The Office Manager is currently undertaking this work; this is not sustainable for any prolonged period.

Recommendation 40: The SIO seeks an experienced Receiver – ideally be Monday 31st march 2008.

34. There are many ways in dividing the data held on a Holmes account to make it retrievable for specific incidents and against a number of defendants. Tags or User defined Fields (UDFs) can be used. There are no hard and fast ways of doing this but Detective Sergeant Kevin Denley, (Devon & Cornwall Office Manager in the MIR) is confident that he can arrange for the account to be structured to meet these requirements. If any further expert advice is required on this a disclosure expert such as Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall from West Midlands police should be consulted.

Recommendation 41: In conjunction with the advice from Andy Tattersall, if the enquiry is a complex historical child abuse investigation, the SIO considers how best to sub-divide the Holmes account to address individual suspects.

35. The Holmes Account – Actions: an additional 367 actions have been raised since 13th March 2008 giving an overall total of Actions of 1389. A large number of the overall actions (389) are still shown as allocated with only 8 “for referral” and 18 “referred”.

Recommendation 42: Within seven days, a full review of the incident actions is made to assess and prioritise the work of the enquiry team. This will identify areas of priority to provide the SIO THE BEST EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AGAINST SUSPECTS. This should be completed by Keith Bray and Dave Hill.

36. Other documentation – the queues for the other documentation, in particular the ODs and messages in the “Reading” queue appear to be very large (456 Messages and 526 ODs). The MIR staff are confident these have been initially “read” by the receiver for any priority Actions which are then being raised. Therefore nothing significant is being missed.

37. Dave Hill (the Action Manager) is currently quality assuring the actions returned by the enquiry team. This should cease and the quality assurance on the returned actions should be undertaken by the receiver. This will allow Dave Hill to concentrate on his role as per recommendation 42.

Recommendation 43: That the receiver receives and quality assures the returning actions from the Enquiry team.

38. Intelligence / Analysis – There are 51 suspects on the Holmes account, this includes up to 12 suspects from the Sea Cadets aspect of the early investigation, Recommendations have already been made to prioritise these suspects, risk assess them and manage the evidence for individual trials against them through the Holmes account.

39. Resources – The enquiry has now received staff from the mutual aid programme through PNICC. However, with the return of the receiver to his Force the MIR is light of a key role.

40. Once the Actions have been reviewed the SIO should reconsider is further staff is required for both the MIR and the enquiry team.

Recommendation 44: Following the review of Actions (see recommendation 41 above) the SIO reconsiders the staff requirements.

41. PNICC are currently considering the mutual aid requirements from the medium to long term. This should be in conjunction with the SIO.

Recommendation 45: The SIO should discuss medium to long term requirements with PNICC.

42. It is understood that the States of Jersey Finance department has a separate cost code for Operation Rectangle. The Chief Minister has publicly stated that the money will be made available for the investigation to be undertaken. This is separate to the annual police budget.

43. The Independent Advisory Group – the IAG consists of five members from the community. They have held two meetings to date and minutes are retained. The team sat in on the first two meetings and assisted with the advisory group role and process.

44. Governance – the Chief Officer retains the independent position to advise the politicians and wider community. This not only protects the enquiry from political interference but allows the SIO and team to focus on the enquiry.

45. Mentoring – the team will continue to advise and mentor the key players of the enquiry and intend to return in May once the handover of deputy SIO from Keith Bray to Allison Fossey takes place.

46. Other considerations – Jersey may wish to consider maintaining its own violent and sex offender register or alternatively linking in with the existing UK system and also checking the criminal records of subjects wishing to take up paid or voluntary employment with children through the UK Criminal Records Bureau.

LETTER FROM EXILE: # 12

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

BRITISH POLICING:

ITS REPUTATION –

ON THE LINE.

Association of Chief Police Officers:

Report Supports Jersey Abuse Investigation

And Chief Constable Graham Power.

So, for how much longer

Are UK Police Forces

Going to support

The criminal conduct of

The Jersey Establishment?

Readers of this blog – old, and even new – will, I’m sure have at least a basic knowledge of the history of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster, the investigations of the last three years – and the political controversy that erupted when those investigations were sabotaged by the Jersey oligarchy.

And sabotaged, they were.

Not least by the criminal, politically motivated suspension of the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force, Graham Power, Queens Police Medal.

The unprecedented events of November 2008 saw the unique – in the British Isles, at least – spectacle of two senior police officers – David Warcup and Mick Gradwell – colluding with two Jersey oligarchy politicians – Frank Walker and Andrew Lewis – in the corrupt and dishonest sabotaging of a major investigation into decades of concealed child abuse.

However – it was obvious, even at that time – to anyone who applied a little common sense and considered the facts then in the public domain – that the sabotaging of the investigation was dishonest, politically motivated – and a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.

Even then.

But from those days to this – scarcely a month has passed without yet more – and more hard evidence emerging that supports the original investigation – and further casts into incredibility the actions of the Jersey oligarchy.

Not that one would ever know it from the corrupt Jersey media – but the hard, evidenced facts have always supported the investigation.

Today sees the publication of two, further dramatic items of evidence.

I reproduce below the first report by the Association of Chief Police Officers, of March 2008. ACPO became involved, and produced this report, at the request of the team investigating the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster.

In addition, the Voice for Children site is publishing an equally remarkable document – the transcript of the first review hearing – conducted by Jersey Home Affairs Minister, Ian Le Marquand – of the unlawful suspension of Mr. Power.

The juxtaposition of the two documents – the ACPO report, and the suspension review transcript – is remarkable.

It is not difficult to tell from reading the transcript that Senator Le Marquand is a lawyer by profession – such is the degree of sophistry on display.

For Mr. Power was suspended – for the allegedly poor standard of the investigation; the investigation as reviewed and described in the ACPO report.

That his suspension – and continued suspension – is a wholly unjustified – and, frankly criminal – action becomes clear when reading the ACPO report.

What are the key characteristics of this document?

It provides an expert review of the methodology of the investigation – and its findings are positive and supportive. As one would expect in the case of any such highly complex and demanding undertaking, the ACPO report identifies and recommends certain improvements. As the second ACPO report makes clear, the ACPO team were entirely satisfied that the abuse investigation, under the leadership of Lenny Harper, had willingly and readily adopted those recommendations that were relevant – and appropriate – to the Jersey investigation circumstances.

What does NOT appear in either this ACPO report – nor the second ACPO report – is anything – even remotely capable of justifying the subsequent sabotaging of the investigation by Jersey politicians, Crown Officers and David Warcup and Mick Gradwell.

Nor – crucially – do either ACPO reports – in any way – support the Jersey oligarchy’s political and corrupt actions in suspending the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force, Graham Power, QPM.

In fact – to this day – the only, supposed, grounds for the suspension of Mr. Power and the sabotaging of the investigation – remains some kind of “interim report” or memo – supposedly written in the name of the Metropolitan Police Force, which – it is alleged – contains utter damnation of the abuse investigation.

Such implacable and extreme criticism apparently justified – allegedly – the immediate suspension of a decorated Chief Constable of unblemished professional record; an all-out political assault upon the child abuse investigation; and the public condemnation and sabotaging – by David Warcup and Mick Gradwell – of what was an on-going major police inquiry. This latter being an action that remains wholly without precedent in the entire history of modern, British policing.

And – of course – the report of the Metropolitan Police Force must be a document which examined in detail the reports of ACPO, peer-reviewed them – and utterly condemned them.

Because no serious or credible condemnation of the leadership of the States of Jersey Police Force in respect of the child abuse investigation could have been written without reviewing the ACPO reports – and finding dramatic, evidenced fault with those documents.

So – where is the report of the Metropolitan Police Force?

THE – sole – document upon which the entire condemnation and sabotaging of the Jersey child abuse investigation was based.

It couldn’t be, could it – that, in fact, no such formal report actually existed?

That no official ‘Interim Report of the Metropolitan Police’ – was produced, as opposed to, say, an incompetent and dishonest file note, or something of that nature – written by a maverick Met officer – who was doing a favour for Warcup or Gradwell?

I have to pose that question – because a Met officer involved in producing this so-called report – Brian Sweeting – quite remarkably, refused to interview key witnesses. Indeed – the “document” relied upon by Gradwell, Warcup and their Jersey oligarchy paymasters – if it actually existed – was “completed” – before several of the central figures involved in the investigation had even been contacted – let alone interviewed.

Well – one way – or another – the full truth of that whole episode is going to emerge.

That I can promise.

It seems to me that there is an increasingly unavoidable issue involved – one that grows by the week as more evidence emerges. It is this:

Just how much longer are several United Kingdom Police Forces – not least the Met and Wiltshire – going to continue to allow themselves to be used?

Used as components in what is – plainly – a criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice?

Just how much longer must this disgusting farrago continue – before the Metropolitan Police, Wilshire and several other forces – realise they have been suborned into a criminal enterprise – and publicly disown and condemn the Jersey oligarchy?

For how much longer are they – and ACPO – going to continue to have their good names tarnished – by playing along with the charade of the Jersey gangsters?

When – for the good name of British policing – are they going to publicly denounce what they have become unwittingly involved in, and instead, express public support for Graham Power?

I don’t know when the leadership of the UK police forces are going to recognise what has taken place – but I’m certainly going to try and find out – by writing to them – and making formal, evidenced complaints.

The full truth is going be exposed.

And I would really rather that my constituents were not being denied protection, by several UK police forces that have sleepwalked into the profoundly embarrassing position of – effectively – being components in a criminal conspiracy to undermine the rule of law, the purpose of which is to protect child abusers from facing justice.

In case the situation that prevails in Jersey isn’t quite clear enough, consider a few, fundamental facts.

The States of Jersey is, effectively, one organisation; an organisation that encompasses the legislature, the judiciary, the executive and the prosecution system. It has a shared purpose in always concealing embarrassing or damaging truths. As such – it is not subject to any effective checks and balances. Indeed – the impossibility of holding this oligarchy to account is starkly demonstrated in the transcript on the VFC site, and the extraordinary conduct of Senator Le Marquand.

This fact gets sometimes forgotten – but a key suspect – perhaps THE key suspect in the Jersey child abuse investigation is – the States of Jersey.

All kinds of corporate criminal offences – spread over a period of decades – both committed, and criminally concealed, by the States of Jersey.

So when we consider the criminal actions against Graham Power – and the unlawful sabotaging of the historic child abuse investigation – we are contemplating actions taken by the States of Jersey – in an un-ambiguously criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice – engaged in by the organisation, in order to shield itself from facing justice.

Are various United Kingdom police forces – including the Met – content to continue being participants in that criminality?

And should the point not yet be made clearly enough – let me suggest that readers go to the Voice for Children site – and read the transcript of the review-hearing of the suspension of Mr. Power, as conducted by Senator Ian le Marquand.

Many observations could be made about that evidence, but for the time being, I shall confine myself to two points.

It can be seen from the transcript that the States HR manager, Mick Pinel, answers a question concerning who in his department will continue to handle the case against Mr. Power in the long term. This is what he says:

“What will happen, Minister, is that I would sit with you representing the Director of H.R. (Human Resources) who is Ian Crich and who will have left his post by then. I do not know who will present the case but I think the idea is that Jane Pollard in the Human Resources Department would be the H.R. officer who would present the case.”

That is the Jane Pollard – who is the wife of the former Health & Social Services Chief Executive, Mike Pollard – who himself – as is evidenced in Graham Power’s July 2007 file note – as published in letter from Exile # 9 – engaged, along with Bill Ogley, in a criminal and anti-democratic conspiracy to engineer my dismissal from Office, in an attempt to prevent me from exposing child protection failures. The same Jane Pollard who was instrumental in commissioning and designing the Chapman report.

No checks and balances.

And what of Senator le Marquand himself? One of the most serious, well-documented and long-term acts of criminality engaged in against children by the States of Jersey – was the unlawful and abusive use of extended periods of coercive and punitive solitary confinement against already damaged and messed-up children.

These periods of criminally abusive solitary confinement would, in some cases, continue for months.

Children passing through the magistrates’ court would often be expressly sentenced in such a way as to categorise them as recipients of the unlawful solitary confinement regime. Indeed, the provision against the casual use of imprisonment against children was routinely unlawfully subverted by the magistrates’ court – who would remand children in custody – thus, de facto, sentencing them to periods of imprisonment.

Before leaving his post – and becoming elected as Senator in 2008 – Ian le Marquand was the magistrate who most rabidly pursued these criminal policies against children.

Such gross conflicts of interest – and such a startling absence of functioning checks and balances – epitomise “The Jersey Way”.

So perhaps we can’t be truly surprised that the entire criminal conspiracy to undermine and sabotage the Jersey child abuse investigation was engaged in by the Jersey oligarchy in flat, brazen defiance of such evidence as the ACPO report, reproduced below.

This positive, professional assessment stands in stark contrast to the supposed report of the Metropolitan Police – the only document the Jersey oligarchy have cited in support of their undermining of the abuse inquiry. A document which, I hear, has long-since been disowned by the Met.

Until any evidence to the contrary is made public – all intelligent and decent people must judge the situation upon the published facts; such as this ACPO report.

Stuart.

Report of the Association of Chief Police Officers, prepared for the States of Jersey Police in respect of the Historical Child Abuse Investigation.

March, 2008.

Operation Rectangle – Haute de le Garenne, Jersey

Homicide / Child Abuse Investigation

1.Initial Report – this is an initial report by the Association of Chief Police Officers Homicide Working Group’s Advice team appointed to mentor and advise Mr. Lenny Harper, the Senior Investigating Officer for Operation Rectangle. This is a strategic report based on the team’s findings when they visited Jersey from the 29th February 2008 to 2nd March 2008.

2. Mentoring – between the 23rd February 2008 and the 29th February 2008, Andy Baker has mentored and advised Lenny Harper on a needs basis by telephone from the UK. On arrival in Jersey the team visited the crime scene at Haute de la Garenne.

2.2 The team attended the morning meeting / briefing chaired by Mr Harper. The investigation is focused on searching and exhibit recovery at the former care home. This is the correct approach – it allows for recovery of exhibits and evidence, corroboration of accounts and allegations being made by witnesses and victims and ensures that public reassurance is addressed as to the integrity of the investigation. The morning management meeting / briefing was open and allowed for all attendees to contribute. Some observations were made resulting in the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and other meetings) and a minute taker records the salient points and any decisions and any actions arising.

Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.

3. The search parameters / crime scene management.

3.1 The whole scene is well cordoned off and the media corralled in an area away from the entrance to the site. Although some cameramen had gained access to private accommodation and public land overlooking the external excavation areas to the rear of the site. There is good use of the parish police in controlling the cordons. A record is kept of everyone entering and leaving the grounds. High visibility policing is clear and sufficient control rooms, lighting and scene tents are available where required.

3.2 The Crime Scene Manager (Vicky Coupland) referred to the whole site as the crime scene and focused on the cellar rooms in particular.

3.3 At the morning meeting / briefing they discussed the incident where reports suggest that human bones were found in 2003 and shown to the pathologist who decided they were in fact animal bones. The builder however has since reported that he felt that some were human bones. The existence of the bones were not immediately brought to the attention of the police back in 2003. That specific allegation is not being investigated at the current time but the information is being used to assist with the areas to be excavated and searched by the team. This is the correct approach as the team must focus on the child abuse allegations and the homicide investigation – with relation to the partial piece of a child’s cranium (skull) and not be diverted into other areas.

3.4 The team also attended a briefing for the officers undertaking excavation and fingertip search. This was given by Vicky Coupland (the Crime Scene Manager), Julie Roberts (Forensic Anthropologist), Carl Harrison (Archaeologist) and Martin Grimes (Search Expert / Human Remains Dog Handler). This was a thorough briefing that covered requirements, what is to be looked for and what action to be taken if anything was found or any questions raised. This is a good use of scientific expertise and reassures the officers undertaking the dig to be thorough and raise any concerns however apparently irrelevant or small.

3.5 The Archaeology / Anthropology recovery and identification will take a long time with the current process being undertaken manually. Is it possible to speed this up via another process, e.g. mechanical sifter in a production line basis staffed by police and being supervised by Archaeologist / Anthropologist?
Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting debris.

4. Forensic and exhibits strategies.

4.1 The SIO has a Forensic / Exhibit Policy book. This was read and is being completed in the correct fashion. The Crime Scene Manager is packaging any exhibits and recording them at the scene. However, following a visit to the Major Incident Room (MIR), where the team spoke to the disclosure / exhibit officer, it was soon identified that there are in fact three exhibit stores. One at the scene (managed by the Crime Scene Manager), one on police premises off-site (the cage) and one secure store within the MIR. There is also a freezer in the MIR that has a young female’s femur retained therein. The exhibit officer is correctly entering exhibit details in the Holmes account. He has not however recorded details of the 16 exhibits held by the Crime Scene Manager at the care home. These have been requested but the Crime Scene Manager wants to submit a full and inclusive statement once the scene examination and exhibit recovery is completed. This should be recorded as policy in the policy book and can be attended to in another manner.

Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. “these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.”

5. Witness and victim strategies — specifically interview and Family Liaison Officers / Family Liaison Coordinators

5.1 There is good practice identified from the Witness / Victim policy book. These include – an integrity promise form (between the police and the witness); initial research and risk assessment of potential witnesses; and risk assessment of witnesses.

5.2 The enquiry has vetted all staff to ensure they were not residents at the care home.

5.3 Currently, the first police officer having contact with any victim is being considered and appointed as their family liaison officer. They may well be untrained in this demanding role. It is understandable why this decision was made but should be reviewed for the following reasons: if the first officer will now often be a contractor from the UK or a police officer on mutual aid and may not be on the enquiry for an extended period; the numbers of victims are growing; many victims will become significant and will be engaged with for a prolonged period through trial; and some victims may subsequently suffer as a result of coming forward, giving a statement or giving evidence (that may be over a prolonged period of time).

Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and, through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).

5.5 The use of the NSPCC for both third party recording and ongoing care and referral for counselling is good practice.

5.6 The SIO has amended the process for evidential capture from the victims. Originally it was by way of Audio / Video interview with a covering statement but was amended to now also be followed with a full written statement. Subject to the Law of Evidence in Jersey. The SIO should review this position and ensure that this is duly recorded in the policy log as presently there is confusion within the team and in the logs. This team provided the deputy SIO with advice papers on such strategies.

Recommendation 6: That the SlO ensures that his policy for presenting victims’ evidence to the courts is recorded in the policy log. Further advice can be obtained from Gary Shaw National Interview Advisor (NPIA) through Teresa Russell.

5.7 The enquiry team have been contacted by victims from all over the World. Enquiry officers have travelled to Australia and victims now live in the USA. Thailand and other countries. There is no apparent policy for dealing with victims who live off the Island, in the UK or beyond.

5.8 The Cage exhibit room holds a high volume of care home residents’ files. These are taken and added to the Holmes account and exhibited as and when the witness comes forward to police. What is the strategy regarding interviewing all residents (or not)?

Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be interviewed (or not)?

Recommendation 8: The SI0 should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.

6. Arrest and prosecution strategies (police perspective only)

6.1 Policy decision 2 details the investigation threshold of ‘serious indictable offences’. This is good practice at an early stage which allows the team to focus on the most serious offences and not be diverted by minor assaults that could have amounted to ‘the moderate correction of a child’.

6.2 One suspect – Wateridge has already been charged with criminal offences of indecent assault based on multiple victims and similar fact evidence. The team do not question this decision but raise a concern if this individual was in fact a more serious offender and is arraigned before all allegations are received.

Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.

6.3 The SIO has publicly stated that arrests will be made following a full and thorough investigation of any allegation. The arrest strategy must be recorded in the policy files.

Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.

6.4 The existence (or not) of care workers files who were employed at the home is unclear. Where are the files of all the care workers at the home?

Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).

6.5 The excavation and abuse allegations may well take a protracted period of time. The victims and suspects will reflect on the incidents and allegations and both may well come under some pressure and the latter may well flee and hide in countries around the world. The SIO must give some consideration to these possibilities.

Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.

7. Governance of the Investigation

Resilience —

7.1 Other than from a supervisory and responsibility standpoint Mr Graham Power Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police is not involved in the actual investigation. He is, and has been, responsible for attending to any issues of a political nature or in an advisory capacity to the Chief Minister, Ministers and politicians. It is very important that this continues to protect the investigation and allow for the investigation to be unfettered by any demands.

Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

7.2 The SIO (Lenny Harper), Deputy SIO (Keith Bray) and Office Manager (Detective Sergeant Dave Hill) have high demands on them as individuals and their time is spread thinly. To aid them and provide an independent sounding board Andy Baker has offered to continue mentoring the SIO; Anne Harrison has offered to mentor Keith Bray; and John Mooney has offered to mentor Dave Hill.

Recommendation 14: That key members of investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from this team.

7.3 The SIO is responsible for the strategic direction of the investigation. He makes and records the decisions. Quite rightly he is focusing on the scene and the high media demands. However, he is still undertaking his role as deputy chief officer and this is making excessive demands on him. The deputy SIO must take responsibility for the MIR and the inquiry team. He is responsible for ensuring that the SIO is informed of all matters important so he can, in turn, make decisions and direct the investigation. The deputy SIO must also co-ordinate the briefing material for the SIO and the other lead role players as well as keeping the team apprised of developments and that everything is correctly recorded on the Holmes system. The Office Manager is responsible for the management of the Holmes suite. These roles must be adhered to and resilience provided.

Recommendation 15: That the SIO, deputy SIO and Office Manager are allowed to concentrate on their roles and multi tasking of them is avoided.

Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone to temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.

7.4 It is understood that the current deputy SIO, Keith Bray, is to retire in May 2008. Arrangements are in hand to ensure he is replaced by Detective Inspector Allison Fossey. This is good succession planning.

7.5 There are presently thirteen staff on the inquiry team but arrangements are in hand for an additional twelve detectives to be attached from the UK. The investigation was declared a critical incident and a Cat A+ by the SIO – decision number 8. He also decided not to hold a Gold Strategy group or complete a Community Impact Assessment (CIA). The reasons for the lack of a CIA are shown with regard to his concerns of possible suspects in public offices. A CIA can be wholly internal to the police and one should be considered. To assist such an Independent Advisory Group could be convened for this specific investigation / enquiry. This team are more than content to assist with this proposal.

Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents at this home, could include advisors from the NSPCC or community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.

Media Strategy

8.1 There is a media policy file and press cuttings are collated and retained.

8.2 In viewing the media cuttings, there is clear evidence of witnesses providing accounts of what occurred in the home and there exists wide media speculation (even some of the graphics of the cellar area are incorrect). The SIO has, wherever possible, refuted wide suggestions and, at appropriate times, refused to confirm sensitive information to minimise sensationalism.

8.2 The investigation has three media officers to provide resilience and cover. This meets the demand and can be reviewed as and when that demand changes. The media managers must ensure they: pre-brief the media as to their expectations at any conference — what will happen, how questions are to be asked (introducing themselves by name and organisation), how many questions or period of time allowed for questions (NB; this is partly covered in the media policy file) and make comprehensive notes of what is said and by whom to the media.

8.3 During the briefing that this team attended on the 1st March 2008 possible interference with witnesses was raised and discussed in some detail. The advice team felt that a hard stance should be taken on this specific issue to reassure any victims and potential witnesses that they will be protected and that the law will prevail. The SIO was advised accordingly. It is worthy of note that at his first opportunity provided at the first media interview and subsequent briefings on the 1st March that the police position on any interference was strongly outlined. The media have reported this position and the IAG could be invited to for a view in any future situations.

8.4 The SIO has retained an open mind with regard to the piece of skull that was recovered. He acknowledges that it could be quite dated not be from a murder. He is treating the case as a homicide investigation until he can prove otherwise. The piece of a child’s skull was found in suspicious circumstances and the SIO was correct to state to the media that this was a homicide investigation but that the human remains may be found to be not subject of any violent act. Forensic test to identify the piece of bone may take another four weeks (carbon dating and subsequent DNA). The circumstances as to its provenance may then be clearer. He still, however, leads an investigation into a number of allegations with regard to children going missing, a history of recovered and discarded human bones and an extremely complex historical child abuse investigation. Until the contrary is proved, the SIO is dealing with allegations of homicide, serious sexual assaults and prolonged periods of child abuse within a care home.

8.5 Internal media to keep all staff up-to-date is important. The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

9. The HOLMES Suite and Account

General Comments

9.1 The team visited the Major Incident Room (MIR) on 1 March 2008. The MIR was effectively closed over the weekend.

9.2 They met Detective Inspector Keith Bray (the deputy SIO); Detective Sergeant Dave Hill (the Office Manager); Bob de La Cour (Disclosure / Exhibit officer); Tony Williams (Analyst); and Lynn Lang (Intelligence Officer).

9.3 Sergeant Hill has been given the responsibility of the Office Manager, Receiver and Action Manager within the MIR. He is also responsible for supervision of some of the outside enquiry team. Sergeant Hill showed enthusiasm, dedication and is obviously keen and willing to learn given the duties he has taken on.

9.4 The basic MIR organisation is Devon and Cornwall based with D&C officers assisting in staffing the MIR. They also gave Sgt Hill ‘on the job’ training (believed to be three days for a two week course) to perform the roles he is now undertaking within the MIR.

9.5 The incident was created from a combination of smaller enquiries involving the care home at Haute de la Garenne. The incident has been given the Operational name ‘Operation Rectangle – Jersey Historic Child Abuse’. States of Jersey Police do not have their own HOLMES 2 system and therefore are linked back to Devon and Cornwall’s server.

9.6 The staff within the MIR, in addition to Sgt H, consists of a Document Reader, 2 Indexers, a Disclosure / Exhibits officer and a typist. The staff is a mix of D&C staff, States of Jersey personnel and agency staff.

9.7 The SIO’s policy file has not been entered onto the HOLMES account to date. The Indexers Policy File is based on a generic D&C Indexers Policy File with inserts for the specific Incident. The initial enquiry required a fairly large Back Record Conversation (BRC) to allow all of the Documentation to be viewable and searchable on HOLMES. It is anticipated this was carried out on recommendation by experienced D&C staff and although laborious assists in pump-priming the incident.

9.8 The initial view of the incident statistics shows the main ones as:
• 740 Nominals;
• 599 Actions; and
• A total number of 1342 Documents including 888 Other Documents (mostly from the BRC).

9.9 It is apparent, from the Documents awaiting processing that additional staff are required to assist a decent volume of flow for the incident documentation.

9.10 Currently the flow for the volume of documentation appears to be bottle-necked at:
a) – the Receivers ‘in tray: and
b) – the Management of Actions. i.e. what is relevant to current Lines of Enquiry.

9.11 As an example, at the time of viewing the Action Queue Manager (AQM) there are 222 Actions For Allocation and approximately 200 Allocated to the fairly small enquiry team. It also shows only 1 ‘For Referrer and 18 Referred’. Managing Actions is ultimately the responsibility of the SIO. However given the complexity of the Incident overall it is suggested that the Deputy SIO could be delegated this responsibility in conjunction with a dedicated Action Manager (see below) to alleviate this task and thus provide a means of prioritising the Actions to the Lines of Enquiry identified.

9.12 It was also noted that some 100+ Messages await processing in the in tray of the Receiver, together with Returned Actions that also contain additional documentation. This will generate another batch of Actions that will require rigorous management by the Deputy SIO and Action Manager.

9.13 The SIO is aware of a requirement to provide additional resources and has set this process in motion via letters to address this situation. To date these relate to twelve outside inquiry officers and four more indexers. However, more staff are required in the roles of Receiver, Action Allocator and Typists.

9.14 The MIR staff and Enquiry team also take calls from the freephone helpline, often from Victims / Witnesses that will generate additional work. They may also become the designated FLO as they could be the first contact officer. This is a very important aspect of the enquiry but does not assist the efficiency of the MIR flow.

9.15 Currently the MIR sits beside the enquiry team and also acts as the centre for calls as a result of the freephone appeal for Victims and Witnesses. On visiting the MIR Sgt H who performs the combined roles of OM, Receiver, Action Manager, took at least 6 calls from members of the public, some of whom were clearly distressed. Whilst he dealt with the calls in a very sympathetic and expert manner, it obviously detracts from his core duties of running the MIR.

Initial Recommendations In Relation to the MIR

Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader / OM / Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.

Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a “relevant” number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering message for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.

Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to the MIR.

Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SIO to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to “For Referral” or “referred”. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to “clear the ground” from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.

Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be “living documents” on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence / update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.

9.16 There are potential issues of multi case elements, e g. separate charges and prosecutions. Within the MIR everything is contained on the one incident that could generate a number of separate prosecutions. The work required around issues such as Disclosure and how it is separated will become very important. If there is no plan towards how to separate the individual files this may cause problems and additional work at a later date.

9.17 There will inevitably be ‘cross-overs’ of Nominals who will be abused, abusers and witnesses. This will add to the complexities of separating out the different Investigations.

It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattrshall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are Invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.

Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account so staff are able to access them.

10. Analysis strategy / procedures.

10.1 There is a dedicated intelligence cell with a robust procedure to ensure that information is protected but still recorded on the Holmes account.

10.2 The analyst has utilised 12 to good effect in producing timelines of residents at the care home, linkage charts of victims, suspects etc. He has the capacity to make more rapid progress but is impeded due to speed with which information is being typed into the system and the lack of confirmed staff / suspect information.

10.3 The enquiry will benefit from some of his work being displayed in both the MIR and the enquiry team’s office.

11. Any other relevant strategy that needs to be considered.

11.1 It is understood that there is one victim from the home who may be wanted for child abuse offences within the London area. The investigation team should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

11.2 There is a lack of trained staff within the MIR, e.g. Sgt Hill and the Analyst limited to on the job training received (not HOLMES trained). Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

Recommendation 26: Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to review progress of the recommendations, revisit the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.

This team — Andy Baker (SOCA), Anne Harrison and John Mooney (NPIA).

LETTER FROM EXILE: # 11

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM

FROM REALITY.

‘TEACHERS’ PERKS’.

“PIERS BAKER alleged he was unable to provide any information but made an outrageous comment that DYKES had abused the pupils in payment for the time he provided in taking pupils sailing.”

Police Officer Anton Cornelissen
E-Mail: 06/08/2007.

How Difficult is it

To Investigate Child Abuse In Jersey?

Near Impossible.

The Abusers and Concealers of Abuse

Claim They’re Being “Bullied”;

The Investigators are Oppressed.

Under the previous posting we’ve had quite a discussion concerning the facts as revealed in the sworn affidavit of the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force, Graham Power, QPM.

A fundamental truth distinguishes that document – from the reams of guff churned out by the Jersey oligarchy, their spin-doctors, and their Friends at Court at Whitehall.

It is a sworn statement – willingly made to court – and based upon a constellation of hard, supporting evidence; of facts.

Just how many sworn statements have the Jersey oligarchy politicians and their corrupt senior civil servants been prepared to produce?

None – so far as I am aware. Instead, it has been sophistry, half-truths, spin and out-right lies.

Mr. Power is – plainly – a man of the utmost integrity, calibre and professionalism. He is also a nationally respected Chief Constable and recipient of the Queens Police Medal.

Yet – there he is; unlawfully and corruptly suspended from his post by a halfwit politician and a corrupt, politicised civil servant.

And with no remedy or protection available to him from any part of Jersey’s public administration.

Mr. Power has been bullied. Just as the last decent Jersey Home Affairs Minister, Wendy Kinnard was bullied.

Just as have been so many other decent people in Jersey – who try to do what is right.

Yet – in a Kafkaesque inversion of how things should be in a decent society – it is the victims of bullying – of oppression – who are labelled and damned as ‘bullies’ – whilst those who claim to be victims, are, in fact, the real bullies.

This woeful phenomenon is not, of course, unique to Jersey; one finds it, to an extent, in all societies.

But in Jersey – just so Orwellian has been the hi-jacking of the phrase – that to try and protect children from being battered and raped – to try and bring the perpetrators to justice – is to be dammed by the island’s public authorities for “bullying” the attackers and those who have concealed the attackers’ crimes.

And so pernicious is this culture – so ingrained and maintained by a culture of fear – that it permeates all levels of public administration.

The Jersey oligarchy have – for so long – enjoyed a sense of utter invulnerability, that they have never felt deterred from oppressing and bullying even highly placed individuals; indeed – all the better to make an example of a few high-profile people – to keep the rabble in line.

So readers of this blog will be very familiar with the bullying and oppression visited upon people such as Mr. Power, Simon Bellwood, John Day and me.

But if it’s that bad in Jersey for those of us who have at least been in a position to fight back – just how bad is it for the average, decent person trying to do a good, ethical job?

I scarcely have the words or space to begin doing justice to that question.

It is so bad – you simply couldn’t make it up.

And in this posting I’m going to produce yet another item of evidence which illustrates that fact.

I reproduce below an e-mail which was written by a decent, honest Jersey cop, in which he recounted to a senior Officer his experiences of attempting to investigate and deal with the many years of concealed child abuse at Jersey’s leading private school, Victoria College.

That whole, disgusting and wretched episode is examined in detail in the Sharp report – which is on the web. There is a direct link to it from my blog.

The e-mail I reproduce below was written by Detective Constable Anton Cornelissen to help the more recent historic child abuse investigation understand just how so much of this foulness can have been tolerated and concealed – the victims gone unprotected – and the crimes unpunished – for so many decades.

The e-mail speaks for itself. However – certain points deserve particular note. The fact that certain senior Officers at that time socialised with the abuser, Andrew Jervis-Dykes; the fact that they failed to declare that conflict of interests; the fact they refused to permit DC Cornelissen to even view the Yacht Club log book.

The fact that – “the Police were under pressure to drop the investigation as it was harming the reputation of the College”.

The fact that DC Cornelissen – “personally received threats and promises that [his] career would be hampered.”

The fact that – “certain exhibits went missing from the file”.

The fact that DC Cornelissen – “felt very uncomfortable. [he] would protest that the information was confidential but would be met with threats of rank.”

The fact that his – “secondment to [the] Child Protection Team was terminated and [he was] returned to shift. This caused such a surprise [to] the duty Sergeants”.

What is that – if not a regime of bullying?

Worse – a regime of bullying that actually involves criminal acts and motivations?

And – worse yet – a regime of bullying that is expressly designed to protect foul individuals who have abused children?

Just how much worse does “bullying” get – than adults sexually molesting children?

Certainly, bullying and oppressing those who are trying to protect children must get pretty close.

If the weakest and most vulnerable members of society cannot be defended without their protectors running the gauntlet of oppression themselves – then we have a system which actively generates elevated levels of danger for already vulnerable children.

It cannot be anything other than inimical to the public good that in Jersey the dangerous are protected. And by ‘dangerous’ – I do not mean only those who actually attack children; I also mean those who would – and do – conceal such crimes.

They, too – are dangerous – in that they protect the abusers.

And in that context, we must ask what – in the name of all that’s good – can any civilised person make of Piers Baker’s response when asked by DC Cornelissen to assist in identifying the boys who were being sexually abused in the video footage seized by the police from the house of Jervis-Dykes?

“Towards the end of my secondment, the DS in CPT was DS Roger PRYKE. I invited Mr. Piers BAKER the deputy headmaster of Victoria College into the CPT in order to view certain images previously seized from DYKES; this with a view to identifying the pupils obviously being abused. BAKER alleged he was unable to provide any information but made an outrageous comment that DYKES had abused the pupils in payment for the time he provided in taking pupils sailing.”

People will need to read the Sharp report to really fully understand just how reprehensible and dangerous was the conduct of Piers Baker – his repeated, pro-active and wilful obstructions of the police investigation.

But even without that reading – any decent person will find it staggering, as did I –that Baker – a man who was the head of the junior school – could blithely quote a colleague – who regarded sexually abusing children as, somehow, a kind of “payment”, for the time he was providing.

And bear in mind – this was not some information speedily volunteered to the police – to warn them of the dangers Jervis-Dykes posed. This was the infamous, casual, “teachers’ perks” observation – finally made by Baker at one point, during months of obstructions and refusals to co-operate with the police.

These events have, naturally, been denied by Baker. Nevertheless, he had to resign from the school in disgrace.

But – whom do we believe?

Piers Baker – a Jersey oligarchy man – supported by the full might of the conflicted Jersey judiciary – and a load of powerfully–placed bent cops?

Or a decent, honest police officer – who had no motive to invent such things – on the contrary, a person who – by doing the right thing and being honest, knew perfectly well all he would incur would be the wrath, bullying and oppressions of his bent seniors?

As DC Cornelissen remarks in this e-mail, “The only person who supported me in the action was Barry FAUDEMER.” And, ” I have no doubt that if it were not for Barry FAUDEMER supporting me, then I would have been in hot water.”

Here is the full e-mail:

“From: Cornelissen, Anton
Sent: 6th August 2007 15:17
To: Fossey, Alison

Ma’am,

Further to our earlier conversation, as requested I confirm in writing what I have alleged.

In 1996 I was deployed to B shift under Derek UPTON. I was seconded for a time to the Child Protection Team where Barry FAUDEMER was the DS and John DE LA HAYE the DI.

I took on an investigation concerning Mr. Andrew JERVIS-DYKES a Teacher at Victoria College who had allegedly assaulted students whilst either on Combined Cadet Force (Navy Section) outings or when taking pupils sailing either in and around Jersey or Greece. DYKES was later convicted of numerous indecent assaults committed on the pupils and possession of indecent images of children (pupils at Victoria College.)

During the investigation I had cause to conduct enquiries at the St Helier Yacht Club situated at South Pier. It was alleged that Dykes took pupils to the Club to socialise and teach them navigation. He would also supply them with alcohol. Unfortunately having made my intentions known, I was prevented by DE LA HAYE to attend at the Yacht Club without his presence. On attending there, DE LA HAYE viewed the Club log book/register and provided me with certain dates that DYKES had attended there. I was not allowed to attend at the Club without his presence, or to view the log book.

As the Club Secretary and Chairman were very much on-side, and not understanding the reasons as to why I was prevented from viewing the log book, I attended at the Club where the Secretary allowed me to view the log book. I then discovered that a group of senior officers frequently attended at the Yacht Club together, and who were apparently sailing buddies. From memory I seem to recall those officers documented were Rolly JONES, Trevor GARRETT and DE LA HAYE. I seem to recall discovering that at times when the officers had attended at the Club, DYKES was also present with students.

It is worthy of note that due to the high profile of the investigation, the Police were under pressure to drop the investigation as it was harming the reputation of the College. I personally received threats and promises that my career would be hampered. In addition certain exhibits went missing from the file. This resulted in the file being locked in the DI’s (then Barry FAUDEMER) office at the end of each day.

Derek UPTON would press me for an update of the investigation at every opportunity, and which I felt very uncomfortable. I would protest that the information was confidential but would be met with threats of rank. Then despite being up to full strength on shift, on the insistence of UPTON my secondment to CPT was terminated and I returned to shift. This caused such a surprise that the duty Sergeants on shift that to make a point they decided to have a shift photograph. The Sergeants Andy CROWEL and Gary PASHLEY could not understand the reasons for my return especially as the investigation into Victoria College had escalated.

Towards the end of my secondment, the DS in CPT was DS Roger PRYKE. I invited Mr. Piers BAKER the deputy headmaster of Victoria College into the CPT in order to view certain images previously seized from DYKES; this with a view to identifying the pupils obviously being abused. BAKER alleged he was unable to provide any information but made an outrageous comment that DYKES had abused the pupils in payment for the time he provided in taking pupils sailing. The Headmaster Jack HYDES was subsequently dismissed from the College and BAKER requested to resign. BAKER and HYDES instigated civil proceedings against me as I disclosed the comment BAKER made to me to PRYKE, and in my report summary. The only person who supported me in the action was Barry FAUDEMER.

It is worthy of note that DE LA HAYE and PRYKE were friends. At no time did PRYKE disclose that he was also a neighbour and a personal friend to BAKER. During the investigation PRYKE denied categorically that I informed him about the comment that BAKER made. I have no doubt that if it were not for Barry FAUDEMER supporting me, then I would have been in hot water.

I provide this information in all good faith, but due to the passage of time, I can not be absolutely certain of the facts.

Anton Cornelissen

07/08/2007″

The e-mail of a man who was intimidated, obstructed, taken off of Child Protection, put on shift – and generally bullied – for trying to expose and bring to justice child abusers.

Child abusers who seemed to find nothing remarkable in the concept that their crimes against children should be regarded as “payment” – for taking them on sailing trips.

As a commenter observed under the previous posting – we never really did find out for sure – just who was holding the camera – and who was committing the abuse.

Another tragically characteristic feature of this disgusting sequence of events – so typical of “The Jersey Way” – is the complete failure of many of those involved to declare their conflicts of interest. De La Haye and others – not declaring the fact they frequented the Yacht Club.

And, in particular, the truly startling failure of DS Roger Pryke to declare the fact that he was a neighbour and close friend of Piers Baker.

The late Roger Pryke being the husband of Deputy Anne Pryke – the current Minister for Health & Social Services – and thus THE politician with political and legal responsibility for child protection in Jersey.

Can a person who is a family friend of a creature like Baker – be remotely regarded as a suitable person to be responsible for child protection in Jersey?

Of course – she cannot. And the concern is not merely theoretical.

Already she has demonstrated herself to be utterly unwilling and incapable of properly addressing the culture of child protection failure in Jersey.

For example – voting against the promised Public Inquiry into the child protection disaster.

It is also worthy of note – that Deputy Pryke exhibited exactly the same failures as her late husband in respect of not declaring the conflict of interest. At the very least – she should have declared to the States assembly that she was acquainted with Baker when she was a candidate for the post of H & SS Minister.

The fact that she didn’t – is yet more wretched evidence of the toxic “Jersey Way” at work.

Why did those children have to suffer?

Why do the interests of the weak and vulnerable in Jersey – always have to come a distant second to various cabals of friends, families, colleagues, and other factions and cliques with shared interests and common purposes?

Perhaps the vulnerable have suffered – do suffer – and will continue to suffer – because anyone who tries to do what is right – to stand up to the ‘Jersey Firm’ is – in Orwellian Newspeak – condemned as a “bully”, whilst being bullied into silence themselves?

What hope can the real victims of crime have, when decent cops in Jersey, who try to do the right thing – try to act professionally – are dicing with their careers? When they can’t be free of fear and the threat of bullying – and have to gamble in a kind of lottery that they’ll happen to have a senior Officer on their side to protect them?

Graham Power and Lenny Harper did much to try and stamp-out the culture of bullying in the force when they came to Jersey, which is one of the reasons why they are – and Lenny in particular is – so hated by the old-fashioned bent faction of Jersey cops.

However, the episode described by DC Cornelissen happened before either Mr. Power or Mr. Harper were in post in Jersey. He was lucky – as his e-mail makes clear – in having the support of Barry Faudemer, who – back then, at least, as people have said to me – was one of the good guys. Whether he still is – is open to question given his 2009 statements in respect of the ‘Nurse M’ case. We shall see. But – perhaps then, he too has been bullied?

But – of course – in Jersey, it isn’t only the comparatively powerless who get oppressed and bullied. Such is the entrenched and – hitherto – invulnerable might of the Jersey oligarchy, they’ve been able to oppress pretty much anyone – including the decorated Chief Constable and the senior Senator.

And it is such outcomes which provide the great illustration of what it is we’re dealing with. You doubt the stagnation, the dangerousness, the bullying, the corruption of “The Jersey Way”?

Let us compare and contrast some actual personal cases.

Example 1:

John Day: An innocent man – scapegoated for a disaster caused by gross, management failings at H & SS. Excluded for three years.

Richard Jouault: One of the key, culpable mangers. Escapes all sanction, and promoted to Acting Chief Executive.

Example 2:

Graham Power: Chief Constable: unlawfully suspended – without a trace of proper due process – and in defiance of the evidenced facts – because the Jersey oligarchy needed to bury the child abuse investigation. Remains suspended to this day.

David Warcup: Demonstrable liar, admitted destroying evidence, conspired to pervert the course of justice and engaged in a calculated act of sabotage against the child abuse investigation of such recklessness it remains without precedent in all modern British policing. Promoted to Acting Chief Officer.

Example 3:

Simon Bellwood: Professional and ethical social worker. Objected to unlawful and abusive solitary confinement regime being used against vulnerable children in custody. Bullied, oppressed, unfairly dismissed.

Joe Kennedy: Simon’s manager. Liar, bully, oversaw, endorsed and routinely carried out the psychologically tortuous and criminal coercive solitary confinement regime against children. Interfered in a promotion to give the job to a woman he was having an affair with, over a superior candidate. Restored to post and in receipt of several pay-rises.

Example 4:

Me: Trying to secure improvements in child protection, and trying to prevent my elderly constituents from being murdered. Had to uncover various child protection failings under my own initiative, in the teeth of opposition from my own senior civil servants; was mislead by omission, obstructed, lied to, plotted against, lied about, bullied, oppressed – and ultimately raided, arrested, prosecuted, denied legal representation, and even denied a public interest disclosure defence. Shortly to be unlawfully driven from Office, made unemployed. No official protection. Zero pension.

Piers Baker: Knew of, but yet concealed – for years – complaints of child abuse at Victoria College. Went on sailing trips with the abuser and groups of boys. Allowed the abuser to get them intoxicated and behave inappropriately with them. Not only failed to report the issues to the police – but when the police did become involved – pro-actively obstructed them. Apparently saw nothing problematic in a colleague regarding the abusing of children as “payment” for taking them sailing and regarded it as “teachers perks”. Although had to resign in disgrace from Victoria College, quickly re-habilitated by the Jersey oligarchy – into a bullet-proof, very highly paid job at the Harbours Department – with a gold-plated pension.

And where – amongst other things – he has strategic responsibility for the protection of children at sea.

Just who – in truth – are the bullies – and who are the bullied in Jersey?

George Orwell would see the truth.

Stuart.