Monthly Archives: September 2010

THE 7.00 A.M AFFIDAVIT

The Journey to Strasbourg Begins

“To get through the hardest journey we need take only one step at a time, but we must keep on stepping”

“I haven’t a clue as to how my story will end. But that’s all right. When you set out on a journey and night covers the road, you don’t conclude the road has vanished. And how else could we discover the stars?”

Monday morning – weekend flitted by in rest, joy or anti-climax – another five days of work begin to loom at the horizon’s brim of consciousness as the alarm clock blips and glacks vehemently into the cloud of rest; it might be raining outside; you hit the snooze-button and begin to engage, psychologically, with the day’s preparations. Is there enough milk for breakfast – how many attempts will it take to persuade the children to get ready for school – is the day’s work going to be boring, challenging – thinking of the people you’ll be working with, nice, nasty, or just flatly bizarre? The tolling slow-motion tumult of mundanity coalesces on its territory – Monday morning.

7.00 A.M – Monday morning – but somewhere – something else – something unusual – is happening in the small, quasi-self-governing island of Jersey. Amidst the predictability, a process – a journey – will be beginning; a journey that has at its end the long over-due destruction of a captured and corrupted power structure; an overlapped and conflicted system of governance that has enabled the entrenched local oligarchy to run Jersey in ways that are utterly lawless – to serve their own ends – for over 800 years.

Strasbourg – here we come.

Yes, a small piece of history will occur – in Jersey’s Royal Court at 7.00 A.M tomorrow morning – when the court convenes to hear and dispose of my judicial review application, by which I have sought to have the court fulfil the role of providing scrutiny and oversight of the unlawful and corrupt activities and abuses of power of the conflicted Office of Jersey Attorney General; the island’s sole prosecutory authority.

An authority that is nothing more than a legally empowered wing of the corrupt set of gangsters who rule Jersey; a prosecution system that protects the entrenched establishment by letting off the criminals who are on their side – or those who to prosecute would be terribly embarrassing – and, instead, criminally abuses it prosecutory powers to oppress opposition politicians and other dissidents.

The magnificent apparatus of Jersey’s Royal Court has decided – in its wisdom – that convening the entire show – at 7.00 A.M on Monday morning – is vitally necessary; because if they didn’t – well, that would mean the petty process in Jersey’s Magistrates’ court against me might have to be adjourned for a day – or even a morning.

And we just couldn’t have that now – could we?

Because – well, hell – we all know copies of the Napier report are floating around, and – who knows – it might have certain findings in it, which could give strength to my abuse-of-process argument – which the oligarchy are absolutely and indecently determined will be disposed of on Monday morning in the Magistrates court.

Just in case I should obtain a copy of Napier.

And – as they’ve gone to so much trouble – deeply embarrassing trouble – to expressly deny me disclosure of known evidence I need to prove the abuse-of-process argument – and deny me access to other  evidence that would strengthen my public interest disclosure defence – and have even deemed all such evidence “inadmissible” – it wouldn’t look too clever if some material got published which showed them to be a load of crooks – especially people such as Dave Warcup and Mick Gradwell.

The two cops who led the politically oppressive actions against me.

I guess when you’ve already conducted yourselves in such extraordinary ways – you may as well have lit a bonfire of a thousand copies of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Royal Square – convening the Royal Court to throw out a judicial review application at 7.00 A.M – when few – if anyone – will be around to come and watch – and listen to what is said – just seems a normal and natural thing to do?

But – have no fear!

That 7.00 A.M, court hearing – just too much of a freaky intrusion into your Monday morning?

Exclusively – to the Quite Vile Blog – you can read my 65 page affidavit – which is published below!

And pay attention now. This is a sworn affidavit – that is before Jersey’s Royal Court – and is forming the very core of a fundamentally important examination of public law – of public policy – of human rights – of power – in Jersey.

So – read it carefully – and remember – it is a sworn affidavit – so if I have lied in it – why, we all expect – don’t we – perjury charges to be brought against me forthwith.

Well, I mean, to say, if that doesn’t happen – then – well – we’d have to conclude it’s all true.

And if it’s all true – then – we are, indeed, ruled by a collection of utterly despicable gangsters.

Shameless criminals – who have occupied and captured the highest Offices in Jersey.

But even if you can’t make Monday morning, but still fancied the idea of enjoying such a spectacle – don’t worry – I’ll be appealing – and appealing – and thence – taking it to Strasbourg.

And not just this action either! Why, I have at least another four others nearing launch.

And, no – the threats of massive court-costs and bankruptcy do not – and are not – going to deter me.

Not for one second.

I’ll be bankrupted soon – and – I just don’t care.

It’s all far, far too late for the oligarchy to be relying upon such a tactic.

I’ve had nothing left to lose for a long, long time.

And that makes me legally and politically dangerous.

Really dangerous.

Like I said – Strasbourg – here we come!

Stuart.

In the Royal Court of the Island of Jersey

(Samedi Division)

In the matter of the application of Stuart Syvret for leave to institute judicial review proceedings in respect of decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct of Her Majesty’s Attorney General.

In the matter of the application of Stuart Syvret for leave to institute judicial review proceedings in respect of decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct of the Connetable of Grouville.

The decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct of Her Majesty’s Attorney General, and the decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct of the Connetable of Grouville complained of, constituting – as described in detail below: –

Various unlawful acts, inter alios: –

Various breaches of his Human Rights, contra the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000;

Incidental breaches of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002;

Various conspiracies to pervert the course of justice;

Various Torts;

Various breaches of Article 47 of the States of Jersey Law 2005;

Various examples of misconduct in a public office;

Various examples of misfeasance in a public office.

Affidavit of Stuart Syvret

1. I, Stuart Syvret of – – St. Helier, Jersey, MAKE OATH and state that the contents of this, my affidavit, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and say as follows:

2. I make this affidavit in support of my applications for leave to institute judicial review proceedings in respect of the decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct, on various dates, of Her Majesty’s Attorney General; and the decisions, acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct, on various dates, of the Connetable of Grouville.

3. I do so in support of the reliefs sought as laid out in the Form of Notice for Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (Rule 16/2(2)).

4. Should it be necessary, I also make this affidavit in support of my application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings more than 3 months having elapsed from any of the dates when the acts, measures, policies, omissions and conduct complained of, occurred.

5. I make this affidavit in support of the accompanying Form of Notice – because all of the matters raised are of the utmost public law, public policy and public interest concern – and thus require the proper and public scrutiny and oversight of the court, for the general public good.

6. I am Stuart Syvret, and until April of 2010, I was a member of the parliament (‘the States’) of the island of Jersey.

7. First elected to the States at the age of 25 as a Deputy for St. Helier No. 3/4 district in 1990. I was elected three years later as a Senator by the whole island, coming second in the island-wide poll, by which six Senators are elected for a six year term of Office. I was re-elected as Senator in 1999, on that occasion coming first in the poll. I was again re-elected as Senator, again coming first in the poll in 2005.

8. The 2005 election marked a change in the island’s system of government from a Committee system to Ministerial government, with a cabinet that would be led by a Chief Minister. I was the only candidate to go to the electorate with a declaration that, should I be re-elected, I would seek election as Chief Minister by the States assembly.

9. My centre-left/Green politics and outspoken ethical and moral stance against corruption in Jersey power circles has always caused me to be profoundly unpopular with the political / judicial / business establishment, who have frequently persecuted me for having such a political philosophy. It was no surprise, therefore, that I was not chosen by the States assembly to become Chief Minister.

10. As an example of the type of anti-democratic political oppression I have been subjected to, I was improperly suspend from the States assembly for approximately 6 months in 1996. This action was initiated and driven against me by the then Bailiff, Sir Philip Bailhache, in a corrupt effort to protect his friend and political ally, the then Senator Reg Jeune who I had exposed engaging in the corrupt abuse of his position as a member of the States and as President of the then Policy & Resources Committee.

11. Sir. Philip Bailhache being the brother of William Bailhache, the Attorney General responsible for the unlawful actions taken against me – which actions form much of the grounds for this judicial review application. William Bailhache having since been promoted from the post of Attorney General to that of Deputy Bailiff, with responsibility for the actions of his Office when Attorney General devolving to his successor in that post, Timothy Le Cocq.

12. Nevertheless, in spite of various obstructions, my political career continued to be successful. Following the 2005 elections, I remained the politician with the highest electoral mandate in the island at that time, and as the longest continually serving Senator, was ‘Father of the House’.

13. Therefore, for a sustained period of approximately twenty years, I was an effective and respected politician, doing a job I was good at, felt genuinely committed to, and was popular with the public. Whilst things are always uncertain in politics, I had a credible expectation that I would continue in Jersey politics for further terms of Office, still being comparatively young, at 45 – having been elected at the age of 25.


14. However, the ethical and anti-corruption approach I took throughout my political career was always regarded as a serious threat to the traditional ruling oligarchy.


15. Now – my political career and my life has been unlawfully destroyed by the malfeasant actions, criminalities, inactions and unlawful nature of certain public authorities in Jersey, such as the Attorney General, and accessories before and after the fact, such as the Connetable of Grouville.


16. After 20 years of dedicated, honest and principled public service, I find myself homeless, single, unemployed, penniless, with no assets, no pension, my involvement in politics terminated, no career, and of poor health. This situation in which I find myself is as a direct result of the unlawful actions of the Attorney General, the Connetable of Grouville, and certain other public authorities in Jersey, who have misused and abused their powers as public authorities to politically oppress me in illegal ways, in order to prevent me from exposing a wide variety of otherwise hidden, criminal malfeasances, the public exposure of which is, or would be, massively damaging to the island’s political establishment and/or certain senior individuals within that establishment.


17. I should state at this point that other Jersey public authorities have also acted in malfeasant and criminal ways – the conspiracies and unlawful campaigns against me involving a number of individuals and departments. Other actions will, in due course, be taken by me in respect of those unlawful practices. However, for the purposes of this affidavit and judicial review application, it is specifically the unlawful actions of the Attorney General and the Connetable of Grouville that cause them to be the respondents.


18. Of all of the unlawful and oppressive harassments I have suffered in the course of my career as a dissident politician in Jersey, the mobilisation against me of a conflicted and deeply politicised prosecution system and partly-corrupted policing apparatus – so as to use the police and the law enforcement system to do to me what legitimate political opposition had failed to achieve – namely obstruct, de rail, discredit and destroy my political work and career, is the most serious.


19. Even more than the corrupt and anti-democratic exclusion of me from the Jersey parliament in 1996, as caused by Sir Philip Bailhache, as referred to in paragraph 10 – the inconsistent, biased, disproportionate, conflicted, improperly motivated, corrupt and unlawful use of policing and prosecutory powers against me amounts to an illegal enterprise of the most damaging kind, inflicting a variety of harms and wrongs against me, and, significantly, against the public good; the facts of which are elaborated below.


20. During 2007, I was unlawfully obstructed, harassed and oppressed by various public employees and authorities – including the Attorney General – for the improper purpose of preventing me from fulfilling my statutory duties in respect of child protection when I was Minister for Health & Social Services. So deliberate, calculated and effective was that conspiracy that it succeeded in engineering my removal from Office as Minister.


21. The conspiracy referred to above was so brazen, an attempt was even made by senior civil servants to suborn and draw into the criminal enterprise, the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force, Graham Power, Queens Police Medal. Mr. Power flatly rejected all such approaches, and wrote a contemporaneous file-note recording the meeting in question. That file-note forms part of the evidence for this application.


22. So great was the shock I felt during 2007 – as first I investigated and discovered many years of previously hidden child abuse – and then experienced the corrupt wrath of certain authorities and individuals who were responsible for concealing such crimes for many, many years – that I had to fundamentally re-appraise the capacity of public administration in Jersey to deal honestly and ethically with difficult and problematic issues. This caused me to re-visit and re-asses various other controversial matters and view them with a fresh seriousness.


23. Amongst those matters was a 1999 police report that represented an initial investigation into a male nurse – ‘Nurse M’- against who there was prima facie evidence for being a mass-murderer and serial rapist.


24. Although aware of the case for some years, I had previously been assured that there were, in fact, no grounds for concern, the matter had been investigated fully, and that the allegations of murder against Nurse M had been discovered to be baseless.


25. However, by the end of 2007, I had experienced something akin to culture-shock. In the course of 12 months, it had become starkly clear to me that straightforward concealment – the burying – the “brushing under the carpet” – of any major scandal – no matter how criminal – was the routine modus operandi of the States of Jersey, its public departments and its senior managers. I labelled it the Culture of Concealment, so widespread is it. The Culture of Concealment is inimically hostile to the public good – yet – it is all but impossible to fight – because avoiding problematic, embarrassing scandals, suits everyone involved. Workers, managers, union representatives, chief executives, politicians and Law Officers. The “anything-for-a-quite-life” approach is utterly dominant. And woe betide anyone who breaks ranks and exposes failings and malfeasances; such a person will find themselves with virtually no allies; may find themselves with their lives utterly ruined, as mine has been.


26. Nevertheless, by now, around late 2007 and early 2008, I could not escape concluding that the matter of Nurse M, was not some mere fleeting suspicion; some misunderstanding that had been adequately investigated. Given what I had so plainly and shockingly learnt about the endemic Culture of Concealment, as much as I did not want to face the truth, I knew that the 1999 investigation had been no “mistake”. I realised the grounds for the investigation must have been good – but the crimes represented an unspeakable nightmare – that had been buried by “the system”.


27. I made two attempts to persuade authorities to take the case seriously and re-examine it. When I became aware of a new, professional approach by the police under the leadership that had chosen to investigate the many decades of previously hidden historic child abuse, I e-mailed them a copy of the 1999 report, and expressed the hope the case would be re-opened once time and resources allowed following the child abuse investigation. Additionally, I tabled the 1999 report as an item of evidence in the Royal Courts of Justice in London during an attempt to secure a judicial review of the UK Justice Secretary’s failure to ensure the proper rule of law in Jersey.


28. Neither attempt to secure “official” intervention having succeeded, I took the decision to make a public interest disclosure of the 1999 report in accordance with the statutory public interest disclosure clause and the journalism clause in the Data Protection Law.


29. It was – ostensibly – the public interest disclosure of the 1999 report on my internet blog that led to a massed police raid, my arrest, unlawful imprisonment, and the total searching – without a search warrant – of the home I shared with my then partner, who was also an elected member of the Jersey parliament.


30. I now know that these actions against me were not motivated by some rational or reasonable or proportionate concern in respect of a possible breach of the data protection law.


31. The unlawful surveillance, grossly disproportionate police raid, and resultant malicious prosecution had – and has – in addition to the data protection law – further, entirely different motives.


32. Yes, the publication of the report – a deeply shocking document – caused obvious concerns to the Jersey establishment – indicating as it did a scandalous failure to see through to a conclusion the investigation of a man who appeared to be as dangerous – if not worse – than Harold Shipman. Moreover, a profoundly series matter – the investigation of which had been improperly abandoned by the then Attorney General. Michael Birt, who, by 2009, was Deputy Bailiff, and is now Bailiff. Naturally the Jersey authorities wanted to intimidate me into taking down the report in an effort to minimise embarrassment and controversy.


33. But there were other motives, as I later discovered. During one of the early directions hearings, the prosecuting Advocate, Stephen Baker asserted words to the effect that there had been no long-term, politically motivated police surveillance engaged in against me or my then partner. However, after that hearing, a police source imparted a quantity of information to me which indicated that Baker had lied; committed perjury.


34. My source told me a number of things. Amongst these were the facts that the officer who had replaced Lenny Harper – the senior police officer who had led the historic child abuse investigation – one Mick Gradwell, had, in fact, spent a majority of his working duties in Jersey on the “task” of “investigating” Mr. Harper and me. Moreover – my source robustly confirmed that I had – in fact – counter to the claims of Advocate Baker – been subjected to a regime of politically motivated covert police surveillance. My source was even able to give me the names of two of the office involved – Mark Cane and Julia Jackson.


35. Upon being confronted with this information, Advocate Baker had to concede its accuracy – essentially admitting perjury. He later quoted in court from a note written by Mick Gradwell, which, in addition to confirming the validity and accuracy of my source, purported to justify the unlawful surveillance on the grounds that “there was a concern I might be writing defamatory remarks on my blog”.


36. The perjury by Baker – and the admittance by Gradwell that, essentially, the police and prosecution actions against me were, basically, designed to stop me, and by example, others, from expressing disfavourable views concerning those in public authority in Jersey – the entire illegality of the exercise against me was established at that point. [Improper motives by the public authorities; powers not being used for the legislative purpose for which they were granted; abuse of powers; breaches of the ECHR etc]


37. Thus my source was proven to be robust and reliable, even correctly identifying two of police officers involved. I therefore have confidence in the accuracy and robustness of the remaining information supplied to me concerning the several improper and unlawful motivations of certain public authorities, of the Attorney General, the acting Chief of Police, David Warcup, and the Chief Executive to the States, Bill Ogley.


38. The unlawful police raid mounted against me was expressly designed to be ludicrously excessive. Massively over-the-top – in order to attempt to frighten and intimidate me into adopting a far lower and less troublesome profile – and – even more clearly – send a “message” to the burgeoning local blogosphere that which was beginning to make dramatic in-roads with respect to changing and re-directing the usually staid and tame local news agenda. I had to be crushed, as a “frightener”; I had to be made an example of, in an effort to deter other citizen media journalists and non-establishment politicians.


39. A further – very clear purpose of the surveillance – and of the raid – was as an attempt to identify my many sources of information; the various whistle-blowers who provide me with public interest information that would never get published if left to the local mainstream media. (The attempt failed in respect of such important sources, as my habit and practice was to not store or retain information in a discoverable form that could cause them to be identified.) My source also said – as though it needed stating – that a purpose of the raid was also to intimidate and frighten my sources – thus closing off the embarrassing flow of leaks – and, greatly reducing, as a consequence, my effectiveness as a politician.


40. However, my source assured me that the surveillance and raid had one overarching, unambiguous objective to which all others were secondary – one fundamental purpose the Jersey authorities were desperate to succeed in.


41. The then Attorney General, and the political executive he advised, were convinced they would find – amongst my files or on my computer – evidence that would show and prove that either, or both, Lenny Harper and Graham Power (the then Chief of Police) had been leaking me confidential, internal police information and reports.


42. The conversation was around a year ago, so I can’t be absolutely precise about the exact phraseology, but my source said words to the following effect: “they were absolutely convinced they would find them. [the leaks] They just could not accept the idea that you had your own sources and your own initiatives and methods. They were desperate to find leaks to you from Lenny and Graham, because, well, obviously, they needed something, anything, they could grab onto to use to try and discredit Graham and Lenny. And of course that would have done the job. Though Lenny was retired, they still needed something to try and rubbish him with, as the smear-campaign against his competence wasn’t taken seriously by anyone who mattered, and they had suspended Graham, but everyone knew that was on a load of b*ll*cks. The establishment were very worried about the weakness of their position – so a nice fat load of e-mails, or internal police files leaked to you, which would show these senior cops “playing in politics” and breaking the Data Protection Law would have answered their prayers. [Person X] told me [they] thought Bailhache and Ogley were going to cry when they realised the raid had drawn a blank.”


43. In addition to the obviously improper and unlawful motivations for the various political mobilisations of the law enforcement apparatus as described above – such actions were also overtly – and seriously criminal.


44. Criminal – as is the malicious prosecution being mounted against me – because a fundamental motivation and objective of the entire exercise has been to unlawfully conceal a very substantial quantity of serious criminal acts, by a number of individuals, States departments and public authorities. I was dutifully working as a politician to expose such crimes – crimes traditional hidden by the Culture of Concealment. Therefore, I had to be politically oppressed in order to stop me from exposing previously hidden crimes.


45. For example – crimes committed by the Office of Attorney General – such as perverting the course of justice, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, breaches of the Children (Jersey) Laws and of misconduct in a public office. Such crimes having – evidencedly – been engaged in by a former Attorney General, Michael Birt, and his successor, William Bailhache.


46. Indeed, it would appear that the “requirement” to perpetuate the continued unlawful concealment of such malfeasances and crimes has been adopted and is being carried forward by the current Attorney General, Timothy Le Cocq.


47. I am being prosecuted for four alleged offences. Stated simply, the alleged offences are:


48. Alleged failure to up-date the address to which my car was registered.


49. Alleged failure to renew an out-of-date driving licence.


50. Alleged failure to be registered under the Data Protection Law.


51. Alleged unlawful disclosure of controlled data.


52. Obviously, the two alleged data protection law infractions are, by far, the significant charges, and it is those I focus upon primarily. However, the two motoring charges are not irrelevant – given they arise out of the same unlawful, politicised, prosecution and police surveillance as the Data Protection Charges, and demonstrate significant bias and disproportionality by the prosecution in the action against me.


53. Further – as I will explain – the two motoring charges and the nature in which they were investigated – such investigation involving as it did at least two of the island’s amateur, voluntary, elected political police forces, which are answerable to the Attorney General’s Office – raises a number of serious matters – both of the general and the particular nature.


54. For example, in Jersey the professional police do not possess the power to charge; that power resides exclusively with officers of the island’s twelve ‘honorary’ political police forces. Moreover – each of those twelve parish police forces is led by an elected parish Constable – who are fully empowered, voting members of the island’s legislature, ‘the States.’ The Constable of the parish in which I resided during the relevant time – Connetable Dan Murphy, of Grouville – who is a respondent to this application, is widely known to be a political and personal enemy of mine and of my former partner. Given his highly conflicted role – as a parish Connetable – as both a fully active and empowered member of the legislature – and the head of a powerful, elected police force – neither he, nor the Office he holds, can meet, nor is capable of meeting, the requisite test of a public authority that it must not “have a direct interest in the outcome of a decision, or show actual bias or a real possibility of bias”.


55. A further – extremely problematic – issue arises when considering the twelve political police officers who are also members of the legislature and who are the heads of the twelve elected, voluntary – but powerful – political police forces.


56. The Jersey Attorney General is the overall head of the twelve ‘honorary’ police forces, and the associated powers confer upon the Attorney General a degree of influence and control over these politicised police forces and the twelve police officer members of the legislature, the parish Connetables.


57. Both the post of Connetable in general, as presently structured, cannot operate lawfully, and, in the instant case, the individual post-holder cannot fulfil the lawful expectations upon a public authority, in respect of the applicant. I return to this subject below.


58. The post of Attorney General in Jersey carries with it a variety of highly conflicted and unsustainably mutually exclusive powers; powers that simply cannot be lawfully exercised – given the need for “a public authority to have no direct interest in the outcome of a decision, or show actual or real bias”. The authority relationship the Office of Attorney General has over the twelve Parish Connetables is but one conflicted and unsustainable power. The others are elaborated upon in greater detail below.

59. I will now provide a brief summation of the unlawful acts giving rise to this application. Before progressing to the specific, detailed, evidenced serious concerns in connection with the actual conduct of the prosecution against me – I will begin by describing the unlawful police actions – including the covert surveillance, breaking and entering, unlawful arrest, unlawful imprisonment and unlawful search.


60. It should be noted, that – following an unlawful conspiracy involving the then Attorney General, William Bailhache, the then Home Affairs Minister, Andrew Lewis, the Chief Executive to the States, Bill Ogley and the then Deputy Police Chief David Warcup, the Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police Force had been unlawfully suspended in November 2008. The police force had, therefore, from that point come under leadership that was amenable to the unlawful and political purposes of the Attorney General and the political executive.


61. Because of the immense range of conflicted and mutually exclusive powers held by the Office of Attorney General in Jersey, the said Office will have played a significant role in initiating, instructing, advising, guiding, controlling and/or influencing the police investigation of me and subsequent unlawful actions.


62. The extent to which this has occurred is not yet clear, but that it did occur is known. For example, the previous Attorney General, William Bailhache, at the time of my unlawful arrest, originally denied all knowledge of it. Under questioning in the island’s parliament he subsequently recanted on this denial, albeit in a manner involving a brazen degree of sophistry.


63. The fact is – the very idea that the police in Jersey would mount a massed police raid on the most senior elected member of the island’s legislature, imprison him for seven-and-a-half hours, search the house from top to bottom – without a search-warrant – and remove his constituents’ parliamentary privileged data – without the prior knowledge and agreement of the Attorney General is – quite literally – incredible.


64. Mr. William Bailhache could not – and cannot – be regarded as capable of ever being an objective and fair public authority in respect of decisions concerning me. This is the case given his direct political and personal conflicts of interest in matters concerning me – especially in respect of the efforts I was making to expose unacceptable and unlawful failures to bring child abusers – and child abuse concealers – to justice. Mr. Bailhache – along with the Advocate actually conducting the malicious prosecution against me, Advocate Stephen Baker, both being – evidencedly – involved in obstructing the police in bringing to justice highly evidenced child abusers.


65. In the knowledge, therefore, of the involvement of the Attorney General’s Office in the following matters, I turn to a description of the unlawful conduct of the police.


66. Unlawful, politicised, police surveillance and investigation.


67. It is the case, inter alios, that: –

68. The very extensive, long-term police investigation of me, and surveillance mounted against me and my former partner (also an elected politician, Deputy Carolyn Labey of Grouville) was unlawful.


69. It was conducted with improper motives.


70. It was engaged in ‘bad faith’.


71. It was engaged in by a public authority, notwithstanding the fact the public authority in question was, and remains, incapable of meeting the principle test: “A body must not have a direct interest in the outcome of a decision, or show actual bias or a real possibility of bias”.


72. It was engaged in by a public authority which was failing to exercise statutory powers for the purposes for which they were conferred, and not on relevant grounds of public interest.


73. It was politically motivated.


74. It was personally motivated.


75. It was a breach of certain Rights as guaranteed under the ECHR.


76. It had a variety of different motivations and objectives – most of which were unlawful and most of which did not relate to the charges brought against me.


77. It involved at least two – but probably several more – covert, unlawful intrusions into the property by police officers.


78. It breached legal privilege, given certain legal matters I was engaged in.


79. It breached the Data Protection Law.

80. It breached parliamentary privilege – in that it amounted to a direct and highly invasive intrusion into the privileged communications between many private constituents and their elected representatives.


81. It threatened the public good, by amounting to a police-state type assault against a prominent opposition politician – thus jeopardising the safe functioning of free democracy.


82. It constituted a direct, criminal breach of Article 47 of the States of Jersey Law.


83. It was – plainly – ‘disproportionate’.


84. The conduct described above directly and closely involved a number of police officers – the identity of at least three of which has been discovered by me – notwithstanding earlier – perjured – denials by the prosecution; the three in question being Mick Gradwell, Mark Cane and Julia Jackson.


85. The conduct described above served no ‘legitimate purpose’, given its disproportionality, unlawfulness, excessiveness given the nature of the allegations against me – and was illegitimate, given the Data Protection (Jersey) Law (DPL) contains within it provisions for investigating and enforcing alleged breaches of the (DPL) which were not followed in the extant case.


86. The above unlawful actions – involving breaches of statute law, common law, tort law and my human rights – have caused dramatic, and very substantial distress, damage and actual harm to myself and my health, my relationship, family and friends, the destruction of my career prospects and professional reputation – thus causing great distress and anguish, in addition to the complete loss of my livelihood.


87. The unlawful regime of covert police surveillance described above progressed to an unlawful, politicised, police raid, false imprisonment and unlawful property search.


88. At approximately 9.00 am on one morning in April 2009 I stepped from the front door of the property to collect an item from inside my car. Three unmarked police cars – each carrying so far as I could tell under the circumstances, two plain clothes officers – sped up the drive, stopped, and two officers exited from each vehicle. I was immediately surrounded by these officers, one of whom grabbed my wrist and told me I was “under arrest for an alleged breach of the Data Protection Law, and that I would now be taken to Police Headquarters, where I would be questioned whilst the property was searched.”


89. It was later revealed that in addition to these six officers, a further two specialist search officers had been waiting nearby, and a further two officers were also present, equipped with a ‘battering-ram’ – of the kind used in drugs raids – had I not exited the building and it “had become necessary to effect a forced entry”.


90. There were, therefore, to the best of my knowledge, ten police officers at the site of the property – this to give effect to the arrest and detention of an unarmed, elected member of the Jersey legislature – in connection with an alleged breach of the Data Protection Law, and this notwithstanding the fact that the police were already aware of his possession of the item of data at issue – not least because he himself had e-mailed it to the police – on at least two previous occasions.


91. In addition to the ten police officers referred to above, at least a further five were involved in the exercise, in an operational capacity from Police Headquarters. Amongst that number being one Dave Minty.


92. Therefore, at least fifteen police officers were involved in an operation that involved the unlawful raid, arrest, detention and searching – of a prominent opposition politician – concerning the alleged improper handling of an item of data – which the police were already aware of the politician’s possession of – because he himself had disclosed his possession of the item to them.


93. Before being taken to Police Headquarters, I asked if I might get a clean T-shirt. Several of the officers escorted me back into the property. A cleaner was present in the house at this time, and she was terrified, as was Deputy Labey’s mother, who, by this stage was aware of something happening, and was deeply shocked and very worried the police might take the computers of Deputy Labey’s children, which contained their vital school work.


94. Whilst briefly in the house, the thought occurred to me to ask to see the search warrant.


95. Though I was lied to at the time, it later became clear that no search warrant existed.


96. When I asked, the officer who had arrested me began to reach into his jacket pocket, but hesitated, and stopped, and said to me, “no – we’ll give you a copy of the search warrant when you’re at Police Headquarters”. This was a straightforward lie by the arresting officer.


97. Instead of obtaining and relying upon a search warrant, as described in the Jersey Data Protection Law, the police and Attorney General’s Office had instead decided to rely upon Article 29 of the Jersey Police Procedures and Criminal Evidence Law (the Jersey equivalent of PACE) which – allegedly – confers upon any police officer who has a “reasonable suspicion” that evidence of a crime may exist in or on a property – to search that property upon the simple expedient of arresting a suspect in or near the property in question – without requiring any formal search warrant.


98. The use of Article 29 in the aforesaid manner is plainly a dangerous abuse of power, subverting as it does in theory, virtually all requirement on the police to obtain search warrants. The use of Article 29 in this way and for these purposes was illegal.


99. The general public policy implications of such an abusive misapplication of Article 29 are self-evidently profoundly serious. Especially so when the Article is abused to – essentially – engage in acts of terror against opposition politicians.


100. Immediately following my arrest, I was taken to Police Headquarters. Upon arrival, I was forced to hand over what few personal possessions I had in my pockets, I was photographed, my belt was removed, so I had to hold my trousers up for the rest of the day – and I was placed in a windowless, ground-floor interview cell, into which I was locked for most of the day. The only significant period of time I left the cell before release, was when being taken to a larger interview cell, equipped with recording equipment, where I was questioned for approximately two hours, before being returned to the ground floor cell and locked-in again. I was able to leave this cell on a couple of occasions by pressing an electric call-bell that, eventually, resulted in an officer appearing, who would escort me to the lavatory, before returning me to lock-in.


101. After approximately seven-and-a-half hours under arrest and under lock-and key – I was eventually released. My goods were returned to me in a clear plastic bag and I was told to leave via the van entrance, where I was filmed, still holding my trousers up.


102. During my time under false arrest, the entire property (which belongs to my ex-partner and her mother) was searched from top to bottom. This included the children’s bedrooms, their wardrobes, chests-of-draws, personal effects and their computers.


103. My former partner’s personal possessions were, likewise, searched aggressively, including her clothing cupboards and draws. Deputy Labey’s files and computers were also searched.


104. The sofas in the sitting room – although replaced – had obviously been turned upside-down, and the kitchen bin had been simply up-ended on the kitchen floor. Whilst some attempt had been made to replace the garbage, food scraps and other waste was still present on the floor.


105. The search was further unlawful, in that notwithstanding the unlawful use of Article 29 of PPCE under these purposes, the said law requires that the police obtain permission from the owner/controller of a neighbouring property before extending an Article 29 search into such premises. The work office used by Deputy Labey and myself was in a converted room of an outbuilding that belongs to Deputy Labey’s mother. No permission was sought or given for the Article 29 search to be extended into this building. However, the police raid intruded heavily into this area – where they discovered my computer and files. The computer and several very sensitive files were unlawfully removed by the police from this building.


106. Additionally – and significantly – certain of Deputy Labey’s files were also disturbed and copied. Amongst the disturbed files was one box in particular that contained some information relating to bribery and corruption in respect of planning policies that the Deputy was investigating, and had reported to the police.


107. During 2007 and early 2008, the Deputy of Grouville, Carolyn Labey, was growing increasingly concerned at plans to re-zone a significant number of areas of open land across the island. Designated in the legally binding planning policy as ‘country-side’ or ‘green-zone’ land, the many fields in question were – supposedly – protected from development.


108. From September 2006 discussions took place amongst a group of people, including the Planning Minister, the twelve parish Connetables, certain property developers and the then Housing Minister – Terry Le Main.


109. These discussions had the supposed objective of identifying land suitable for development to provide “essential” housing for the over-55s, and eventually led to the production of a ‘white-paper’ which was then presented at a number of public meetings.


110. At face value, this exercise might seem perfectly reasonable; after all, perhaps there genuinely was a pressing need to create such housing.


111. However – upon closer examination, the exercise had a number of deeply puzzling characteristics.


111.1. For example –


111.2. The eight large sites identified for such housing – just happened to be in the countryside-zone or green-zone.


111.3. The twelve Connetables – in “surveying” the populations of their parishes to gauge the supposed “need” for such housing – used different criteria – or even no criteria – from parish to parish, leading to random and amorphous results – the veracity and consistency of which could never quite be pinned-down.


111.4. No methodologically sound, verifiable analysis of the supposed “need” for this housing has ever been produced.


111.5. This open land was being proposed for development – over and above far more suitable ‘brown-field’ sites – such as some redundant glasshouses; the island’s tomato growing industry having declined.


111.6. Strangely, the re-zoning of these eight pieces of land was being rushed through – even though a fundamental review of the island’s planning policies and zoning had begun. Far more rational, surely, to wait twelve months, and examine the need for such housing – and any resultant need for land re-zoning – within the broad policy of planning in Jersey, the ‘Island Plan’?


111.7. Notwithstanding the absence of any methodologically robust justification for, or analyses of, the supposed “need” for this specific type of housing – nor any meaningful contextualizing of it within a broad housing strategy – the then Housing Minister – Tel Boy Le Main – was rabid in his insistence that the “need” was ‘urgent and pressing’ – and in using his political influence to ensure that these eight sites be re-zoned to enable development. Indeed, when bringing forward the proposals for debate, the Planning Minister made it clear he was doing so only because of the insistence by the Housing Minister that the re-zoning for this type of housing was essential.


111.8. Of the eight sites brought forward for re-zoning, a certain property developer – a Mr. Geoff Noel – had a heavy commercial interest in at least five of them.


111.9. Mr. Noel happens to be a personal friend of the then Housing Minister, Terry Le Main.


111.10. The same Housing Minster who had to recently resign – for having sought to use his influence to have a prosecution of another friend of his, dropped.


112. In early 2008, being deeply concerned at the seeming irrationality of this exercise, and alarmed at what may well be the needless destruction of environmentally important open land, Deputy Carolyn Labey brought a proposition for debate before the States (P.33/2008) in which she argued strongly that the proposed re-zoning made no sense ahead of the Island Plan review; that there was no consistency or method in the assessment of the supposed “need” for such housing; and that, in any event, if such need did exist, the States should first look to such brown-field sights as certain redundant glasshouses.


113. The major part of her proposition was that the re-zoning of the eight sites should not be proceeded with, and, instead should be considered as a part of the overall Island Plan review.


114. The debate took place in April 2008, and that central part of the motion was heavily defeated – there being a Jersey Establishment Party ‘three-line-whip’ to vote against it.


115. Subsequently, the re-zoning proposition – P.75/2008 – was tabled, debated – and approved – in July 2008.


116. However, the two debates – as is often the way of these things – were of particular interest to quite a number of members of the public, who contacted the Deputy – and provided her with information that made the whole re-zoning exercise appear even more dubious.


117. Deputy Labey then spent some months investigating the matter further, and gathered more information.


118. What she learnt so alarmed her – she reported the matter to the police.


119. And not just any police officer – but the Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police, Graham Power, Queens Police Medal.


120. Mr. Power considered the Deputy’s information and agreed that it could be a very serious matter, and that it did, indeed, merit full and thorough investigation.


121. He handed the case to a senior officer to carry forward – one Dave Minty.


122. Minty approached the investigation with what appeared to be complete intransigence.


123. Notwithstanding repeated requests from Deputy Labey to know what progress was being made, nothing appeared to happen. Indeed, Minty flatly refused to formally interview certain willing witnesses, who were prepared to make statements.


124. Nevertheless, unable to simply ignore the complaints totally, they were instead referred to the Controller and Auditor General.


125. Earlier in this process – with rumours of investigation beginning to circulate – Le Main is known to have had a meeting with the then Bailiff, Sir Philip Bailhache. It was shortly after this meeting that the investigative process seemed to come to a virtual halt.


126. Deputy Labey again e-mailed the Chief of Police, Mr. Power, to express concern that the powers-that-be might be slowing the investigation in order to protect Le Main, and/or avoid a major scandal for the States. Mr. Power – quite properly – added the e-mail correspondence to the case-file. The case being supposedly investigated by Dave Minty.


127. By now, the date was early November, 2008.


128. It was around this time that Mr. Power – before leaving the island for a short break – was in communication one evening with the then Attorney General, William Bailhache.


129. Mr. Bailhache raised the issue of the Deputy’s complaint with Mr. Power – and strongly expressed to him the view that it should not be taken seriously. He said “the Deputy’s judgment couldn’t be trusted; one only had to look at who her partner was.” The pressure and stress of the various oppressions we have both suffered having since driven us apart, but at that time I was her partner.


130. Mr. Power grew angry at this, and informed the Attorney General that his remarks were wholly inappropriate; that the Deputy’s complaint to the police was the proper thing to have done, and that the matter did need inquiring into.


131. However – unbeknown to Mr. Power and Deputy Labey, Dave Minty had simply been leaking everything – including the Deputy’s e-mails to Mr. Power – directly to William Bailhache. This in direct and flagrant violation of the Data Protection Law.


132. And – in turn – William Bailhache was leaking at least some of this data – to his brother – the then Bailiff, Sir. Philip Bailhache. Again – this leaking of data – and its receipt – both being unambiguous criminal acts. For not only was the Data Protection Law being broken – it also amounted to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.


133. That this unlawful leaking of data was taking place was discovered by Deputy Labey – or rather it was revealed to her – in subsequent events.


134. On the 5th November, 2008, the Deputy received an angry message from the Bailiff’s chambers – demanding that she attend his office that day, as there was an issue he wanted to speak with her about.


135. Although intimidated by this, the Deputy refused to attend that day, as she had other commitments, but did agree to go to his office the next day – the 6th November.


136. As soon as the door was closed and she was alone with Philip Bailhache – “he threw across the desk” at her, “a copy of one of her e-mails to Graham Power, and demanded that she explain her actions in making the complaint, and demanded that she write a letter of ‘apology’ to Graham Power ‘for having “misled” him with her e-mails’”.


137. The actions of Philip Bailhache were unlawful in many respects. Not only was he in breach of the Data Protection Law – he was also breaking Article 47 of the States of Jersey Law – by attempting to intimidate and harass a States member.


138. Shocked, intimidated and very upset at these events, Deputy Labey – with reluctance – wrote an e-mail to Mr. Power, but not one of ‘apology’; instead it, essentially, just informed him that the meeting had occurred, and what had been said to her.


139. Mr. Power, by this stage, was on leave in the United Kingdom for a few days. No doubt – once preliminary investigations, and the work of the Controller and Auditor General had been completed, the Police Chief would have then ensured a full investigation did take place.


140. However – he was unable to see that this happened.


141. At 8.44 a.m on the morning of Saturday the 8th November – William Bailhache wrote the first draft of the letter of suspension that was to be served on Graham Power – without warning – by Bill Ogley and Andrew Lewis – on the morning of the 12th November 2008.


142. That being the supposed “emergency” suspension – the letters for which, having – supposedly – been written only in the preceding twelve hours before the meeting on the morning of the 12th.


143. The “official” version of events supposedly saw the recently appointed Deputy Police Chief, David Warcup, receive an “interim report” by Brian Sweeting, of the Metropolitan Police. This being a peer-review of the historic child abuse investigation.


144. The report by Sweeting allegedly contained such criticism of the child abuse investigation, that it merited the immediate suspension of Graham Power.


145. This notwithstanding the fact that four reports by the Association of Chief Police Officers – ACPO – had thoroughly endorsed the historic abuse investigation – and Sweeting did not even interview the two, central figures relevant to the conduct of the investigation – Lenny Harper, and Andre Baker of ACPO – until the 18th November.


146. That being eight days after Warcup received Sweeting’s “Met report” on the 10th November 2008.


147. And ten days after William Bailhache wrote the first draft of the suspension letter – on the morning of the 8th November 2008.


148. Mr. Power strongly suspected that the “official” version of events was not true, and he strove to obtain the evidence.


149. Eventually – after nine months of official lies – and absolute determined refusal by Terry Le Sueur to disclose this information – Mr. Power eventually succeeded in obtaining the electronic data that showed the true date and time of when the key letters were first created.


150. Not on the 11th November – as the “official” version of events had it – but on the morning of the 8th November.


151. Two full days before the “interim Met report” was received by David Warcup.


152. Plainly – the Jersey establishment had many pressing motivations to remove, and attempt to discredit, the Chief of Police – not least their urgent wish to ridicule, in the eyes of the public, the historic abuse investigation – before the politically crucial Deputy elections later that November.


153. Mr. Power is firmly of the view that amongst those establishment motivations for ‘neutralizing’ him – was his attitude to the planning corruption issues raised by Deputy Labey – and his defence of her in response to William Bailhache’s denigrations.


154. But – no doubt to the distress of the establishment – the question of planning corruption was not terminated with the unlawful suspension of Mr. Power.


155. Deputy Labey, in response to constituents’ concerns, continued to research the subject, and press for a full investigation.


156. In April 2009, the Data Protection Law was used as an excuse to mount an unlawful massed police raid against me. At that time I shared the home of Deputy Labey.


157. The police chose to ignore that law’s requirements for a search warrant – instead relying – unlawfully – on an emergency search power. This was a tactic quite deliberately settled upon by the Attorney General, William Bailhache and David Warcup – because had the raid been conducted under a search warrant for the purposes of the Data Protection Law, the search could only have been undertaken to the extent reasonable and proportionate for the purpose for which the warrant was issued. And that would not have served the various objective of the establishment.


158. The raid and search had many motivations. Not least amongst them, enabling the theft of my constituents’ private data and communications with me – and attempting to identify and intimidate my various sources.


159. But – also this. The Deputy and I worked from the same office on the premises.


160. Amongst the files searched and copied by the police during the raid was one of her large file transfer cases, in which she kept some of the information related to the planning corruption.


161. The box in question was left with its lid open, in a disturbed state on a table in the office.


162. On the day of the raid and during the next day, the police officer responsible for the operation was quoted in the local media.


163. He was Dave Minty.


164. The same man who was prevaricating over investigating the Deputy’s complaints.


165. The same man who unlawfully leaked the Deputy’s e-mails to Graham Power – to William Bailhache – all those months earlier.


166. But – Minty suddenly vanished from all – apparent – involvement in the unlawful raid – a couple of days after it took place.


167. And – even more strikingly – even though it is a matter of public record from the media reports of the time, that he was involved in controlling the operation – his involvement has been repeatedly – dishonestly – denied.


168. The Advocate prosecuting me for supposed breaches of the Data Protection Law – Stephen Baker, formerly of 7 Bedford Row – and a former employee of William Bailhache – has repeatedly committed perjury during preliminary court hearings, by denying Minty’s involvement.


169. Why – we must wonder – should the establishment be quite so desperate to pretend that Minty was not involved in the planning or controlling of the unlawful police raid?


170. And why should the politically motivated prosecution being mounted against me – initiated by William Bailhache – have repeatedly refused to disclose to me the evidence necessary to my defence?


171. After these unlawful events, it took an excessively long period of time for me to be provided with a copy of the ‘search-book’ by the police.


172. It is the case, inter alios, that of the conduct described above: –


173. It was improperly motivated.


174. It was engaged in ‘bad faith’.


175. It was engaged in by a public authority, notwithstanding the fact the public authority in question was, and remains, incapable of meeting the principle test: “A body must not have a direct interest in the outcome of a decision, or show actual bias or a real possibility of bias”.


176. It was engaged in by a public authority which was failing to exercise statutory powers for the purposes for which they were conferred, and not on relevant grounds of public interest.


177. It was politically motivated.


178. It was personally motivated.


179. It was a breach of certain Rights as guaranteed under the ECHR.


180. It had a variety of different motivations and objectives – most of which were unlawful and most of which did not relate to the charges ultimately brought against me.


181. It breached legal privilege, given certain legal matters I was engaged in.


182. It breached the Data Protection Law.


183. It breached parliamentary privilege – in that it amounted to a direct and highly invasive intrusion into the privileged communications between many private constituents and their elected representatives.


184. It threatened the public good, by amounting to a police-state type assault against a prominent opposition politician – thus jeopardising the safe functioning of free democracy.


185. It constituted a direct, criminal breach of Article 47 of the States of Jersey Law.


186. It was – plainly – ‘disproportionate’.


187. The conduct described above served no ‘legitimate purpose’, given its disproportionality, unlawfulness, excessiveness given the nature of the allegations against me – and was illegitimate, given the Data Protection (Jersey) Law (DPL) contains within it provisions for investigating and enforcing alleged breaches of the (DPL) which were not followed in the extant case.


188. The above unlawful actions – involving breaches of statute law, common law, tort law and my human rights – have caused dramatic, and very substantial distress, damage and actual harm to myself and my health, my relationship, family and friends, the destruction of my career prospects and professional reputation – thus causing great distress and anguish, in addition to the complete loss of my livelihood.


189. However, the manifest illegality of the actions against me continue to this day in respect of the overtly unlawful, politicised conduct of the prosecution against me.


190. To show the improper and unlawful motivations of the Attorney General and the police – States and honorary – for engaging in this unlawful conduct against me, it is necessary to establish the context and preceding events.


191. From December 1999 until December 2005, I was President of the then Health & Social Services Committee.


192. Following a change to a Ministerial system of government, I became the Minister for Health & Social Services from December 2005 until 11th September 2007.


193. In addition to the broad common law responsibility to ensure a public department, such as Health & Social Services (H & SS) operates lawfully and to a high standard, the Office of H & SS Minister carries with it a number of statutory duties, obligations and consequent powers.


194. For the purposes of these proceedings, the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 is specifically cited.


195. The Minster for Health & Social Services is the public authority with responsibility for child protection in Jersey, with the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 being the primary legislation defining such responsibility and conferring the relevant powers.


196. Of particular, but not exclusive, relevance to these applications are the following Articles and relevant Paragraphs: –


196.1.1. “Article 42: Minister’s duty to investigate: –


196.1.2. Where the Minister –


196.1.3. is informed that a child is the subject of an emergency protection order or is in police protection; or


196.1.4. has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm,


196.1.5. the Minister shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as the Minister considers necessary to enable the Minister to decide whether he or she should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.”


196.1.6. “Article 42, Paragraph 8: –


196.1.7. “8: Where the Minister is conducting enquiries under this Article, it shall be the duty of any administration of the States to assist the Minister with his or her enquiries (in particular by providing relevant information and advice) if called upon by the Minister to do so, unless it would be unreasonable to do so in all the circumstances of the case.”


197. In early 2007, I began to receive information from unofficial sources; information which should have been fully and frankly reported to me by the relevant senior States of Jersey employees.


198. This information, when combined, in some cases, with certain information made officially known to me, caused the me to become seriously concerned that a number of examples of poor practice, and of child protection failure had occurred.


199. I became alarmed and concerned with what I was discovering, as it was very clear that a number of important facts, and a number of general failures on the part of child protection standards in Jersey, had been improperly and unlawfully withheld – over a period of decades – from the relevant political authorities of the day, including me as Minister and, previously my Health & Social Services Committee.


200. I, as H & SS Minister, having reasonable cause to suspect that children had suffered, were suffering, or were likely to suffer significant harm, sought to fulfil my legal obligations – as defined in the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 – by pursuing several lines of enquiry into a number of different examples of child protection failure with a view to protecting children from harm and determining what action I should take to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.


201. In seeking to discharge this fundamentally important and unambiguously stated lawful duty, I had a right to expect full and honest support, co-operation and assistance from all relevant States employees, States departments and Ministerial colleagues.


202. Further, I was guaranteed such support as the Minister for H & SS, it being a statutory obligation upon “any administration of the States” to provide such assistance, as described in Article 42, Paragraph 8 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002.


203. Following, and during, my enquiries into child protection issues, I began to express my concerns to relevant public employees, and to express my concerns publicly when providing an honest and frank answer to a question asked of me in my capacity as H & SS Minister during a meeting of the island’s parliament on the 16th July 2007.


204. Rather than receiving the assistance and support I could properly expect from the relevant public employees, and receiving the statutory assistance, as guaranteed by Article 42, Paragraph 8 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002, I was, instead, subjected to a criminal conspiracy to obstruct me in the discharge of my duties, to harass me, to damage my public standing and to unlawfully engineer my removal from Ministerial Office.


205. I was unlawfully obstructed in the discharging of my lawful responsibilities and obligations as Minister for Health & Social Services.


206. These actions against me being – unambiguously – an attempt to sabotage effective child protection in Jersey, thus permitting, failing to prevent, sustaining and concealing the abuse of children.


207. Being lawfully engaged in attempting to expose several criminal offences against children, the obstructive and sabotaging actions taken against me constituting a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.


208. Further, given that many, if not all, of those so acting to obstruct and sabotage me in the discharge of my lawful duties, being the holders of ‘public office’, the actions against both me and the vulnerable children of Jersey amounting to the common law offence of ‘misconduct in a public office’.


209. The aforesaid criminal conspiracy against me is evidenced and demonstrated by Exhibit 1, submitted with this Affidavit.


210. Exhibit 1 being a file-note written by the recently retired Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police Force, Mr. Graham Power, on the 25th July 2007. Mr. Power wrote and filed this note immediately following a meeting of some senior civil servants at which Mr. Power was present.


211. Involved in the meeting in question – in addition to Mr. Power – were: –


212. Bill Ogley, Chief Executive to the Council of Ministers and the Head of Jersey’s Paid Services.


213. Mike Pollard, the then Chief Executive of Health & Social Services.


214. Tom McKeon, the then Chief Executive of the Education Sport and Culture department.


215. Ian Crich, the then Director of States of Jersey Human Resources.


216. Exhibit 1 is self-explanatory, but particular attention is drawn to this sentence of Mr. Power’s file note:


217. “I was left with the clear impression they were attempting to draw me, in my capacity as Chief of Police, into a civil service led attempt to remove a Minister from Office.”


218. It is plain from this evidence from an authoritative and highly credible witness that a criminal conspiracy was undertaken against me in order to prevent me from discharging my lawful duties in respect of child protection.


219. Further, similar evidence exists in the form of the corresponding file note written by Detective Inspector Alison Fossey, who was present at the contemporaneous meeting of the then Jersey Child Protection Committee, which was likewise involved in the criminal conspiracy against me, in my capacity as the lawful, public authority with responsibility for child protection.


220. Also particularly involved in the conspiracy against me were, inter alios:


221. Marnie Baudains, the Directorate Manager of Social Services;


222. Richard Jouault, the Deputy Chief Executive of H & SS.


223. The criminal conspiracy against me representing nothing less than a complete breakdown in the rule of law, of democracy, of accountability and of functioning child protection in Jersey.


224. The criminal conspiracy against me by the senior States of Jersey employees in question, was joined by the then Chief Minister and Council of Ministers, who agreed to undertake the necessary procedures to have me dismissed from the Office of Health & Social Services Minister.


225. I have – in respect of many of the criminally unlawful acts described above – made several formal criminal complaints to the States of Jersey Police Force; these have involved the giving of several signed statements.


226. It is clear on the available evidence that several serious criminal acts have been committed over a period of time, in respect of child protection failures, and, resultantly, against me, of which I am aware, and for which more than prima facie evidence is available.


227. The offences complained of, include: –


228. Breaches of the Children (Jersey) Law 1969;


229. Breaches of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002;


230. Conspiracies to pervert the course of justice;


231. Misconduct in a public office.


232. The individuals complained of include, inter alios: –


232.1.1. Mike Pollard;


232.1.2. Bill Ogley;


232.1.3. Marnie Baudains;


232.1.4. John Le Breton;


232.1.5. Piers Baker;


232.1.6. Frances Hamon;


232.1.7. Emma Martins;


232.1.8. Frank Walker;


232.1.9. William Bailhache;


232.1.10. Iris Le Fevre.


233. Notwithstanding the powerfully evidenced case against these individuals none have been charged.


234. The failure to prosecute those who have – prima facie – committed criminal offences against me and others – must stand in marked and stark contrast to the manifestly disproportionate actions taken against me. It demonstrates the overt politicisation of the prosecution function in Jersey.


235. I – as do all people – enjoy the protections described in the European Convention on Human Rights. Many of those fundamental rights have given rise to case-law which shows a right to be protected from criminal acts.


236. The same failure to prosecute those who have committed offences against me, is of a very similarly kind to the politically motivated and contaminated decisions to not prosecute States employees who have abused children, those in positions of authority who have concealed child abuse, and public departments of the States where such departments have – as public authorities – broken the Children Law themselves.


237. And it is in the decades-old habit of not prosecuting serious crimes of all descriptions, when to do so would be embarrassing or problematic for the States of Jersey or the island’s ‘establishment’ in general – that the heart of the matter is found.


238. The overt habit of making politically motivated decisions on prosecutions is handed down from one Attorney General to the next like a disease.


239. There is an established legal requirement upon public authorities to act in the public good.


240. There is an established legal requirement for public authorities to avoid conflicts of interest – apparent or actual – and to act impartially and in a disinterested manner.


241. The Jersey prosecutory system fails to meet those standards, those tests – not only for the ‘apparent’ and ‘structural’ grounds described above – but also for an evidenced history of manifestly politicised actual prosecutory decisions.


242. Be those decisions to investigate and prosecute – as in the instant case, for example – or decisions not to investigate and prosecute, in many other cases; frequently, when to so prosecute would be problematic, embarrassing or damaging for the island’s establishment.


243. The determining factor often appears to be overtly political.


244. And – of great and central significance in respect of the instant case – many of the individuals who have, did or do occupy posts within the Jersey prosecutory apparatus, have been involved in certain of these historic, highly questionable prosecutory decisions.


245. A factor which has a highly significant bearing upon my recently terminated political work, as will be explained.


246. The reality of that overtly ‘political’ state of affairs is to be observed in many evidenced cases, but I will touch briefly upon a few.


247. 1: Unlawful dumping of toxic incinerator ash into sea-porous land-reclamation sites.


248. From 1979 until the late 1990’s, the combined ash from Jersey’s municipal waste incinerator was dumped – counter to both local laws and international convention – into the marine land-reclamation sites that form St. Helier’s Waterfront. The waste contains many significant human health hazards such as dioxins, furans, PCBs, and a variety of toxic heavy metals such as lead, mercury, cadmium, arsenic etc.


249. For many years I campaigned against this criminal activity – including to the point of drawing the unlawful actions to the attention of the then Attorney General, Michael Birt. I arranged an appointment at which I and a marine biologist would explain the facts to him. Mr. Birt cancelled at the last moment, so no meeting took place.


250. To this day, what is a grotesque and manifestly seriously criminal act by the Jersey authorities – has not been prosecuted by Jersey’s Attorney General, nor his Law Officer’s Department. The same Department which will have been providing legal advice to the States of Jersey departments committing the unlawful and hazardous toxic waste dumping.


251. 2: A series of rapes and indecent assaults committed against a number of female victims by an influential and powerful local figure.


252. Notwithstanding a very long-term police investigation – and the existence of a significant number of victims – most of who are not known to one another – the individual concerned has never been charged.


253. 3: Numerous – and frequently quite brazen – attempts to pervert the course of justice.


254. Perverting, and attempting to pervert, the course of justice in Jersey is so wildly common, it is difficult to have it recognised as a criminal offence.


255. Indeed, the Attorney General’s Department itself willingly accommodates such criminality.


256. For example, the proprietor of a local tow-truck business was bribing a number of police officers in exchange for receiving the call-out business to motor traffic accidents. Although the then leadership of the police strove to have the officers concerned, and the person committing the bribery prosecuted, such was the reluctance on the part of the Attorney General’s Office to proceed, only one officer was prosecuted for comparatively minor charges – and the business proprietor – even though admitting the bribery in open court, eventually had the charges against him dropped.


257. The dropping of the charges occurred some time after two politicians – Sarah Ferguson and Colin Egre – who were acquaintances of the accused, sought – and were granted – a private, secret meeting with the then Attorney General, William Bailhache – for the purpose of interceding on their acquaintance’s behalf.


258. Not only should the prosecution of the man accused of bribery have proceeded to a conclusion – the two politicians – and the then Attorney General himself – should have been investigated and charged for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.


259. A further, recent and similar case occurred, when the then Housing Minister, Terry Le Main, sought to intervene repeatedly in order to prevent the prosecution of a friend of his, and then further sought to have any penalty reduced. The man in question had not only been charged – and subsequently convicted of breaches of the Housing regulations – the very area of responsibility of Terry Le Main – but, it transpired, had also paid Terry Le Main’s election expenses for many years.


260. Those acts amounted to both bribery, and an attempted perversion of the course of justice by a Minister.


261. No charges have been brought.


262. 4: So many examples of misconduct in a public office it would be difficult to itemise them.


263. Misconduct in a public office – by senior civil servants, politicians, Law Officers, members of the judiciary, police and others – is so widespread it is an ingrained culture.


264. For example, recently, very substantial sums of public money were “granted” by the Health & Social Services Department in – supposed – ‘support’ of a charity that sought to assist care leavers. A Jersey branch was established – originally in good faith with the support of people, including myself. Yet the local organisation was evidencedly suborned and subverted by certain individuals based in the UK, who were – clearly and on the evidence – being bribed – with tax-payers money – by corrupt senior civil servants in the Jersey Health & Social Services Department – in order to corral, pacify and control local victims of child abuse, and to nullify and undermine the organisation, the Jersey Care Leavers Association. The UK based individuals – with the full knowledge and connivance of Jersey civil servants, engineered a manifestly unlawful ‘take-over’ of the JCLA, by plainly inadequate local individuals, who proceeded to steal significant sums of the public moneys made over to the JCLA.


265. Legitimate and well-intentioned members of the JCLA strongly resisted this lawlessness and straightforward criminality – but were – for a long time – thwarted by the UK based individuals who were manipulating events, with the support of Jersey Health & Social Services.


266. A good, non-corrupt member of the JCLA repeatedly e-mailed their concerns over the months to H & SS – only to be lied to and ignored. Eventually, the good local members finally succeeded in wresting control of the organisation back from the criminals who had hi-jacked it. Upon doing so – as expected – much evidence of brazen fraud and the naked theft of public money was revealed.


267. This was reported to the police by the legitimate Chair of the JCLA.


268. She was – eventually – told by the police that they had zero interest in investigating the fraud and theft of public money; if she wished it to be taken forward – she would have to investigate it herself, and furnish the police with more evidence.


269. Quite in addition to being criminal fraud involving external individuals who have been bribed using taxpayers money which has been fraudulently obtained and used by senior civil servants – the conduct of the staff in question is also – prima facie – misconduct in a public office.


270. The police have simply refused to investigate it.


271. 5: Numerous examples of police corruption.


272. Too vast to catalogue, but see 3 and 4 above.


273. 6: Frequent firearms offences – often involving some deeply alarming weaponry.


274. Jersey’s firearms legislation is extremely lax by UK standards. But even the law, such as it is, has proven virtually impossible to enforce. Decent, senior professional police officers have made the attempt – but there is a massive reluctance on the part of the Attorney General’s Office to prosecute people for lapsed or non-existent firearms licences.


275. 7: Widespread and virtually openly-practiced corruption – especially in respect of planning and development permissions.


276. Notwithstanding the fact that Jersey has some of the highest land-values on Earth, a seemingly inexhaustible demand for accommodation, limited land-supply, immensely high property prices and a massive accommodation industry – the island has – apparently uniquely in the entire modern world – never had a case of major planning corruption. Or it has simply not suited the Office of the Attorney General to ever prosecute any of the many examples of such widespread corruption.


277. It should be closely noted that, in respect of the instant case – the criminal concealment of wide-spread planning corruption – involving highly placed politicians – and the unlawful concealment of that planning corruption – and the oppression of honest attempts to expose it – with the direct involvement in that unlawful concealment of no less figures than the then Attorney General, William Bailhache and his brother – the then Bailiff Sir Philip Bailhache – the surveillance and action taken against me – the raid on the home I shared with Deputy Carolyn Labey – and consequent unlawful search without a search warrant – is one of the central elements which demonstrate the action against me to be a malicious prosecution.


278. 8: Serial murder; the case of ‘Nurse M’.


279. As mentioned above, in 1999, a male nurse was suspected of murdering a number of frail elderly patients in Jersey’s general hospital. A police investigation was launched, and a significant amount of evidence was gathered. At an early stage, an initial police report to the Attorney General’s Office was produced.


280. It is this case concerning the serial killer nurse that forms the basis of the DPL charges against me.


281. I had obtained a copy of the police report, and, following no action from the Jersey prosecutory authorities to re-open and correctly investigate the case, it is alleged that I unlawfully published the report in question.


282. The then Attorney General who unlawfully failed to ensure that the killer was fully investigated, and prosecuted, was Michael Birt, currently the Bailiff.


283. At that time, the key agent of the Attorney General who worked on the abandoned investigation was one Cyril Whelan.


284. Cyril Whelan now being a close colleague of Advocate Stephen Baker, working for the same firm.


285. 9: Many, many examples of child abuse.


286. As the former Minster for Health & Social Services – I had political – and legal – responsibility for child protection.


287. Of all Jersey politicians who have held the responsibility for child protection since the end of WWII, I was the first – and only – to recognise gross and systemic failures in the island’s child protection systems, and to speak-out against them.


288. The Office of Attorney General – by way of contrast – has evidencedly sought to obstruct much of the investigative work into child-abuse and the necessary prosecutions.


289. Advocate Stephen Baker – the lawyer prosecuting me, as the Attorney General’s agent – was key amongst those seeking to minimise the range of abusers brought to charge. For example, in the case of the Maguires.


290. This is an evinced fact.


291. Only with massive reluctance have a few, token abusers been brought to account.


292. Of great and central significance to this case is the unlawful protections provided to – and failures to prosecute – two well-evidenced abusers – Jane and Alan Maguire.


293. Of all of the many malfeasant examples of the concealment of child abuse, the case of the Maguires was, perhaps, the most central of those I was working on.


294. I sought-out, and made contact with the victims, and I obtained evidence for the unlawful concealment of the crimes of the Maguires – and the unlawful abandonment of the prosecution of them – by then Attorney General, Michael Birt.


295. I have also – in recent months – obtained further evidence – which shows the more recent attempts by the police to have the Maguires extradited from France – and fully tried for crimes against children – to have been unlawfully obstructed by the then Attorney General, William Bailhache – the man responsible for the instant malicious prosecution against me – and – of equal significance – the direct, intimate and pro-active involvement of Advocate Stephen Baker – acting as an agent for Mr. Bailhache – and now Mr. Le Cocq – in the obstruction of the bringing the Maguires to justice.


296. That fact – alone – renders every single action taken against me – throughout the entire episode – which in any way involved William Bailhache and/or Stephen Baker – apparently biased – actually biased – and to render the public authority they represent wholly incapable of being disinterested in the outcome of the cases against me.


297. 10: Many, many examples of the unlawful concealment of child abuse; not least, certain cases of concealment involving the Attorney General and his Law Officers’ Department itself.


298. To cite just briefly three examples of the brazenly unlawful failures to bring to justice those who have – evidencedly – unlawfully concealed child abuse.


299. Firstly, I have touched upon the case of the Maguires above.


300. So many public authorities, employees – and the prosecution system – have been involved in concealing the abuse committed by the Maguires that only the Judicial Review hearings will furnish sufficient time to examine all that evidence.


301. Secondly, the persistent child abuse that was taking place at Victoria College was knowingly – and pro-actively – concealed by a number of senior individuals. For example, Piers Baker, Jack Hydes, Commissioner Frances Hamon and now Jurat John Le Breton. The case that those individuals should have been prosecuted for concealing child abuse is massive and simply overwhelming.


302. None have ever been charged.


303. The Attorney General at the time who failed to bring these people to justice was Michael Birt – now the Bailiff.


304. Thirdly, many of the cases of child abuse that I began to discover when Health & Social Services Minister were pro-actively – evidencedly – unlawfully concealed by many senior individuals – to greater or lesser degrees of involvement – for example, Marnie Baudains, the Directorate Manger of Social Services, Bill Ogley, the Chief Executive, William Bailhache, the then Attorney General and Emma Martins, the Data Protection Commissioner.


305. It is of the utmost significance that not one – I repeat, not one – of the very many extremely well-evidenced examples of the unlawful concealment of child abuse and concealment of child protection failures, has been prosecuted. Indeed, many charges of overt failures to protect children – as defined in both the Children (Jersey) Law 1969 and the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 could have, and should have, been prosecuted.


306. Indeed – many charges of misconduct in a public office should have been brought on similar grounds.


307. Not one has.


308. And at the very heart of that conundrum – is the Office of Jersey Attorney General, the Law Officers Department – and – at least – the last three incumbents of the post – Michael Birt – William Bailhache – and Timothy Le Cocq.


309. There are a variety of unlawful characteristics, policies and actions which give the causes of action in this application. However, I will next concentrate on the central unlawful characteristics of the powers, roles and functions of the Attorney General and the Office he holds.


310. To truly understand just how great a concentration of power resides with the Jersey Attorney General – and to understand why that Office is invariably so politically contaminating, it is necessary to understand how the prosecution system of Jersey functions.


311. Jersey does not possess regional Crown Prosecutors, overseen by a central Director of Public Prosecutions. There is thus an immediate absence of a sufficiently broad and distanced check and balance within Jersey’s prosecution system itself, with the Attorney General, Solicitor General and Crown Advocates being closely known to one another. Indeed, often being friends, and colleagues in previous roles.


312. The Attorney General and his Law Officers’ Department stand hopelessly and irredeemably beset by manifestly incompatible interests, powers, functions and conflicts.


313. It is also worth noting – as a further example of the extraordinary concentration of power the Office holds, that in Jersey it is not possible at law to mount private prosecutions for alleged criminal acts.


314. It should also be noted – most strongly noted – that the role of Attorney General in Jersey is, effectively, a political role.


315. The post-holder enjoys an automatic, non-voting, but un-elected and speaking seat in Jersey’s parliament, where the custom and practise is for the Attorney General to make both political and legal speeches and interventions, thus exercising great influence upon proceedings in the assembly. Many, many such speeches, interventions, answers and opinions – covering a period of many years – are there to be read in the States of Jersey Hansard.


316. Further – the Attorney General also enjoys an automatic right of attendance at all meetings of the legislature’s Privileges and Procedures Committee, where the post-holder dispenses “advice”, contributes to discussions and makes recommendations, this in addition to providing written “legal” advice. This role of the Attorney General frequently leading to the anti-democratic oppression of minority, ‘opposition’ members.


317. Of even greater conflict in the role of Attorney General in Jersey is the fact the post-holder enjoys an automatic right of attendance at all meetings of the island’s cabinet – the Council of Ministers – where he participates in the political discussions of Jersey’s executive – in addition to acting as the legal adviser to the said body.


318. The Office of Attorney General and the Law Officer’s Department, over which he presides, is also responsible for legal advice to individual Ministers and departments of the States of Jersey.


319. The politicised and conflicted nature of the prosecution system in Jersey has the effect of denying to the public the protections of one of the very fundamental checks and balances that respectable, modern democracies have traditionally enjoyed: the objective and impartial enforcement of the law.


320. The prosecution system of Jersey is politicised.


321. Both in structure and in practice it is entwined with, and shares interests with, the executive and the legislature.


322. Such a status renders it incapable of carrying out certain prosecution functions lawfully.


323. The prosecution system of Jersey is self-interested – being conflicted – in having its own malfeasances to hide; a status that continues to drive further unlawful decisions and actions by the Office.


324. The fact that the Attorney General’s Office and the Law Officers Department over which he presides, is a public authority which carries an amalgam of overlapping, often conflicting, and mutually exclusive powers, is not disputable, such structural arrangements being openly admitted in the Department’s own public description of its duties as a public authority.


325. Equally, it is the case in law – and on the authorities – that such a concentration of disparate – and frequently conflicting – powers, cannot reliably be exercised in a manner that is lawful, if the exercise of those powers and public law responsibilities render the public authority in question to be conflicted, to appear conflicted, to be in a position of acting inconsistently, to act unfairly, to act against the public good, to be in a position of acting in – or being seen to act in – its own interests, and of exercising statutory powers for purposes for which they were not intended.


326. One of the centrally important matters raised by this judicial review application is the question of the reviewability of prosecution decisions. The Office of Attorney General – at present – claims, no matter how erroneously, that its decisions on prosecution matters should not be subject to judicial review. It is a point that merits some scrutiny at this stage.


327. In asserting a defence of ‘non-reviewability’ the Attorney General has pointed to extant case-law, principally from other jurisdictions, where the courts have held against judicial review of prosecution decisions, in all but the rarest of circumstances.


328. A number of legitimate and powerful arguments against the position of the Attorney General can, and will, be adduced. However, one point merits especial attention at this stage.


329. When considering the case-law and authorities from, say, England, in respect of attempts to judicially review prosecution decisions, the prosecution decisions that the courts have been asked to scrutinise, have been made by uncontaminated public authorities – whose sole function is the determination of, and conduct of, prosecutions. The Crown Prosecution Service – and the Director of Public Prosecutions – exist to fulfil those specific functions.


330. That prosecution apparatus is thus free from other considerations – free from contaminating and conflicting roles and functions. Therefore the reluctance of the courts – in all but rare circumstances – to intervene in the exercise of a discretionary power – as exercised by a dedicated public authority, is understandable.


331. However, when considering the prosecution apparatus of Jersey, we are not considering an independent structure – a dedicated apparatus – free of contaminating and conflicting powers, duties and functions – whose sole remit is to consider the merits of prosecutions and to conduct those prosecutions.


332. Instead – in the case of the Jersey Attorney General and his Office, we are dealing with a public authority – which is the sole authority for determining and conducting prosecutions – but yet also carries a variety of other direct powers and responsibilities. For example, providing legal advice to individual departments of the States of Jersey, individual Ministers, to the executive as a whole, the Council of Ministers itself and to the States assembly.


333. Such diverse duties, responsibilities and powers invariably place the Attorney General, his Office and his decisions in close, partisan alignment with other public authorities and, effectively, commit the Office of Attorney General to de facto political positions.


334. But – if the Office of Attorney General – in the peculiar context of Jersey – is able to act in partisan, political ways – is able to adopt and support particular courses of action by other agencies – is, effectively, aligned with public policy actions of arms of the executive – then, in acting in such ways, the Office of Attorney General must be susceptible to judicial review – because it is acting as a ‘public authority’ in a broad sense, so – like other public authorities, the lawfulness of its actions, use of its powers and its decisions must be susceptible to judicial review.


335. It is, of course, argued that it is possible to compartmentalise the roles and powers of the Office of Jersey Attorney General. It is propounded that the Attorney General may routinely take part in meetings of the cabinet – the Council of Ministers – where he participates in discussions and advises the said body – but then, one week, be expected to make apparently and actually impartial decisions as to whether to mount what may be prosecutions directly against substantial parts of that very same executive apparatus he has been routinely advising.


336. It scarcely requires stating, but such an arrangement is not capable of satisfying the established legal requirements upon public authorities – in this case the Office of Attorney General – that they act impartially, be seen to act impartially, do not act in self-interested ways, act in the public interest and act fairly.


337. Nor can such an arrangement satisfy the legitimate public expectation that there will be the objective and impartial rule of law, and that the law will be objectively enforced upon the executive and public departments should they break the law.


338. However – an even greater problem besets the Office of Jersey Attorney General. Given the Office and the post-holder do play an active and important role within and amongst executive public authorities – a role that does overlap and impinge upon prosecution powers – can it be right for the Office to suddenly claim immunity from judicial review – immunity from the oversight and scrutiny of the courts – when the Office’s de facto political / executive involvements are challenged?


339. The Jersey Attorney General and his Office cannot play an involved, partisan legal role, in pro-active support of the legislature and the executive on a week-to-week basis – happily enmeshed in, and allied to, the world of public authorities, advising and guiding them – and then suddenly run for cover, behind the carapace of a ‘prosecutors usual non-reviewability’ – when it suits the purposes of the Office to be sheltered from the proper scrutiny and oversight of the courts.


340. In Jersey – for good or ill – the Office of Attorney General – in addition to being the Crown Prosecution Service of Jersey, and its Director of Public Prosecutions – is – unlike those services in England – also closely involved in partisan, pro-active political work with the executive. The Office therefore cannot pick-and-choose when it will – and when it will not – be susceptible to judicial review.


341. That is doubly – and even more inescapably the case when – as in the extant application – the legal and political enmeshments of the Jersey Attorney General’s Office with the executive, involves overtly politicised, biased, unfair, inconsistent – and even corrupt – decisions in respect of who will – or will not – be prosecuted.


342. The arguments advanced above are not theoretical.


343. A variety of profoundly disturbing prosecution actions and decisions have been described above.


344. These being decisions to initiate police surveillance, investigations and raids, and to prosecute on the one hand – and to refuse to investigate and/or to prosecute on the other.


345. It is accepted that decisions on prosecutions are usually regarded as ‘discretionary’, and that a degree of lee-way is permissible; that prosecution public authorities are granted the power to exercise discretion.


346. However, public authorities that possess discretionary powers owe various basic duties, the breach of any of which can justify the court’s intervention.


347. Such basic duties include, inter alios, the duty to act in the public interest; to act in good faith; to act reasonably; to act proportionately; to promote the legislative purpose; to act fairly; to act lawfully, for example, not cause and maintain breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights.


348. The Attorney General and his Office have breached all such duties insofar as the matters complained of in this application are concerned.


349. A closely related means of expressing the legitimate expectation upon a public authority is that the authority in question should only exercise the powers conferred on the authority for the purposes envisaged by the legislation granting the powers in question.


350. The Attorney General and his Office have breached that legitimate public expectation. For example, the powers vested in his Office have been misused for the improper and unlawful purposes of protecting criminals, and oppressing me in my attempts to expose criminal activity.


351. The present – profoundly conflicted – nature of the role and Office of Attorney General in Jersey is not lawful.


352. It is not capable of meeting established standards of objectivity.


353. It is not capable of fulfilling – nor being seen to fulfil – those requirements that are placed upon a prosecutory authority through the practical application of the ECHR as applicable to all public authorities.


354. It is, therefore, against that background that the police surveillance mounted against me and my former partner, the massed police-raid on her home, my detention in a windowless police cell for the best part of seven and a half hours – and the search of the property from top to bottom – without a search warrant – must be viewed as a matter of fundamental public importance.


355. That unlawful police activity – and the subsequent unlawful conduct of the prosecution – have been driven, overseen, advised and conducted – by Jersey’s Attorney General’s Office and his Law Officers’ Department – a public authority that is – effectively – little more than the legal-enforcement wing of the island’s entrenched, political establishment.


356. In short – the police action – and the conduct of the prosecution against me – are – under these bizarre Jersey circumstances – impossible to safely view as objective and impartial – and can only be credibly viewed – given the disproportionality involved – as the gross misuse of law enforcement powers for the improper and illegitimate purposes of the straight-forward political oppression of a senior opposition politician; a political ‘dissident’.


357. This is doubly the case – given the direct, active and central involvement of Jersey’s sole prosecuting authority in the very heart of the island’s political executive and in its legislature.


358. It is clear that a culture of graft, bribery, corruption, misconduct in a public office, cronyism, and blackmail, abuse of powers and culture of concealment is so entrenched in the local business, political, media and legal environment, and is readily accepted in those circles. It is so entrenched, the island has its own name for the practice, “The Jersey Way”.


359. The general laxity shown towards a variety of ingrained criminal conducts demonstrates a prosecution system heavily geared towards the improper and politically motivated protection of Jersey’s governing and administering class.


360. Additionally – the stark and remarkable contrast in the approach and conduct of the Attorney Generals’ Office between, on the one hand, protecting people such as senior civil servants who have evidencedly criminally concealed child abuse – and on the other, engaging in massed police raids, unlawful imprisonment and unlawful searches without a warrant against me – at the time the senior elected member of the House – demonstrates clear illegality.


361. That support for the protection of public employees who have – prima facie – acted criminally exists is there to be seen in the extraordinary supports and protections that have been afforded to overt and obvious criminals – in an attempt to assist them in disguising their – and consequently the States of Jersey’s – own malfeasant and criminal conduct – and instead depict the criminals as “innocent victims” – and, by way of contrast, to persecute those like me and other whistle-blowers who have sought to expose wrongdoing – and to depict us as villains.


362. The defence case.


363. Throughout these proceedings it has been the position of the defence that the actions taken against the defendant are an abuse of process, and, additionally, that no offence has been committed given the unambiguous statutory defences described in the DPL, in respect of justifiable disclosure on the grounds of public interest to prevent and detect crime, and, further, the publication of information in respect of journalism.


364. The defence has been unlawfully obstructed by the Attorney General’s prosecution in being able to obtain and adduce evidence that goes to both the abuse of process arguments – and the public interest disclosure arguments.


365. Further – and as described above – it is now very, very strongly my belief that the unlawful police surveillance, unlawful raid, arrest, detention, search without a warrant, and charging with the four charges – were all a priori components leading up to what is a malicious prosecution.


366. In my defence I am therefore, now adding malicious prosecution to the arguments.


367. To be clear – there are – so far as I can tell, being legally unrepresented – three main features to the defence case. These are: –


368. 1: Malicious prosecution.


369. 2: Abuse of process.


370. 3: No case to answer on grounds of public interest disclosure, journalistic work and artistic expression.


371. (A fourth element arises – which is hypothetical at this stage – which is that in the event of conviction, a person has a right to the disclosure of evidence that would show mitigating factors, and which would have an impact on sentencing. There is very well-established ECHR case-law on this point. In the hypothetical circumstances of conviction – much of the evidence which has not been disclosed during trial would have to be sought in any event for the purposes of mitigation and sentence reduction.)


372. Arguments 1 and 2 have been massively and improperly obstructed by Attorney General and his agent. Having said that – it is acknowledged the malicious prosecution is a new argument, only able to now be made due to the acquisition of some further evidence – but the point remains. Both arguments place upon the defence, the burden of proof. The defence has been unable to run, even the abuse of process defence – because of the unlawful refusal to disclose evidence by your conflicted agent, Advocate Stephen Baker.


373. Of all of the many and evidenced unlawful components in the conduct of the prosecution against me since charges were laid – the most harmful, improper and damaging has been the refusal to properly disclose evidence necessary to the defence arguments.


374. These immensely obstructive and damaging denials of disclosure have been the decisions of the highly conflicted – and thus unlawfully involved – Advocate Stephen Baker.


375. It is quite bad enough that I have been denied effective legal representation of my choice – contra Article 6 of the ECHR, thus causing me to have to defend myself; it is many times worse when what is already a grossly uneven playing field – in which I have no equality of arms – is further massively tilted against me by unlawful refusals to disclose information necessary to the defence arguments.


376. In the case of an abuse-of-process argument – the burden of proof lays with the defence.


377. The defence must produce the evidence which proves the abuse of process claim.


378. The defence can never hope to succeed in mounting what is an entirely legitimate and proper argument – if the very public authority at the heart of the abuse of process alleged – which holds the evidence which would prove its culpability – can simply decide to refuse to disclose that evidence.


379. That is – precisely – what has happened in this case.


380. Advocate Baker has repeatedly – and unlawfully – refused to disclose evidence, arguing that the evidence sought was “not relevant to the charges”; a statement of itself highly disputable. But – nevertheless – the evidence sought most definitely is of great – absolutely central – importance to the defence abuse of process argument.


381. And argument of which – as the authorities show – the burden of proof lays with the defence.


382. But – at risk of repetition – in a catch-22 situation – the defence can never hope to meet that burden of proof – when evidence known to exist, is unlawfully withheld from the defence by a culpable and conflicted prosecution.


383. A prosecution which cannot hope to meet the test of evidenced bias, the appearance of bias and of being disinterested in the outcome of the decisions.


384. But then – turning to the malicious prosecution argument – an even greater test is placed upon the defence.


385. The authorities show that a high threshold of evidence is required to be met in order to prove malicious prosecution.


386. Some evidence to that effect is already in my possession.


387. However – I am aware of the existence of much further evidence which would – without question – before any civilised and impartial court – enable the defence to prove malicious prosecution.


388. The defence – which has not even been able to obtain known evidence that goes to the abuse of process argument – and has been faced with repeated examples of perjury by the unlawfully conflicted Advocate Stephen Baker – will have zero chance of securing disclosure of that evidence for as long as such a disastrously and hopelessly conflicted public authority remains involved in the prosecutions against me.


389. Let there be no mistake about this – the instant case against me – the alleged unlawful public exposure of an evidenced serial killer that the Jersey prosecutory authorities failed – evidencedly and unarguably failed – to properly investigate – the covert and unlawful police surveillance – the inextricably and heavily entwined issues of multiple child abuse cases and failures to prosecute, and consequent unlawful concealments – the unlawful police raid – the conduct of the prosecution against me – and many of the senior individuals closely involved in the above actions – renders the prosecution system of Jersey – itself – irredeemably and catastrophically conflicted in respect of the actions against me.


390. Conflicted in ways which are fatal.


391. THE prosecution authority and apparatus of Jersey IS the PARTY who’s MALFEASANCES I was attempting to EXPOSE.


392. For example, I offer some detail in connection of the case of Nurse M, the case I am being prosecuted for, in an attempt to conceal the past malfeasance of the Office of Attorney General.


393. A serial killer male nurse: Michael Birt abandons the investigation.


394. Nurse M is a Nurse, registered with the NMC. He is a text-book example of a psychopath, satisfying – on the evidence – virtually every criteria for diagnosing psychopathy.


395. He is a deeply manipulative liar; obsessed with violence, firearms and death; has a record of savage violence, especially towards women; a serial rapist; a thief; controlling; capable of appearing charming, or acting in a way to elicit sympathy, when to do so suits his purposes.


396. In early May 1999 – following a complaint from a former girlfriend – he was convicted of stealing drugs from Jersey’s hospital.


397. However, when investigations of Nurse M began, the police very rapidly realised they were dealing with an extremely dangerous psychopath. The following passages are taken from a 1999 secret police report, made public following refusals of the authorities to re-open the case.


398. Quotes from Police Report of May 1999: –


398.1.1. “On Thursday, 1st April, 1999, Police Officers attended the home address of a female who disclosed that[Nurse M] a Staff Nurse on Corbiere Ward, had stolen and stored drugs at her home address. The female, an ex-lover of [Nurse M], produced to the officers, drugs in the form of Valium and Hypnoval, together with a syringe containing clear liquid and several packets of Coproxamol. These have since been identified and their content verified. Hypnoval is more commonly known as a ‘date rape’ drug. Enquiries confirmed that the drugs were from the hospital and indeed had been sent from the Hospital Pharmacy to Corbiere Ward, where [Nurse M] worked.


A check on the Firearms Register held at Police Headquarters, revealed that [Nurse M] had possession of several firearms, and that his Firearms License had expired in October, 1998. The female who handed the drugs to the Police confirmed that [Nurse M] had attended at her premises with a loaded firearm.


[Nurse M] was arrested on returning to the Island on the 17th April, 1999, and, armed with a Warrant, his home address was searched. During the search, the following property was recovered.


1. One lump of brown cannabis resin, tablets and scales.


2. Knuckle-duster.


3. A Police Philips radio (in working order).


4. Bag containing various medications.


5. Eleven syringes with a clear liquid within, and other medication, including


two bottles of potassium chloride.


6. Six firearms, with large quantity of ammunition.


7. One expired Firearms Certificate.


[Nurse M] was interviewed concerning the medication found, and at first suggested that the insulin in the eleven syringes was intended as an aid to body-building. He later changed this story, in that he intended to kill himself with the medication, by marching down to the Cenotaph in military dress, where he would inject himself with a lethal dose of insulin and potassium chloride.”


398.1.2. The report continues:


398.1.3. “Police Surgeon Dr. Michael HOLMES first expressed concern when he viewed the drugs recovered, in that a combination of insulin and potassium would be very difficult to detect in the body. Added to this, the amount of drugs in the possession of [Nurse M] cast doubt on his account, in that he had several lethal doses of drug. If a person with a serious medical history were to be injected with the combination of drugs found in the possession of [Nurse M], the cause of death would not be clearly apparent. His possession of such drugs was therefore regarded as suspicious.


398.1.4. “Enquiries have continued over the last three weeks, and have established that [Nurse M] has had several affairs with either patients or relatives of patients at the General Hospital.”


398.1.5. The report goes on to state:


398.1.6. “Incident 1 – an elderly male admitted to Corbiere Ward (name unknown) suffered a heart attack which was further complicated when his insulin levels became abnormal. He was placed on a glucose drip, which is the normal procedure. The drip had been inserted correctly, and was working fine when Nurse A checked the patient on the previous evening in question. Nurse [M] handed over to a nurse on the ward, just prior to Nurse A arriving for duty (the am. shift). On this occasion, [Nurse M] had not worked with Nurse A and the normal team. As normal, the nurse checked on her patient and discovered, to her horror, that the glucose drip had been disconnected from the patient, and a bung put into the base, preventing the substance from leaking. The patient was unconscious and close to death. The nurse reconnected the drip and the patient recovered within about ten minutes.”


398.1.7. The report further states:


398.1.8. “Incident 4 – A young girl was admitted to Corbiere Ward, following an overdose. [Nurse M] found her attempting to hang herself in the toilet on the ward. The patient was transferred to the APU, where it is alleged that the young girl disclosed to a member of staff that [Nurse M] had offered to show her how to commit suicide correctly.”


398.1.9. In reference to a statement from a former girlfriend of [Nurse M] from the time when he worked at Basingstoke Hospital, the report says this:


398.1.10. “She explained that they had experimented with [sexual activities excised], with her permission. This had, however, progressed to [Nurse M] becoming very violent, and he had on one occasion, thrown her over his shoulder and placed his knee on her chest, asking her if she wanted to die. She suffered a fractured sternum on this occasion. She alleges that the violence progressed to rape, and on one occasion, she was tied up on a table, naked, when he put a poker in the fire, took it out, placed it in water and ran it along her body at the time. Nurse B is very scared of [Nurse M], and she was spoken to by her line manager, after sporting a black eye and cut lip at work.”


399. For a short time after May 1999, the police investigations continued, and even more disturbing evidence came to light. However, against the strong, professional wish of the officer leading the investigation, Barry Faudemer, Michael Birt and his then agent, Crown Advocate Cyril Whelan and the then Police Chief decided the investigation was to be dropped.


400. Following the public interest disclosure of the 1999 report, in 2009, I was subjected to a banana-republic type massed police raid and arrest, authorised and driven by Michael Birt’s successor as Attorney General, William Bailhache.


401. Obviously – the publication of the report – revealing as it did the Jersey prosecutory authorities – on that occasion, Michael Birt – to have abandoned the investigation into a Harold Shipmanesque medical mass-murderer – essentially, to “avoid a scandal and the bad publicity” was devastating to the Jersey establishment.


402. There, it is well evidenced and illustrated that the actual prosecution apparatus of Jersey is directly and immediately conflicted – in seeking to oppress me – in order to stop me from exposing the extremely dangerous, past malfeasances of the Office of Attorney General.


403. The killer and serial rapist, meanwhile – [Nurse M] – remains at liberty and has – since 1999 – frequently worked in various private-sector nursing homes.


404. It is entirely feasible he has continued to kill; he could have murdered dozens upon dozens of frail, elderly people.


405. The man the then Attorney General, Michael Birt let off – in order to protect the Jersey authorities from a political scandal.


406. A further powerful example of the unlawful conflictedness of the Jersey prosecutory authorities in respect of me is to be seen in the case of the child abusers, the Maguires, as referred to above.


407. Jane and Alan Maguire: two evidenced child abusers.


408. This is the case of Mrs Jane Marie Maguire and Mr Alan William Maguire. The Act of Court – quoted below – records that the prosecution was abandoned on the 20th November 1998.


408.1.1. “Her Majesty’s Attorney General declared that he abandoned the prosecution against Alan William Maguire and Jane Marie Maguire on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support it.


408.1.2. The Court therefore discharged the said Alan William Maguire and Jane Marie Maguire from the prosecution and, by virtue of Article 2(1) (c) of the Costs in Criminal Cases (Jersey) Law, 1961, ordered the payment out of public funds of the costs of the defence”.


409. The assertion made by the then Attorney General, Michael Birt in the above statement to the court in respect of the abandonment of the prosecution of Jane and Alan Maguire constituted straightforward perjury – on two clear grounds.


410. The battery, torture and abuse of children, as committed by these two, formed a significant part of the subject matter of a BBC Panorama program, which was broadcast on Monday 31st March 2008.


411. The Maguires were routinely beating, abusing through grotesque punishments, neglecting and treating with great cruelty many of the children that passed through the ‘Blanche Pierre Group-Home’ they used to run for the then Education Committee, which body had responsibility for child “protection” at the relevant time (1980s to mid-1990s).


412. The concealment of the crimes of the Maguires was just one of the many cases that were drawn to my attention when then Health & Social Services Minister by whistle-blowers during 2007.


413. The accumulated evidence – which was drawn to the attention of the police – was in two substantial lever arch files and one smaller ring-binder file. The evidence contained in these files was absolutely compelling – and horrifying. Many witness statements, affidavits of victims, statements from other members of staff, an “internal” report from 1990 by the Children’s Service – all of which concluded that the actions complained of were happening. The documented evidence was, essentially, a catalogue of utter savagery against the children.


414. Notwithstanding a plain and evidenced conclusion of rampant abuse, reached in 1990 – 8 years before the police came to know of the crimes – the Children’s Service of the day failed to inform the police of the abuse – instead allowing Mrs McGuire to “retire” from running the group-home – and instead to go and work in the Family Development Centre.


415. Purely through happenstance, the States of Jersey Police became aware of the abuse episode – 8 years later – in 1998.


416. The Maguires were investigated and charged.


417. Yet the Office of Attorney General, asserted, as in the record of court quoted above, that there was “insufficient evidence” to continue the prosecution.


418. But the files of evidence described many children being routinely – over a period of years – beaten with fists, implements and other items which were used as weapons against them. They were frequently made to eat soap. They were held down and made to drink Dettol. One child had his head smashed violently against a bunk bed frame. One of the part-time support staff witnessed “Big Al” Maguire throw a three-year old child a distance of about 7 feet across a room to impact against the wall because the child was not tidying up to Maguire’s satisfaction. Psychological and emotional cruelty and abuse were routine. Female child residents were regularly sexually abused by Mr Maguire.


419. Most of these offences were evidenced, many witnessed by former victims or junior staff members – and yet the then Attorney General, claims to have had “insufficient evidence” to carry through a prosecution.


420. The decision of the Attorney General to not proceed with the prosecution was utterly perverse.


421. Clearly – to have prosecuted the Maguires would have been to expose to outrage and contempt a States of Jersey department for permitting the abuse to continue for a decade – the 1980s – and to have acted unlawfully in not informing the police the instant the abuse came to the department’s attention. Further, the department would have been viewed with even greater contempt and disgust by the public when it became known that Mrs Maguire was kept in employment by the department for some years afterwards – working in the Family Development Centre! It would also have meant exposing to contempt and disgrace a Jersey Establishment icon, Iris Le Feuvre, then President of the relevant Committee, who happily went along with the cover-up in 1990 and, moreover, wrote a quite sickening letter of “thanks” to the Maguires upon their “retirement”.


422. It is plain that the failure to see through the prosecution in this case represents a complete breakdown in the Rule of Law. An abandonment of justice in order to protect the “reputation” – such as it is – of the States of Jersey, and the island’s establishment in general. The victims of the Maguires were denied justice.


423. Very significantly, the Attorney General’s statement as recorded in the Act of Court quoted above, was also perjured in that it failed to mention – thus mislead the court through omission – that the – supposed – “ill health” of Maguire did, in fact, play a significant part in the internal discussions of the prosecution, when seeking reasons to abandon the prosecution.


424. The fact is, however, that no actual medical evidence of any kind, to justify Maguire’s claims of “advanced terminal cancer”, could be located by the police when they re-opened the investigation in 2008.


425. Not so much as GP’s sick-note.


426. In many ways, it could be argued that the abandonment of the prosecution of the Maguires serves as the most singular and well-evidenced example of both the malfeasance the then Attorney General, and of the contaminating, political imperatives that beset the Office of Attorney General in Jersey.


427. So overwhelmingly clear was the criminal case against the Maguires that the police – when re-investigating the case in 2008 – produced several internal, confidential studies of the events surrounding the two investigations.


428. To this day the many victims of the Maguires are still struggling to cope with shattered lives – and have been denied justice.


429. Denied Justice because of the clear politicisation or the Office of Attorney General.


430. It is also worth observing that the unlawful abandonment of the prosecution of the Maguires by Michael Birt, serves as a powerful example of the syndrome of inherited contamination of the Office of Attorney General.


431. Because the original – unlawful and improper – concealment of the crimes of the Maguires was undertaken by one Attorney General – Michael Birt – the same cover-up had to be continued and maintained by his successor, William Bailhache – ten years later.


432. Because had the reopening of the investigation by the police in 2008 been allowed to succeed – as it should have done – the result would have been not only the destruction of Michael Birt – for having improperly abandoned the first prosecution – it would also have destroyed the reputation and credibility of the present, dysfunctional Jersey system, which lacks a separation of powers, an independent DPP and any effective checks and balances.


433. The case of the Maguires should not be forgotten; it should serve as a central, powerful example of the politicisation and failures in Jersey’s prosecution and judicial systems.


434. I also draw to the attention of the court in this affidavit the fact that the conflicted role and powers of the Attorney General have given rise to unlawful breaches of the my rights and protections when a States member.


435. Article 47 of the States of Jersey Law 2005, which states: –


435.1.1. “A person who blackmails or attempts to blackmail or who offers any threat, assault, obstruction or molestation or attempt to compel by force or menace any member of the States, member of a committee of inquiry established under standing orders or officer of the States in order to influence him or her in his or her conduct as such member or officer, or for, or in respect of the promotion of or of opposition to any matter, proposition, question, bill, petition or other thing submitted or intended to be submitted to the States, the Council of Ministers, the Chief Minister, any other Minister, an Assistant Minister or any committee or panel established under standing orders, or who is a party to such an offence, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and a fine.”


436. I was – in respect of several important aspects of my duty as a States member – and in respect of my statutory duties as the then Minster for Health & Social Services – subjected to threats, obstructions, molestations, attempts to compel by menace – in order to influence me in my conduct – in respect of propositions, questions, bills and other things submitted, or intended to be submitted to the States, the Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister.


437. The committing of these criminal offences against me has caused me hardship, suffering, harm and loss.


438. I have not received the proper protections of the law in respect of these unlawful acts against me, given the exclusive power of the conflicted Attorney General’s Office to authorise prosecutions.


439. In general, it appears to be the case that prosecuting authorities are often allowed to draw a narrow boundary around that evidence they consider to be relevant, and thus disclosable.


440. Given that the exercise of such discretion by the prosecution to determine what it considers to be relevant – or not relevant – it is doubly important in the interests of justice that any prosecuting authority or agent exercising such power should be absolutely free of any form of personal or political conflict.


441. The decisions arrived at by a prosecutor as to which evidence they will disclose, will often have a profound impact upon the course of a trial. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to over-state just how important and dramatic a power is being exercised.


442. Indeed, the power of prosecuting authorities to largely determine for themselves what they will, or will not, disclose has been frequently supported by courts, with case-law existing.


443. Given the immense difficulty – the very high hurdles a defendant faces in challenging prosecution decisions on disclosure, it is of absolutely fundamental importance – in law and in the interests of natural justice – that the original decisions by the prosecution in respect of what it deems relevant evidence to disclose are taken with objectivity and professionalism – and exhibit no risk of actual or apparent bias – and nor involve the prosecuting authority in a conflicted interest in the outcome of the decisions at issue.


444. If bias and conflicts of interest exist at that early stage – for example, pre-trial disclosure – a defendant may well be denied justice throughout the entire procedure because a prosecutor has made tainted decisions in respect of disclosure of evidence.


445. The role of Attorney General in the island of Jersey embodies a variety of conflicting roles, of a kind that are rare, if not unique, in modern, Western democracies.


446. However, of particular relevance to this application is the following legislation:


447. The Magistrate’s Court (Miscellaneous Provisions (Jersey) Law 1949, as revised to 1st January 2006.


448. In particular, I refer to PART 4: –


449. PROSECUTION OF PROCEEDINGS


449.1.1. 14 Proceedings by a legally qualified prosecutor


449.1.2. The conduct of proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court may, with the approval of the Attorney General, be undertaken on behalf of the prosecution by –


449.1.3. an advocate; or


449.1.4. a solicitor or a person who has been admitted –


449.1.5. to the degree of the Utter Bar of one of the Inns of Court of


449.1.6. England and Wales, or


449.1.7. as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England and Wales, and who is employed in the Law Officers Department.

449.1.8. 15 Role of the Magistrate

449.1.9. In proceedings conducted in accordance with Article 14, the Magistrate shall perform only a judicial role.

450. The passage quoted above establishes that the Attorney General is responsible for the “proceedings” that are conducted in the Magistrates court, by the “legally qualified prosecutor” who the Attorney General has so approved to conduct the proceedings in question.

451. Paragraph 15 is also of significance. It establishes that where a criminal prosecution is being conducted by the professional prosecutor, as approved as his agent by the Attorney General, the presiding Magistrate shall perform only a judicial role; that being as opposed to performing an inquisitorial role.

452. It is therefore established in law that the professional prosecutor possesses very significant powers concerning the conduct of proceedings in the Magistrate’s court, with the Magistrate unable to engage in inquisitorial functions.

453. Admittedly my knowledge of such matters is not extensive, but from those researches I have been able to undertake, I have not been able to discover a case before Jersey’s Magistrates’ court in which the dominance, control – indeed – overt direction over the Magistrate – by the prosecuting lawyer – has been as staggeringly overt and brazen as it has been in the case as conducted against me by Advocate Stephen Baker.

454. Being originally denied effective legal representation – contra Article 6 of the ECHR – I have had to attempt to defend myself throughout the proceedings; a burden which has been immensely harmful and damaging to me. I left school at the age of fifteen with no academic qualifications, so attempting to defend myself against Jersey’s leading criminal lawyer has been extremely taxing. Doubly so when the lawyer in question is – on the evidence of the transcripts – running the court – and is personally conflicted thus improperly motivated – and who has regularly committed demonstrable perjury during the preliminary proceedings.

455. The above statements are readily demonstrable as fact, as having to represent myself did deliver one advantage, in that – after some argument – I was able to secure the production of transcripts of all of the hearings concerning my case.

456. The evidence of those transcripts is quite remarkable.

457. So frequent – and startlingly overt – are the “directions” and “guidance” and “advice” offered to the presiding Magistrate – Bridget Shaw – by Advocate Baker – and as equally staggering is the Magistrates passive acquiescence to such direction – that it is quite impossible – even with a willing, but honest, mind – to conceive of the court in these proceedings as constituting an impartial and objective tribunal.

458. Further facts become clear upon a close study of the transcripts.

459. For example, several examples of brazen perjury by Advocate Baker.

460. To cite one example, Advocate Baker denied I had been subjected to some form of long-term police surveillance. I discovered – through sources – that not only was Advocate Baker’s statement a brazen lie – I also discovered the identities of two of the police officers who had been assigned to the task of the surveillance, namely Mark Cane and Julia Jackson.

461. When confronted with this information through correspondence and at a later hearing, Advocate Baker was forced to concede that, yes, such surveillance had, in fact, taken place. He quoted from a note written by officer Mick Gradwell, which accepted that the surveillance had taken place – and that I had correctly identified the two officers in question.

462. However – in what – in many respects is one of the most alarmingly revealing statements of the entire unlawful saga, Gradwell’s note (which Advocate Baker has – unlawfully – refused to disclose to me) stated that these many months of targeted, covert police surveillance against me – had been conducted – supposedly – “because there was a ‘concern’ I might be writing defamatory comments on my internet blog”.

463. Whether words appearing on my internet blog may be defamatory is a civil law question – with the established and customary remedies available to anyone who feels they have been defamed.

464. When I last examined the situation – the Nazis had been ejected from Jersey in 1945.

465. I was not aware we retained some taint of a regime that considered it the right, and power, of the state – to abuse criminal law and the police – to act for those in favour with the government, in order to oppress those who may be saying disagreeable things about them.

466. The entire concept of the stretching, abusing and misapplication of the Jersey DPL – by the state – to, essentially, suppress criticisms, and oppress critics of the government and its agents, is not only manifestly unlawful – it is little short of an all-out assault on free, democratic society, which – if allowed to succeed – would render the strong scrutiny and effective criticism of government and public authorities in general, all but impossible.

467. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the prosecution being mounted against me – a prosecution which has unlawfully driven me from elected political office, is a matter of substantial public importance.

468. The prosecutory proceedings being run by the Attorney General and his agent, Advocate Baker are unlawful – and have been from the outset.

469. They are further unlawful – because they were initiated by the profoundly conflicted former Attorney General – William Bailhache.

470. There is an entirely unhealthy and closely overlapping conflicts of interest amongst and between all of the state powers in Jersey; there is no effective separation of powers. This situation is further compounded by the often extremely close personal friendships and acquaintances of the individuals involved in the apparatus.

471. The Jersey Crown Officers and their immediate circle are the prosecution system – they are the Court – they are the Court of Appeal – they are the friends and colleagues of many legal practitioners – they are the political allies of many senior politicians – they are answerable to no power, nor subject to oversight of any accountable authority in Jersey. It is a system that could have been designed to generate and entrench a Culture of Concealment – and of cronyism.

472. As an illustration of the incestuous nature of power and promotion in the Jersey prosecutory and judicial systems, it is useful to note the fact that Michael Birt qualified as an Advocate with the law firm Ogier & Le Cornu in 1977, where he practised until 1994, until then becoming Attorney General.

473. In 2007, a new Solicitor General was chosen – one Timothy Le Cocq; a person who has now followed the predicted course, and become Attorney General.

474. Before becoming Solicitor General, he too practiced at Ogiers.

475. At the time, Ogiers boasted of this fact on the firm’s web site, saying this:

475.1.1. “Tim Le Cocq appointed Her Majesty’s Solicitor General for Jersey.

475.1.2. One of Ogier’s Jersey partners Tim Le Cocq, has been appointed as Her Majesty’s Solicitor General for Jersey with effect from the retirement of the current Solicitor General, Stephanie Nicolle Q.C., at the end of March 2008.

475.1.3. Tim qualified as a Jersey advocate in 1985 and has been a partner in Ogier since February 1992. He will retire from the Ogier partnership at the end of January 2008 and is expected to be sworn in as Solicitor General in April 2008.

475.1.4. With Tim’s appointment, we see a continuation of the Ogier tradition of public service. Michael Birt and Julian Clyde-Smith, both former Ogier partners, currently hold the offices of Deputy Bailiff of Jersey and Commissioner of the Royal Court of Jersey respectively.”(Emphasis added.)

476. Added to that picture of the Birt, Le Cocq, Clyde-Smith clan, originating from Ogiers, it should also be noted that the recently retired Bailiff, Philip Bailhache, is the brother of the former Attorney General, now Deputy Bailiff, William Bailhache.

477. That information illustrates how the most powerful and publically important posts in Jersey prosecutory and judicial apparatus usually end up occupied by an incestuous amalgam of friends, colleague, former colleagues, quasi-political allies and even siblings.

478. As a further example of the inability of the administration of justice in Jersey – as presently structured – to meet modern, lawful requirements of impartiality, it can be noted that Michael Birt has extremely close professional and personal links with the Barristers who work from the Chambers of 7 Bedford Row. When Attorney General he began to funnel a great deal of the Jersey Law Officers’ department’s work to the occupants of 7 Bedford Row; a flow of work that, by now, must have attracted combined fees of many millions of pounds. A custom and practice that was continued by Mr. Birt’s successor as Attorney General, William Bailhache.

479. Indeed, it is worth noting that the recently recruited Solicitor General, Howard Sharp, was recruited from 7 Bedford Row.

480. For the all of the above reasons, the applicant strongly contends that the variety of actions taken against him – ostensibly in the name of the prosecutory and judicial apparatus of Jersey – cannot be safely viewed as objective and impartial and free of improper motives.

481. A judicial review is unavoidably necessary for the public law, public policy and public interest matters arising.

Sworn before me:


Stuart Syvret

at St Helier Jersey

This 24th day of September 2010

“THIS IS A COURT OF LAW, YOUNG MAN, NOT A COURT OF JUSTICE”

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Another day in Jersey’s Courts;
It’s just like the Nazis Never Left.

Right, I guess I’d better confess straight away; I can’t yet supply my readers with the crucial, core facts from yesterday’s ‘directions hearing’ in Jersey’s Magistrates’ court.

Shameful though it is – I spoke to the reporters from Jersey’s only “newspaper”, the Jersey Evening Post – more commonly known as The Rag – and gave them an exclusive.

So you will have to wait until the said journal emerges to in order to be appraised of the central public interest information.

Namely, what I was wearing when I attended court.

I even gave them the brands.

How’s that for a dynamite source?

In the mean time, readers of this blog will have to settle for a detailed description of the manifest ultra vires nature of the conduct of, and the proceedings of, what passes for ‘justice’ in Jersey’s courts.

It was, of course, tediously predictable in oh-so many ways.

I was given half-an-hour to read some medical evidence – and then denied an adjournment in order to give it detailed consideration or seek a second opinion.

I was – again – refused disclosure of much of the crucial evidence required to show the abuse process argument – and to evidence the public interest disclosure defence.

I was flatly refused an adjournment – even though – in light of newly obtained evidence – a new string to the defence argument – that of criminal malicious prosecution – now exists, and requires time and disclosures to prove.

And I was denied an adjournment to enable the time necessary to pursue legal disclosure against the UK Nursing & Midwifery Council – who have been inveigled by the Jersey authorities into not acting appropriately and decisively on the evidenced complaint against ‘Nurse M’ – because “it would aid Syvret’s defence” if they did.

Perhaps most remarkably – in light of such apparently and actually biased decisions by the Magistrate Bridget Shaw – she continued to refuse to disclose the facts of her conflicts of interest – and continued to maintain – in the teeth of all evidence and precedent – that she “was not biased”.

Tuesday’s instalment of Kafka did produce one benefit – the only one I thought might emerge, and the only reason I attended; I was able to state my grounds for the proceedings being unlawful and seeking a judicial review of the conduct of Jersey’s judicial authority, the ‘Judicial Greffe’.

Admittedly – it took the customary forceful arguments – against Bridget Shaw – to eventually make her accept the fact that she cannot conduct the entire proceedings without letting me state my defences. But after various attempts to stop me from speaking, I was able to read out my grounds for arguing that the conduct of the proceedings of the Jersey Magistrates’ court against me are unlawful.

And having so read it in open court – I reproduce the entire document below, in this posting.

It is long – and tedious – but forgive me; these grounds have to be correctly and fully laid at an early stage – in order to facilitate that long trek to Strasbourg.

Just as certain as was Bridget Shaw’s overt bias against me, and peremptory dismissal of my argument – was her absolute failure to follow the accepted legal authorities on apparent bias, or to state any alternative, superior authority.

Instead, her position was yet more of the customary vacuous assertion: “I have made my mind up – and that is that; I do not have to cite justification; no – I will not let you speak; I do not have to explain my departure from the established English and ECHR jurisprudence; if I say my friendships with all these other Jersey oligarchs – whose suggested identities I will not confirm – does not matter – then that is that. I will not name them.”

For someone who has had to halt proceedings to borrow law books from me – and who has – as can be seen from the evidence of the transcripts – simply done what she is told by the prosecuting lawyer, the heavily conflicted Stephen Baker – Bridget Shaw exhibits remarkable confidence in setting her face so strongly against the entire modern jurisprudence of England – and of Strasbourg – on the question and the tests of apparent and actual bias.

As is readily ascertainable from the authorities, and from numerous judicial codes, judges are obliged – obliged, it is not discretionary – to openly inform the parties to a case if the judge has any kind of personal acquaintance with a person or persons who could be seen to be involved with the parties to the case. It is true that the judge, at first instance, is able to determine for himself or herself whether such acquaintance renders them incapable of meeting the tests of objectivity.

But – inescapably – the judge must – at the very least – let all such potential conflicts be known to the parties to a case.

That is the case – so that should the parties feel the judge is wrong should they refuse to deem themselves conflicted and stand down from the case – the parties can appeal the judge’s decision.

Bridget Shaw – apparently uniquely in the entire sphere of the judiciary of the British Isles – knows better.

She considers herself entitled to withhold from the defence, and the court generally – the fact that she is closely acquainted with – and has worked with – key witnesses in this case – such as Emma Martins, the Data Protection Commissioner, and Dave Minty, the police officer who was instrumental in controlling the illegal police raid, but who has since – against the evidence – denied involvement.

Bridget Shaw thinks it acceptable for her to ignore every wise and circumspect guidance of British judicial practice – and refuse to inform the defence of the fact she worked with a heavily conflicted and involved party to this case – former Attorney General William Bailhache.

She – alone – and in apparent superiority to the practice of every learned high justice in England – considers it acceptable for her to refuse to disclose or acknowledge the fact that she has taken legal advice and guidance in this case from one Advocate Richard Falle – long-term political enemy of mine – and best friend of William Bailhache’s brother, and further political enemy of mine – former Bailiff, Philip Bailhache.

Still – I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised – we are forever informed by these clowns of the “superiority” of “The Jersey Way”.

Indeed – so superior are Jersey judicial proceedings, Magistrate Bridget Shaw needn’t really bother turning up herself – as all she ever does is parrot that which is asserted by the prosecution. She could simply leave her red cloak behind – and Stephen Baker could repeatedly swap it for his black one – as he dashed between the judge’s seat and the lawyers’ bench – conducting a dialogue with himself.

In fact, so “efficient” are Jersey’s judicial arrangements, I need not even attend myself.

Though Bridget Shaw kindly volunteered the information that – should I take the attractive decision to simply stay at home – the hearing would proceed without me, in any event.

Which was about the only useful and rational information that emerged from the oligarchy side in the entire hearing.

Though the heavily conflicted and routinely perjuring Advocate Stephen Baker was absent on Tuesday afternoon, another of Barking Bill Bailhache’s politicised factotums was present – who – apparently – satisfied Bridget Shaw against every – evidenced – objection of the defence – by the simple assertion that I “would never be satisfied that I would secure a fair trial in Jersey.”

The statement was wrong on two – rather obvious – grounds. Firstly, I’d quite happily accept that I would receive a fair trial in Jersey – if and when the prosecution system and the judiciary of the island were not so obviously politicised, professionally and personally conflicted – and was separated from the other arms of the state.

You know? Just like has happened in all respectable democracies for at least the last two hundred years.

And – I would also accept that I was receiving a fair trial – when I was not before a court that – on the evidence – such as Tuesday’s performance – was brazenly exhibiting actual bias, withholding evidence of conflicts of interest – in direct defiance of all English and ECHR jurisprudence – and was flatly denying me the opportunity to obtain and cite the evidence needed to prove my public interest disclosure defence.

The subtlety of that last point may be lost on the casual observer. In Jersey’s Data Protection Law, there are several statutory defences for disclosing ‘controlled data’, for example, a public interest disclosure defence, for the purposes of exposing crime or preventing crime.

But – quite obviously – in order to make such a defence work – an accused person has to show, through evidence, that the data they exposed did actually serve a public interest by exposing and preventing criminal activities.

I can certainly meet that evidential test – several times over.

However – the prosecution and Bridget Shaw are not going to let me.

“Oh yes” – they say – “we do not dispute the defendant’s right to run a public interest disclosure argument. We’re quite happy for him to make that claim.”

“However – what we’re not going to accept is for the defendant to obtain and adduce the actual evidence necessary for him to establish the justification of his public interest disclosure claim.”

You see – what the Jersey oligarchy want to happen, is for me to show up in court – and do no more than point to the statutory public interest disclosure paragraph in the Data Protection Law – and say – “there – see that paragraph? That’s my defence argument.”

And then sit down and shut up.

And be convicted.

What they simply will not countenance is for me to spend time examining in detail – in open public court – all of the mass of evidence – and the testimony of the two expert witnesses I have – that would prove – several times over – that “Nurse M” is – in fact – a psychotic, Harold Shipman-type medical serial killer – and – in particular – that that much was obviously ascertainable at the time of the original 1999 investigation – but the then prosecuting authorities – Attorney General Michael Birt and the man who is currently a legal partner of Stephen Baker, Cyril Whelan – unlawfully abandoned the inquiry, in connivance with the hospital senior civil service – in order to avoid a scandal.

So when it is reported in Jersey’s mainstream media, that I am able to avail myself of the public interest disclosure defence – just be aware – of that subtle – but crucial – twist: I am ‘permitted’ to point to the statutory defence clause in the law – but I am being unlawfully and improperly prevented from adducing the evidence necessary to justify such a defence claim.

You see, Mick Birt – the now the Bailiff, and Jersey’s prosecution system – Stephen Baker amongst it – are the same authorities largely responsible for letting off child abusing psychopaths such as Jane and Alan Maguire.

So it just wouldn’t do – would it – for a very highly evidenced examination of their malfeasant concealment of serious crimes to be conducted through open court.

Why, because that would prove that the Jersey authorities were – in fact – in the habit of concealing serious crimes for reasons of political expediency.

And we just couldn’t have that now – could we.

So when Bridget Shaw and Stephen Baker re-convene to conduct their ultra vires charade – just bear in mind – that what will be taking place is politicised and personally conflicted spin-doctoring – not the administration of justice.

And for those interested in some of the detailed argument as to why that is so – I re-produce below my submission to Jersey’s judicial public authority; a submission which will form the basis of the forthcoming judicial review application.

For those interested in my clothing – you’ll just have to wait until The Rag hits the streets.

Stuart.

LETTER PRIOR TO JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION

7th September 2010

Advocate Paul Matthews
Deputy Judicial Greffier
Judicial Greffe
Royal Court Building
St. Helier
JE1 1DD

By e-mail

ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. STUART SYVRET

Unlawful nature of the administration of the judicial proceedings

LETTER BEFORE CLAIM

Prior to Judicial Review Application

Substantive reply required within fourteen days.

Dear Advocate Matthews.

1. Thank you for your response to my e-mail of the 13th August which I had principally addressed to Magistrate Bridget Shaw.

2. In the final analyses, I felt I had no choice other than to take the unusual step of writing directly to the Judge in question, as my repeated efforts to obtain the important evidence sought in respect of my right to a fair trial, by writing to the court clerk – Magistrates’ Court Greffier David Le Heuze – had all been met with failure.

3. I will address my specific concerns in respect of both Magistrate Shaw and Mr. Le Heuze in greater detail below, but before doing so, I feel I should respond to you with some general points.

4. Firstly, you will note that this is a Letter Before Claim, prior to a Judicial Review application, written to the Judicial Greffe as the relevant public authority, and in connection with important public law matters.

5. In a nutshell, I have no doubt that certain, fundamental aspects of the administration of Jersey’s justice apparatus in respect of my case, have been unlawful. I am, therefore, writing to you and specifically asking that you pass this letter to the Judicial Greffier so that he may consider the requests I am making that he recognise and correct that unlawfulness.

6. It is my strong hope that he will recognise the various unlawful aspects of the situation, and that he will take the appropriate steps to address and rectify them. In the event that he fails to do so, I regret I will have to make the relevant Judicial Review application.

7. I note your wish to regard this correspondence as ‘now closed’, but with respect, the issues being addressed in this correspondence are important, and I do not feel I have been in any way unreasonable or vexatious in writing to you; the questions I raise are legitimate.

8. I accept that I introduced my request for information by reference to the Code of Practice on Public Access to Official information, but, frankly, the request for information is perfectly capable of consideration outside of that guidance, on any reasonable view.

9. You claim that: –

9.1.1. “The reference to the Code is something of a red herring. The Judicial Greffe (of which the Magistrate’s Court is a part) is a judicial department (see Departments of the Judiciary and Legislature (Jersey) Law 1965). It is not an “authority” as defined in the Code of Practice nor a States Department for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982.”

10. With respect to the Code, I would point out that it is not legislation – merely a Code. It does not fix and apply a statutory framework within which the handling and disclosure of information – “official” or otherwise – is defined in law. It is merely a guide – to which public authorities should, as a matter of good practice, adhere. Given the non-legislative status of the Code, it follows, therefore, that public authorities, such as the Judicial Greffe, are not prevented from following those general principles of transparency.

11. I must also explain that the Code – very clearly – defines a “minimum” standard of openness. It suggests that maximum transparency should be the starting point – and that information should only be regarded as confidential when it is necessary to do so.

12. The general principles embodied in the Code are no more than an entirely reasonable set of guidance that any objective person could expect to be followed by any public authority in Jersey.

13. Therefore, if anything is a “red herring”, may I respectfully suggest that it is your attempt to argue that the general – entirely reasonable principles of transparency embodied in the Code – should not apply to a ‘public authority’, such as the Judicial Greffe.

14. Even if – hypothetically – your claim that the Code did not apply to the Judicial Greffe was correct, such a state of affairs would be largely irrelevant to the requests for information.

15. Instead, any objective person would consider the status of the Greffe as a ‘public authority’ – then consider whether, as such, it should comply with moderate and reasonable requests for information that fall within its purview – quite regardless of whether the department is captured by the Code.

16. The question is – ‘is it reasonable for any ‘public authority’ – in the year 2010 – to seek to withhold relevant information that comes within the ambit of that public authority’s formal responsibilities – in the absence of any especially compelling reason for non-disclosure?’

17. I do not believe that the proverbial ‘reasonable man on the Clapham omnibus’ would regard it as right that a modern ‘public authority’, such as the Judicial Greffe, should regard itself as impervious to reasonable requests for information.

18. You state: “The information you seek as to whether David Le Heuze (the Magistrate’s Court Greffier) is related to Ernest Le Heuze (a person convicted in the Royal Court) is not official information.”

19. You later go on to state that, “Even if the Code were applicable the information sought is not official information.”

20. I’m afraid I cannot agree with your definition of ‘official information’. I did spend some considerable time studying the principles of FOI codes and legislation when I was in the States, and I’m afraid it is a common gambit of authorities who wish to avoid gathering, collating and disclosing information that is within their purview to use arguments of the type you advance.

21. The question is not whether the information sought is actually, a priori, gathered, held and collated when the request for disclosure is received. Rather, the question is, ‘is the information sought, information that should reasonably be within the ambit of the authority?’ For example, ‘does the information sought have a clear relevance to the official activities of the public authority in question?’

22. If the answer to questions such as those two is affirmative, the process then moves to questions such as, ‘is the information sought actually reasonably obtainable by the authority in question?’ Or ‘is the request manifestly unreasonable?’ For example, some information sought might be so wildly outlandish as to not form a reasonable request.

23. On the reasonable basis described above, I turn to the actual questions and your responses. You state that the Judicial Greffe does not maintain records as to whether any of its staff are related to those who are tried and/or convicted before the courts.

24. I have no doubt that that claim is correct. Indeed, I go further – and state that I, personally, would not expect the Judicial Greffe to maintain such a general record.

25. However – that, quite obviously – is not really the point.

26. The point is, when the Judicial Greffe receives a question in a specific instance, concerning a relationship between a member of staff and a person convicted of crimes – and the relationship in question could be argued to have a bearing upon the objectivity of the administering functions of court proceedings in which the actual crimes the relative was convicted for have a clear and direct relationship to the accused in the current proceedings – the Judicial Greffe is, in all reasonableness, obliged to seek out the facts sought – and supply them to the present accused.

27. That is, quite regardless of any Code – or, indeed, any FOI legislation, if Jersey had any.

28. I say that because there is very clear UK case-law on the need for the appearance of objectivity to be maintained in courts, and how it is possible for such objectivity to be tainted by apparent conflicts involving staff in Magistrates’ courts.

29. So rather than considering my requests for information under the Jersey Code, rather, the requests should have been considered as a proper request for evidence, needed to test whether the proceedings against me can withstand being tested against extant UK case-law.

30. Indeed, I would argue that given the peculiar nature of Jersey’s Magistrates’ Court Law and the nature of its proceedings in general, and, even more significantly, the very strange nature of the conduct of those proceedings against me – the requested information is of even starker importance.

31. Therefore – my questions concerning the possibility of apparent bias or actual bias on the part of court staff involved directly in administering my case – and my questions concerning similar issues of apparent or actual bias in respect of the judge hearing the case – are entirely proper, reasonable and of the very kind that the relevant public authority – the Judicial Greffe – most certainly should answer.

32. I trust that clarifies my position and purposes in seeking the information?

33. Turning from the general to the specific, you state: –

33.1.1. “These matters arise in the context of judicial proceedings as opposed to administrative proceedings you need to draw your concerns to the attention of the presiding judge in the context of the criminal proceedings. These concerns will be included in your submissions on actual or apparent bias in those proceedings. If you are aggrieved at decisions made by the Magistrate there is a right of appeal and possibility of application for the Magistrate to state a case.”

34. There are, if I may say so, several flaws in that statement.

35. It is, obviously, a truism to state that ‘these matters arise in the context of judicial proceedings’. Why else would I be writing to the Judicial Greffe in connection with them? The Judicial Greffe is the ‘public authority’ responsible for the administration of Jersey’s judicial apparatus.

36. That being the case, the matters I raise are, most certainly, ‘administrative’.

37. For example, the Judicial Greffe employs staff, such as Mr. Le Heuze. As the employing department – the Judicial Greffe – quite plainly – has a responsibility for the suitability, competence, performance and appropriateness in particular instances, of its staff. Fulfilling those responsibilities is, clearly, ‘administrative’.

38. In the instant case, the Judicial Greffe is in no different a position to, say – by analogue – the Planning Department.

39. For example, if I were a Planning Minister, or the Departmental Chief Officer, or Chief Executive to the States, I would expect – simply as a matter of basic standards – Planning Officers to avoid conflicts of interest – apparent or actual. Thus if a planning application were to go before Planning Officer A, for consideration and recommendation – and there was some reason that caused the applicant to have been involved in some controversial matter that also touched, in a personal way, Planning Officer A, I would expect the automatic non-involvement of him with the case of that applicant.

40. Further – if the hypothetical applicant in question actually became suspicious of the existence of such a potential for an apparently biased decision – and actually asked the questions, and raised the matter himself with the Planning Officer, or his employers, I would – most certainly – expect a full and frank disclosure at first time of asking, and immediate withdrawal.

41. However, the applicant should not be placed in such a situation at all – because the Planning Officer – and his employers in this hypothetical example – are perfectly aware of the potential for tainted, or apparently tainted administrative decisions at the very outset – and should thus have ensured non-involvement in the first place.

42. It can be seen – indeed, it is established in law – that the public has a right to expect impartial and objective treatment from public authorities. In order to meet that reasonable standard, public authorities will – from time-to-time – have to be aware of potential conflicts of interest on the part of their employees and, even more so when specific questions are raised, investigate such potential conflicts. Therefore “information” concerning the potential for bias on the part of staff must – unavoidably – be “official” information. It is information that is essential to the proper and effective managing and performance of a public department.

43. But, alas, the Judicial Greffe has failed to meet those, good administrative standards.

44. You admit unambiguously the very clear state of knowledge of the Judicial Greffe in respect of David Le Heuze’s involvement – no-doubt deeply traumatic and distressing involvement – as a witness for the prosecution – in a case of child pornography charges – brought against his own brother, Ernest Le Heuze.

45. You state this: –

45.1.1. “David Le Heuze informed me of matters prior to Ernest Le Heuze’s presentation before the Magistrate’s Court. Arrangements were put in place so that David Le Heuze had no involvement with the case or access to any of the papers. This was particularly important in view of his position as a prosecution witness.”

46. So that the point I am making is absolutely clear and unambiguous, I state to you – as I did in my early questions to David Le Heuze himself – that in no way, shape or form, was I implying any kind of ‘guilt by association’ when raising this issue.

47. On the contrary, I consider that he did a thoroughly admirable thing in being a prosecution witness against his own brother; an act that cannot have been anything other than profoundly and deeply upsetting in all kinds of ways.

48. Rather, my point is this: whether conscious of it or not, no person could go through the trauma of having to help to convict one’s own brother of child porn charges, without it leaving emotional scars, psychological effects or feelings of anxiety – and of confused anger – whenever the subject of child abuse issues arises.

49. I have been at the very centre of attempts during the last three years to root-out and expose many decades of concealed child abuse in Jersey. Indeed – in all the post-war years – I was the only States member to have ever recognised the issue and to have spoken-out against the crimes.

50. Although the charges against me relate to the Data Protection Law – and my allegedly unlawful public exposure of a psychotic serial-killer – who is to say that whenever the administration of my case came across David Le Heuze’s desk – and every time he sat in court staring at me during those many directions hearings – he did not feel some form of resentment – of anger – towards the whole subject? Given the circumstances – how could he not look at me – of all people – and not be reminded of the family trauma of his brother’s crime? How could he not have strong emotions about it? Especially as I was outspoken in the media at that time – as Health & Social Services Minister – in stating that I wanted Ernest Le Heuze sacked without further prevarication.

51. Who is to say that such possible strong feelings on the part of David Le Heuze were not responsible for some of the many delays in the early stages; delays that hampered my defence? For example – the delays in obtaining the court transcripts? Or – perhaps David Le Heuze’s advice and influence on setting the dates for hearings might have worked to my disadvantage – some dates clashing with States meetings? Perhaps – given the status of Magistrate Shaw as a Relief Magistrate – and very obviously in need of frequent advice – some of which came from Mr. Le Heuze, he has had an influence on her?

52. Perhaps last October – when the court was witness to the extraordinary and disgraceful spectacle of Advocate Stephen Baker stating (once he had read the report of my expert witness and realised the prosecution simply had no answer to it) that I would have to “make an application to have that evidence necessary to prove my public interest disclosure defence deemed ‘admissible’” – Mr. Le Heuze should have quietly advised Magistrate Shaw that, actually, the evidence was already admitted – and Advocate Baker was attempting to abuse the court’s procedures?

53. Perhaps he felt – and feels – a deep and growing resentment towards me for re-opening and raising what must be a deeply painful episode for him? Perhaps that’s why I have been prevented from obtaining this information I sought – information important to my defence – for many weeks, by the intransigent refusal of Mr. Le Heuze to answer, or answer meaningfully, my e-mails?

54. Why have I not received transcripts of the proceedings since my return to Jersey? Even though I have requested them from Mr. Le Heuze? The failure – the refusal – to produce the transcripts, massively disadvantages me as a reluctantly self-representing non-lawyer.

55. Perhaps such a resentment towards me – even if sub-conscious – explains why I am having to be dragged through the court every two weeks – even though I am unwell, and the court has now received no less than three written medical confirmations of that fact – for what appears to be no other purpose than the calculated humiliation of me? Why is the Magistrates’ Court Greffier not recommending that the administration of the court should cease to waste time, resources and money on convening for pointless, ten minute hearings that are serving no legitimate purpose?

56. Of course – I would predict that the Judicial Greffe and David Le Heuze would argue that no such bias has occurred. I would argue that it has; that there has been actual bias.

57. However – regardless of whether actual bias has occurred – what most certainly has occurred is the appearance of bias.

58. The administration of the proceedings against me fail – plainly do fail – the test of the appearance of objectivity.

59. Given the nature of the role played by the Magistrates’ Court Greffier in Jersey law, the obvious administrative flaws in the handling of my case – and the extraordinary mater – like an unremarked elephant in the room – of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – no ‘reasonable person on the Clapham omnibus’ could look at the case and say there is no danger of a suspicion of bias in the administrative processes.

60. Whilst I feel it fair to say that some blame must attach to Mr. Le Heuze for not recognising the conflict himself, and then having no involvement in my case – by far the greater blame for this disastrous situation must lay at the door of the Judicial Greffe itself. As the employing department – and – moreover – one that is centrally involved in what should be the good administration of justice – and which should have been aware of the crucial importance of avoiding even the appearance of bias – the Judicial Greffe should have had a higher standard of administrative performance, and ensured its staff were not placed in conflicted situations.

61. Indeed, I harbour no ill will towards David Le Heuze – and can imagine the resentment and distress he must feel at having been placed in this situation when his employers should – most clearly – have exercised a greater duty of care towards their employee – and a greater duty of care towards the accused person; me.

62. Mr. Le Heuze and I have both been placed in an utterly intolerable and unacceptable position.

63. Indeed – it is nothing less than extraordinary that this conflicted situation was allowed to persist – even though the Judicial Greffe was fully aware of it – until I eventually discovered the relationship between the two Mr. Le Heuzes for myself.

64. The fact that such a lack of candour – and, remarkably, such an apparent failure to be aware of the case-law on bias and apparent bias – should exist on the part of the Judicial Greffe must, I’m afraid, now cast great suspicion upon the candour and wisdom of the department generally.

65. Let me state the fact plainly – the involvement of David Le Heuze as the Magistrates’ Court Greffier, and principal administrative court clerk in my case, makes the entire proceedings thus far unlawful.

66. It goes without saying that any and all involvement of Mr. Le Heuze in any matter involving me must cease with immediate effect.

67. In that regard, you state in your e-mail: –

67.1.1. “I should be grateful if you would refrain from addressing any further correspondence on this particular subject to David Le Heuze.”

68. You may rest assured that – for reasons of his clear conflictedness – I will not be engaging in any further communications with Mr. Le Heuze – and nor will I be attending any future court proceedings unless I receive an assurance of his non-involvement.

69. I would, therefore, be grateful if you would supply me with the name and e-mail address of an alternative Magistrates’ Court clerk with who I may correspond in connection with the administration of my case?

70. As stated earlier, this is a Letter Before Claim, written prior to a Judicial Review application. I will, therefore, summarise below the formal requests I am making of the Judicial Greffe.

71. I will now turn to the questions I raised in respect of the presiding Magistrate, Bridget Shaw.

72. In my e-mail to David Le Heuze, dated 19th July, and – which was subsequently forwarded by me to Magistrate Shaw and other recipients including yourself in my e-mail dated 13th August – I asked a number of direct questions of Magistrate Shaw. Though re-numbered here for clarity, In essence, the questions relevant to Ms. Shaw were these as follows.

73. In direct connection with my defence – and the established and absolute right to a fair hearing not tainted with actual bias or the appearance of bias – I require to know the following information: –

74. 1: The identities of all persons from who Ms. Shaw has received any form of legal advice or guidance in respect of any aspect of the cases against me?

75. 2: Specifically, a confirmation as to whether any such advice has been received from Advocate Richard Falle?

76. 3: Expanding upon the points raised in questions 1 & 2 above, I require knowing whether Ms. Shaw is personally aquatinted with, or has socialised with, or has worked with, any of the following individuals:

76.1. Philip Bailhache;

76.2. Michael Birt;

76.3. William Bailhache;

76.4. Richard Falle;

76.5. Tim Le Cocq;

76.6. Stephen Baker;

76.7. Cyril Whelan;

76.8. Emma Martins;

76.9. Bill Ogley;

76.10. Robert Key;

76.11. Frances Hamon;

76.12. John Le Breton;

76.13. David Benest;

76.14. David Minty?

77. The legitimate requirement for this information should be plain.

78. In the event of an application for Judicial Review having to be made, I can describe in some detail – and on an evidenced basis – the reasons why each of the individuals listed in question 3 have to be viewed as having various interests in respect of me, my work in the interests of child protection, and my other political and campaigning activities, so as to render professional or personal relationships with them contaminating of any judge presiding over a case involving me.

79. Indeed, in respect of most of the individuals listed, I can produce prima facie evidence of their direct engagement in criminal actions – for example, breaches of the Children (Jersey) Law 1969, breaches of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002, conspiracies to pervert the courses of justice, and of misconduct in a public office.

80. Moreover – I can likewise demonstrate – on a clearly evidenced basis – my lawful and extensive political work against such crimes.

81. Thus – any association between any of the said individuals and Magistrate Bridget Shaw must – unavoidably – heavily contaminate her, and render her wholly incapable of appearing impartial.

82. But in this matter, I need not even rely upon the established authorities to support the risk of apparent bias; for in this case – I can readily demonstrate actual bias.

83. The evidence is there to be read in the court transcripts of the many directions hearings, and the resultant decisions. I am not aware of a more Kafkaesque set of proceedings to have occurred before a Jersey court since the Nazi occupation ended.

84. Magistrate Shaw has consistently appeared as nothing more than a puppet of the prosecuting lawyer, Advocate Stephen Baker. He has – quite literally – simply been telling her what to do during many of the crucial preliminary hearings. And her acquiescence to the directions of Advocate Baker has been quite breathtaking.

85. And were that not bad enough Advocate Baker himself is wholly conflicted in these matters – and should be playing no role whatsoever in any case involving me – because he worked for, and in connivance with, the former Attorney General William Bailhache, in unlawfully obstructing the police in their efforts to secure the extradition and prosecution of the two child abusers, Jane and Alan Maguire.

86. I having been very closely involved in efforts to secure justice on behalf of the victims of the Maguires.

87. The proceedings against me as presided over by Bridget Shaw are – manifestly – illegal.

88. They are unlawful not only on the grounds of apparent bias – but also of actual bias.

89. The conduct of the original unlawful police investigations against me and my former partner – and the conduct of the prosecution itself against me – are both unlawful.

90. A Letter Before Claim, prior to seeking Judicial Review, has already been written by me to the relevant public authority in Jersey, the very heavily conflicted Attorney General.

91. In that communication I have made it clear that, as a result of me obtaining further evidence – it is now plain that the entire enterprise as conducted against me is a malicious prosecution; a criminal enterprise wilfully engaged in, in order to conceal other crimes and to protect certain public authorities and senior individuals working in those authorities, from the consequences of various malfeasances and criminalities committed by them.

92. I explain that – because – at present – it looks very much as though the Judicial Greffe and the Judicial Greffier – and Magistrate Bridget Shaw – are also parties to that broader criminal enterprise.

93. And to cite just one of the grounds for having that view – one need only consider the deeply disturbing lack of candour – and otherwise inexplicable intransigence – on the part of the Judicial Greffe, of Magistrate Shaw, and of Mr. Le Heuze – in refusing to answer perfectly reasonable and appropriate questions.

94. Questions that do – quite clearly – go to the heart of the tests established in English case-law for assessing such matters as ‘apparent bias’, let alone actual bias.

95. Indeed, in recent years the test has evolved to match that of the ECHR Article 6 test.

96. It is no longer necessary for an applicant to demonstrate a “real danger” of apparent bias.

97. Instead, the test is now “whether the fair-minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased”.

98. Applying that test, there is not the remotest possibility that the Magistrates’ court as constituted in respect of the charges against me, could avoid a real possibility of the tribunal being biased.

99. And – I’m afraid – the wholly unreasonable and unsustainable refusal of David Le Heuze, and of Magistrate Shaw, and of the Judicial Greffe itself – to answer the questions I pose in respect of confounding experiences and of conflicting and compromising friendships and other personal relationships can only massively add to the already very strong appearance of bias.

100. Why – it must be asked – if there were no issues to hide – no relationships to conflicted individuals who could be viewed as parties to the case – the startling reluctance to simply answer the reasonable questions I have posed?

101. After all – all am seeking is a fair hearing before an objective and impartial tribunal.

102. A very long established legal right.

103. One cannot but draw the obvious conclusion from the starkly displayed fear of Jersey’s judicial authorities to exhibit candour in these matters.

104. That conclusion being that the entire proceedings against me are unlawful – starkly and graphically so.

105. That they can satisfy the tests of neither traditional English jurisprudence, nor that of Strasbourg.

106. Obviously – setting aside for one moment the questions that flow from that fact for a number of the current senior individuals – the implications for the present structure of what passes for the administration of justice in Jersey are significant – to say the least.

107. That – however – is not my problem.

108. Most respectable and civilised jurisdictions accepted over two hundred years ago, the need for a separation of powers in order to protect the public good through the existence of effective checks and balances. Many of the contaminations that befoul this case arise because of overlaps in the basic state functions. That the Jersey authorities – belatedly – are to be forced to face that reality and modernise is, frankly, no bad thing. It is – unarguably – to the public good.

109. I’m afraid it is not sustainable for the Judicial Greffe, as the employing public authority – to attempt to cast aside and disown its responsibility for the appropriateness of the involvement of its staff in certain situations or cases. Plainly – what we are dealing with here – in the peculiar context of Jersey- is not merely one unfortunate and rare instance where a judge – Magistrate Shaw in this case – happens to be personally conflicted. Instead – given the small size of Jersey – what we are facing is an inevitability; a structural weakness in the local system; an inherent danger of such conflicts of interest, and appearances of bias arising that – in the absence of a legislative decision to introduce a separation of powers – there must – unavoidably – be upon the public authority – the Judicial Greffe – a particularly acute duty of care to ensure that its employees do not find themselves in conflicted situations, and that members of the public are protected from the risk of being exposed to such conflicts.

110. The Judicial Greffe has failed in that manifest and reasonable duty. It has failed in the case of the presiding judge, Magistrate Shaw – just as it has failed – for reasons explained in detail above – in respect of the Magistrate’s Court Greffier, David Le Heuze.

111. It is not even as though such problems were unforeseeable. Even in a large nation-state, such as the UK, the dangers of apparent bias, actual bias, and other issues concerning the performance, conduct and professionalism of judges are well-recognised.

112. For example, the Guide to Judicial Conduct (Second Supplement published in March 2008) describes the expectations and requirements upon judges very clearly. In explaining how such guidance arose from the ‘Bangalore principles of Judicial Conduct’, the guidance says this:

112.1.1. “On a wider stage, what have become known as the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct were initiated in 2001. The Bangalore principles arose from a United Nations initiative with the participation of Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. A draft code of judicial conduct was prepared by a group comprising senior judges from Commonwealth countries. This was discussed at several conferences attended by judges of both common law and civil law systems and has also been considered by the Consultative Council of European Judges. Revised principles were prepared in November 2002 following a round-table meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague and were endorsed at the 59th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission at Geneva in April 2003.

112.1.2. The principles are succinctly stated as six “values” and their stated intention is: “To establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the Executive and Legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary”. The principles are:

112.1.3. (i) Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

112.1.4. (ii) Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

112.1.5. (iii) Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.

112.1.6. (iv) Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of the judge.

112.1.7. (v) Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

112.1.8. (vi) Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

113. In this context, principles (i), (ii), (v) and (vi) are engaged.

114. The document later states – in section 3, “Impartiality” – at Paragraph 3.12: –

114.1.1. “If circumstances which may give rise to a suggestion of bias, or appearance of bias, are present so that they are to be disclosed to the parties, that should be done well before the hearing, if possible. Case management procedures will often enable this to be achieved.”

115. It is clear – very clear – notwithstanding the extremely telling – and alarming – failure of the Magistrates’ Court Greffier, Magistrate Shaw herself, and of the Judicial Greffe to exhibit candour – that Magistrate Shaw is certainly surrounded with a range of circumstances which “may give rise to a suggestion of bias or appearance of bias” – but yet, not only were these potential conflicts not disclosed to the parties – well, certainly not the defence, at least – before the case started – they were not even disclosed at the beginning of the case.

116. Indeed – utterly extraordinarily – even now – all concerned appear to be doing all they can to continue to conceal the facts of her personal, professional and social acquaintances which – most certainly – do give rise to the appearance of bias in the case.

117. The fact that – even at this stage – it can be regarded as acceptable for Magistrate Shaw and the Judicial Greffe to continue to seek to conceal such fundamental facts from the defence is staggering; it is a fact – of itself – that could easily stand alone to damn judicial practice in Jersey.

118. And as paragraph 3.12, quoted above, says of the dangers of conflict arising, and the need to avoid them, “case management procedures will often enable this to be achieved.”

119. The general policy for case management procedures is a responsibility of the relevant public authority – in this case the Judicial Greffe. If such policies are too inadequate, weak – or non-existent – to ensure that judges and parties are not placed in situations of apparent or actual bias – then that is a clear administrative failure on the part of the Judicial Greffe.

120. An administrative failure that has unlawful consequences.

121. Hence one of the grounds for the Judicial Review application.

122. A further, seriously confounding issue arises in the context of the Jersey Magistrates’ Court Law – and the degree of power, control and direction the prosecuting lawyer has over proceedings.

123. Effectively – and at risk of repetition, the evidence is there to be observed in the transcripts; the prosecuting lawyer, Advocate Stephen Baker is, effectively “conducting” the proceedings. Even were he not directly and personally conflicted in this case – he would still be engaged in what is, effectively, a quasi-judicial role in largely determining the direction of the prosecution he himself is running.

124. But – additionally in this case, he does have a direct conflict of interests in respect of his involvement – as an agent of the previous Attorney General, William Bailhache, in seeking to obstruct the police in their efforts to secure the extradition of the child abusers, Jane and Alan Maguire from France.

125. Given both his personal, professional conflicts of interests – and the de facto quasi-judicial role he is fulfilling – Advocate Baker is being permitted to be ‘a judge in his own cause’.

126. This is directly counter to the ancient dictum, “nemo judex in causa sua”.

127. It is – therefore – of even starker and greater importance that a judge – any judge – presiding over this particular case should be absolutely robustly independent – and categorically free of any bias whatsoever – actual or even perceived.

128. Magistrate Bridget Shaw cannot hope to meet that test.

129. As the famous dictum from an English case – as long ago as 1924 has it, so I’m hardly advancing some outré revolutionary notion – “justice must not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.

130. English courts have gone on to rule that, ‘a real danger of bias might arise if there were personal friendships or animosities between the judge and any member of the public involved in the case. (My emphasis.)

131. There are certainly, ‘friendships’ between Magistrate Shaw and certain of those who could be described as parties to matters concerning me.

132. But a higher test that the tribunal must meet is now established; no longer is it necessary for an applicant to show “real danger of bias” – but rather, as quoted above, “whether the fair-minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased”.

133. Magistrate Bridget Shaw is known – to varying degrees and in various ways – to at least some of the fourteen individuals I list above, and in respect of which individuals I have made repeated attempts to determine the full nature and extent of Magistrate Shaw’s relationships to.

134. I have been wholly unreasonably and improperly thwarted in obtaining that information.

135. That is clearly so on the authorities. As all sources state, there are very few cases where a certain relationship will – automatically – trigger an appearance of bias and of recusal. Virtually all such cases – of disputed impartiality, or of apparent bias – hinge about the specific facts that pertain in each particular case.

136. Yet – in spite of the fact we are all aware of an arguable range, of possibly multiple conflicts of interest – the facts – the evidence necessary for determining whether bias in this case – apparent or actual – exists, is being unlawfully withheld from the defence.

137. In your e-mail to me, you state this: –

137.1.1. “These matters arise in the context of judicial proceedings as opposed to administrative proceedings. You need to draw your concerns to the attention of the presiding judge in the context of the criminal proceedings. These concerns will be included in your submissions on actual or apparent bias in those proceedings. If you are aggrieved at decisions made by the Magistrate there is a right of appeal and possibility of application for the Magistrate to state a case.”

138. As I observed earlier, there are several problems with your assertion.

139. As explained, the apparent and actual bias of these proceedings – of this tribunal – in respect of me, are not some “unforeseeable” and rare act of happenstance.

140. The profound problems with these proceedings arise and exist in the Jersey context as a direct result of unlawful policies – and the unlawful absence, in some ways, of policies – of the relevant public authority – the Judicial Greffe.

141. For example – not having in place a set of administrative procedures that automatically engages all reasonable steps to protect clerks, judges and parties from what are clearly going to be a frequency of apparently or actually conflicted cases in the context of Jersey, is – plainly – a structural administrative failure of the public authority, as opposed to being a one-off error of judgment by one or two employees.

142. Therefore your suggestion that the matters I raise can be dealt with within the extant proceedings, as just another passing judicial consideration for the judge, is not, I’m afraid, sustainable.

143. Indeed – as much was confirmed by Magistrate Shaw herself during the last hearing, when challenged by me on the point of the failure for me to be supplied with answers to my questions concerning her conflicts of interest.

144. We would be able to consider her exact words – but for reasons suggested above – the completion and supply of transcripts has dried up since my return to Jersey, thus greatly hampering my defence.

145. However – going from memory, Magistrate Shaw responded to my question by denying that she had received my e-mail, and went on to say that if I had any concerns or questions concerning her status or conduct in this case – the proper course of action was for me to direct such enquiries to the Judicial Greffe.

146. It can be seen therefore, that a sharp difference of opinion exists between your assessment of the situation, and that of the Magistrate herself, who confirmed – when I drew my “concerns to the attention of the presiding judge” – that the Judicial Greffe was the proper authority with which to raise such questions.

147. You do suggest that Judicial Review may be a possibility, but also suggest that appeal, or ‘case stated’ may be the appropriate way forward, as Judicial Review is usually regarded as a remedy sought at last resort, once more immediate remedies have been exhausted.

148. I would welcome your observations as to whether my understanding is correct, but my recollection is that such remedies are not available to me?

149. You may recollect that I did, in fact, challenge the impartiality of Magistrate Shaw at the very outset of the case. She rejected my application to recuse – deeming herself non-conflicted – and capable of not risking the appearance of bias. (As is now plain – whether we care to admit it or not – Magistrate Shaw was seriously mistaken in that assessment of her position, and was, indeed, in further error in not, a priori, declaring any and all such possible conflicts of interest, but those are separate points.)

150. Having so raised my concerns, at the outset – and having had them rejected, I attempted to appeal Magistrate Shaw’s decisions to the Royal Court, and the Magistrate did, in fact, state a case.

151. My appeal was heard by Sir Richard Tucker – and it was rejected on two grounds. Correct me if I have this wrong, but my understanding was that the judgment suggested that Magistrate Shaw was “premature” (I think that was a polite way of saying she was in error) in even having stated a case.

152. Further – and perhaps more significantly – it was concluded that no right of appeal lay against interlocutory decisions of a Magistrates’ Court. The law appeared to be that all the accused could do was wait until convicted – then appeal against conviction and/or sentence.

153. Therefore – the alternative remedies you suggest have, in fact, already been attempted by me, rejected and exhausted. You also, incidentally, point out that the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982, does not capture the Judicial Greffe.

154. So far as I can tell – Judicial Review is the only remedy left open to me – should I wish to secure to myself the inalienable right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.

155. I am not aware of any case-law – English or ECHR – that deems it acceptable for courts of first instance to be hopelessly conflicted and biased – and incapable of constituting an impartial and objective tribunal – merely because a appellate court exists which may overturn such miscarriages of justice.

156. I do not, therefore, have any intention whatsoever, of surrendering to a biased and plainly unsafe court of first instance – thus allowing myself to be wrongly convicted – in the vague hope that some higher court might – one day – overturn that conviction.

157. I have an absolute right to a fair trial – as guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR.

158. That right applies – quite unarguably – in courts of first instance. Such courts are not excused from maintaining the standards of the impartial administration of justice, merely because some possible avenue of appeal exists.

159. In this case, the court of first instance – the Jersey Magistrates’’ Court – and in the particular circumstances of the case against me – being heard by the conflicted judge, Bridget Shaw – does not constitute an objective and impartial tribunal.

160. And – most significantly – it fails to meet that standard, because of fundamental administrative practices – unlawful policies – of the relevant public authority – the Judicial Greffe.

161. The profoundly serious issues that arise in this case are the result of structural unlawfulness in the policies and practices of the Judicial Greffe.

162. It is on that basis I shall be making an application for Judicial Review.

163. That is, reluctantly making such an application – in the absence of the Judicial Greffier accepting the obvious and serious defects in the authority’s policies and practices, and the unlawfulness of the consequences in my case – and acceding to my requests, which I itemise below.

164. Decisions I am asking the Judicial Greffier to make.

165. For all of the reasons described above – and more besides, the conduct of the judicial proceedings involving me has been unlawful.

166. I am, therefore, asking the Judicial Greffier – as the relevant public authority to: –

167. 1: Recognise the manifest unlawfulness of the conduct of the judicial proceedings against me.

168. 2: Recognise that both the Magistrates’ Court Greffier, David Le Heuze – and the Magistrate, Bridget Shaw – are both conflicted – incapable of meeting the appearance of impartiality – and are biased, in both appearance and substance, even if sub-consciously.

169. 3: Recognise that the many aspects of manifest unlawfulness in the proceedings arise as a result of a structural and policy failings of the Judicial Greffe as the relevant public authority.

170. 4: Recognise that the unlawful administrative failings of the Judicial Greffe have caused the administration of justice in Jersey fall below acceptable standards of impartiality and objectivity.

171. 5: Recognise that in failing to have in place the correct and lawful administrative procedures and safeguards, the Judicial Greffe has improperly exposed employees, judges and parties, to needlessly difficult and stressful situations of conflict.

172. 6: Advise the prosecution that the proceedings involving me so far have failed to meet the requisite standards of objectivity and impartiality, have failed to comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR, and must, therefore, in the interests of justice, be begun again, from day one.

173. 7: Ensure that the re-started proceedings are fully compliant with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR, and with the most recent English authorities.

174. 8: Ensure that all of the information I have sought in respect of conflicts of interest and potential conflicts of interest – and of bias and apparent bias – as itemised at paragraphs 74, 75 and paragraph and sub-paragraphs 76 above, is obtained and supplied to me without further prevarication.

175. 9: Recognise that the failures of the Jersey judicial apparatus to meet the requisite standards for the good administration of justice has caused, and will continue to cause very severe damage to the population of Jersey by denying to them the proper protections of the law and the impartial and objective administration of justice – by administering a judicial apparatus so obviously skewed in favour of the powerful – by failing to ensure the administration of justice in Jersey occurs upon a level playing-field – by failing to ensure that judges and court staff are properly managed, administered and guided in such ways as to ensure that conflicts of interest and apparent and/or actual biases are avoided – by administering a judicial apparatus that enables wrongdoing by the powerful to persist – by permitting Jersey’s judicial apparatus to be used as an instrument of political oppression – the current policies, practices, decisions and administration of the justice apparatus of Jersey by the Judicial Greffe has caused massive harm to the public good.

176. 10: Recognise that in respect of the many manifest wrongs I have suffered as a result of the unlawful acts and omissions of the judicial apparatus of Jersey, I am owed appropriate recompense and justice.

177. As stated at the beginning of this letter, I require a substantive response answer within 14 days.

Thank you for your assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Stuart Syvret.

ANALYSES OF AN ATROCITY:

REVISITED.

A Timely Reconsideration
Of ‘Letter From Exile # 22’

Sometimes I enjoy writing. I used to enjoy it more deeply and would never be without the means of recording my thoughts on this or that subject, from whatever genre I happened to be thinking in. Always a note-book and pen or laptop at hand to capture the conceits or phrases that are all out there, but which might otherwise brush against your consciousness then flit away like startled birds.

But the need to write too much – about subjects too dreadful and Kafkaesque – has soured the act for me. On rare occasions I can force myself to write, but when the blinding page is demanding nothing more than another futile ‘legal’ argument – and when the only reason you now carry your laptop everywhere is fear the police will steal it again if you leave it unattended – writing loses its attractions.

Even the good stuff, like essays, poetry and fiction.

Which is why most of this posting consists of a re-post of an earlier – yet important – and timely – article, written as part of my ‘Letters from Exile’ series. I thought it worth revisiting given forthcoming legal clashes. It is ‘Part 8’ of a specific set of postings I wrote concerning the States of Jersey atrocity against the children who were resident at the Blanche Pierre Group Home. Although the particular posting re-produces evidence – such as the ACPO 3/4 reports – relevant to the Haut de la Garenne investigation – its relevance to the Blanche Pierre atrocity is that it illustrates just how widespread and connected many different episodes of child abuse were in Jersey, just how perpetually desperate the local oligarchy is to conceal them – and how we, as a society, have failed in our collective morality. I’d recommend reading the Blanche Pierre series if you have time.

It is heavily evidenced.

And you could be forgiven for not being aware of this fact if you rely upon Jersey’s indigenous media – but I could not have obtained the evidence – nor published it – had I been in Jersey – as I would have been arrested again.

I don’t know if I could describe my feeling as ‘writer’s block’; it’s more a sensation of ‘everything block’. You know how it is; you’re so gripped by ennui – an anomie of such inertial mass – it’s as much as you can do to bother to carry on breathing.

But then you glimpse the bleak, comic absurdity in the situation – and you remember just what a funny guy Samuel Becket was.

And you smile at the thought of that secret society of great miserablists – those who have faced the blackness – gripped it – held it long enough to discover that it’s funny.

You reach for the iPod, and start gently, with a little Leonard Cohen; Born to Lose, perhaps? Or, One of us Cannot be Wrong? Maybe, Everybody Knows?

Then you go deeper – and click to Tindersticks, Live at the Bloomsbury Theatre, and listen to the band with its sophisticated string section supporting the drunken baritone of Stuart Staples – a man who could sing ‘happy days are here again’ – and make it sound like a requiem for ten-thousand shattered lives. Interestingly, the audience love it – judging by the reaction to such cheery numbers as Tiny Tears, Mistakes, and Raindrops. Misery clearly has a fan club. They do say pessimists are generally more intelligent than optimists.

And then – inevitably – it’s time for Tom. You kind of know what you’re in for with Tom Waits, just by listening to the very first track of his very first album, Closing Time. Before a note has been played, you hear his voice counting in, ‘one, two, three, four’, with such a world-weary intonation, you’re not expecting ‘happy’. Sure enough, the first song, ‘Ol 55, ostensibly about a man leaving a friend’s house early in the morning to drive his old 1955 car home, is really about death.

But back in those early days, Tom was pretty much into straight melancholia – the black humour comes later in his career. Songs just so unfeasibly miserable, you have to laugh out loud at them. So you listen to songs like Tango Till They’re Sore, November, Dirt in the Ground, Come on up to the House, Hang Down Your Head, and The Cold, Cold Ground – and so many others – and you feel much, much better.

Better because these songwriters have shown that when you get so intimate with misery, it can become funny.

But then – the iPod goes further down the playlist – as though it had a malign mind of its own – and begins playing Joy Division.

Ian Curtis went in way too deep. Too deep – too soon. He never found the humorous, absurdist face of melancholia. Or – maybe – in his torments – there was only the crushing blackness – and nothing else. He hanged himself in 1980. Everything you need to know is in the two Joy Division albums; it’s all there.

So the funny side of misery, having been driven away by the involuntary playing of some of the most anguished and tormented music committed to record in the last 50 years, I’m back in the mood where I started – a kind of grey, amorphous soupy feeling – the only enlivenment of which is the occasional spark of anger.

Then – just when I’m about to contemplate again just how crap and empty my life is – suddenly – everything falls into perspective. A sense of balance returns.

I count my blessings.

I realise just how great my life has been – and how lucky I was.

I wasn’t a young child – in the “care” of the States of Jersey – spending my childhood existing in the Blanche Pierre Group Home – at the mercy of the States employees, Jane and Alan Maguire – being tortured, battered, molested and raped – for the worst part of a decade.

Stuart.

LETTER FROM EXILE # 22
(First published 30th April 2010.)

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

Blanche Pierre –

The Anatomy of an On-going Atrocity.

Part 8.

Blanche Pierre – Haut de la Garenne:

A Continuum of Crime.

A.C.P.O 3/4:

Yet More Evidence that HDLG

Investigation was Good.

Therefore Suspension of Police Chief

Was Unlawful.

“Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Evening Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 has also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations.”

ACPO3/4.

“5 Intelligence/Analysis

5.1 It is known that some victims were abused by more than one person and that a number of the abusers assaulted numerous victims. The analyst should interrogate all the evidence and provide charting of the abusers and abused children, together with time lines. This will assist interviews, prosecutors and presentation at court.

Recommendation 50: That the analyst prepares charts of abusers and abused children, together with timelines.”

ACPO 3/4.

“8 Victims of child abuse and witnesses management

8.1 The deputy SIO has overseen a review of all the victims, identifying those that had been abused within the offence parameters set by the SIO. There are now 116 victims of child abuse that meet the criteria, whom have come forward to report crimes committed against them at the Home.”

ACPO 3/4

“6 The homicide Investigation

6.1 Since the last visit, the sifting at the scene has unearthed some 30 fragments of bone and seven teeth. A definitive forensic analysis of all the samples is incomplete. It appears however, that one bone is a piece of a female child’s tibia. Additionally, some of the bones have been cut and some of the milk teeth have long roots, suggesting that they did not naturally fall out. The initial views from expert examinations are that these bones and teeth originate from two children. These facts indicate an unexplained death or deaths and it is appropriate that the investigation continues to pursue what happened to the children.”

ACPO 3/4.

“10 Forensic Strategy

10.1 Articles in the Mail on Sunday (18.5.08) and the Daily Mail (19.5.08) criticised the SIO and the investigation, focusing on the forensic processing. This specifically relates to the first piece of ‘skull’ found at the Home. The articles were followed by some criticism in political circles. The Review team immediately saw the damage this has caused to some of the investigation team and sapped their morale. The political criticism is extremely unhelpful and, if leaked will fuel the media comments and will divert the investigation, Of course, political players have every right in the public’s interest to question efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation but this does not include ridiculing members of the team.

Recommendation 54: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police considers raising what the politician has done with the appropriate authorities.”

ACPO 3/4.

This posting will conclude – for the time being – our examination of the Blanch Pierre child abuse atrocity. A crime that I very deliberately describe as ‘on-going’; as persisting over the years and decades.

I do so because not only is the suffering – and the denial of justice – a continuous presence in the lives of the survivors – I do so because the broad, criminal enterprise – of facilitating and concealing the child abuse that occurred – continues to the present day.

And the evidence for that guilty conduct by the States of Jersey is there – to be seen – not only in that one crime – but also in respect of the concealment of child abuse in general.

For example – the criminal concealment of the true extent of the crimes that occurred at Haut de le Garenne – and the on-going unlawful suspension of the Chief Constable of the Jersey Police Force, Graham Power.

An unlawful suspension, facilitated by the acting police chief – David Warcup.

A fact rendered all the more staggering – given that parts of the ACPO report, which is reproduced below – confirm that the ACPO team met with Warcup – he was satisfied with their findings – and wanted them to continue to be involved.

This being the very same ACPO team who endorsed the investigation – and, specifically, the role played by the Chief Constable, Graham Power.

Yet – a few months later – Warcup was ignoring all of the ACPO reports – and, instead, embarked upon the unlawful usurping of Mr. Power – on the basis of nothing more than a now-discredited memo – written by a personal friend of Warcup’s from the Metropolitan police.

No matter which aspect of the child protection disasters we look at in Jersey – failure and wilful malfeasance are the dominant features of what is – clearly – a systemic entity.

In Part 1 of this series of postings, I explored just how it is that bad and evil things can happen – almost, not quite, but almost – by accident. How people, in failing to be aware of factors such as the Diffusion of Responsibility, of Moral Disengagement and of Groupthink – and of personal distance from the actual, principal, crimes – can end up being components in extensive criminal enterprises.

Not only have such phenomena been very well explored and documented in social psychology, so common-place are they, that several theories of law also address group malfeasances, and the culpability of individuals. Perhaps the most famous expression of the simultaneous nature of collective and of individual responsibility being the rejection of the Nuremburg defence, as used by the Nazis, who sought exculpation from their crimes, by claiming that they were “only obeying orders”.

The law, on that occasion, rightly establishing that actual and moral guilt for crimes could not be assigned from those involved in the committing of those offences, merely because a superior had issued the authority.

We are – each of us – responsible for our own actions – no matter how slight – if we are playing a role in a greater crime.

But, just as people often have the most profound difficulty in perceiving their inchoate responsibility for crimes – people equally have a difficulty in even perceiving that the crimes exist and can often be continual in time – on-going – and often of vast and dramatic complexity – spreading out to greater and greater extent in ever-expanding ripples that bring more and more people into the realm of culpability.

And that difficulty of perception, that prevents people from truly seeing and understanding just what it is they are involved in – can often be the very salve – the very tranquilising-agent – which drugs people and equips them to take part in the gravest of crimes, merely because they are distant from the original or immediate offence.

A way to overcome this difficulty in perceiving reality is to step-back – so that you can see the truth – by being able to see the whole picture – not just your own, small, immediate inchoate part in it.

Look at the whole – reality.

And for our purposes – that broad reality is that which has taken place – and is still taking place – in Jersey; it is a single, monstrous, criminal enterprise.

We might call it the “Jersey Child Abuse Disaster”.

We might term it the “Culture of Concealment”.

We might conclude that whilst there is no current, established over-arching single criminal offence, with which we could conveniently label this enterprise – nevertheless, so obviously wrong is it – and so obviously involving many principal and inchoate criminal acts – that we must see it as a single phenomena.

However we may see it, that process of “naming” the thing – of seeing it as a whole, specific entity – is always crucial to human understanding.

What happened at Auschwitz, or Dachau, or Ravensbruck were not isolated, unconnected acts of mass-murder. They were components in a greater whole. The most disgusting act in human history. And people rightly see that “thing” as the distinct, entire, entity that it was.

We look back upon it; we see it; we know it. We recognise it.

Many Jewish people describe it as the Shoah; more commonly, “it” is known as the Holocaust.

But we have named it – we see it – for the specific episode in history that it was.

That is not, of course, to compare the persistent hate, contempt, disregard and criminality shown towards vulnerable children for decades in Jersey, with the nature of the Holocaust. But nevertheless, we are confronted with a continuing atrocity, that is a distinct entity, and which is greater than the sum of its parts.

Of course a further distinction can be drawn between the two crimes in that the Nazi leadership specifically and deliberately planned to attempt genocide against the Jewish people. They knew what they were doing – they had the mens rea. By way of contrast there won’t – I presume – have been a secret meeting of the leaders of the Jersey oligarchy at which they took a specific decision to knowingly subject the vulnerable children of Jersey to decades of neglect, abuse and torture; to have consciously decided, ‘this is what we are going to do, and, moreover, we will also conceal all such crimes’.

So does that absence of a specific ‘controlling mind’ – with the mens rea for what we now see as the entity that is the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – mean that those who participate in the atrocity bear no responsibility?

For many good – and obvious – reasons, legal theory does not grant such exculpation to individuals. Not least – because if it did, we would be approaching an acceptance of the Nuremburg ‘defence’, whereby people could have participated in the most dreadful of crimes – but be able to claim innocence – by asserting, perhaps even accurately, that their role in the crime was so peripheral, they could not perceive that the crime was being committed in the first place – or, even if they had seen the broader enterprise, that they did not know it was a crime.

It is well-known that ‘ignorance of the law is no defence’, but that is not the only means by which legal theory holds people to responsibility for their own actions.

For example, in civil law, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or, ‘the thing itself speaks’, can establish the existence of a broad ‘duty of care’ – or responsibility – for an act. And even though overall responsibility for the wrong act may lie indistinctly within a group of people, if it is obvious that in that context, that group owed a duty of care, then liability for a wrong suffered by a person, speaks for itself in its obviousness – and need not be directly ascribed to an individual within the group.

And in the realm of criminal law, the existence of inchoate offences has long been established; perhaps the most widely recognised being the offence of conspiracy. An individual may have only played a minor, partial, peripheral role in a conspiracy – but having been so involved, they are guilty of the broader criminal enterprise of the conspiracy.

There can be no doubt that individual employees of the States of Jersey, and the States of Jersey itself, are liable for both civil and criminal wrongs committed against the victims of child abuse. That much is already an unarguable, evidenced fact.

We need only consider the contemporaneous file-note written by Graham Power, the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force in July 2007 – in which he recorded the criminal conspiracy being engaged in by Bill Ogley, the States of Jersey Chief Executive, and Mike Pollard, the Health & Social Services Chief Executive – to unlawfully engineer my dismissal as Minister, for the purposes of preventing me from exposing child protection failures.

Indeed – the dramatic compounding of that criminal offence is there to be seen in the criminal conduct of William Bailhache who – in his then capacity as Attorney General, refused to prosecute criminals such as Ogley and Pollard.

And that particular example – the criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by seeking to conceal crimes of child abuse – is but one example. The event -the continuum that we can describe as the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster is ladled with similar such examples.

No person vaguely familiar with the facts – for example, the great mass of hard evidence published by this blog – could credibly dispute that all the elements required to establish the existence and the commissioning of various criminal offences are present.

Conspiracies – plots designed to achieve criminal objectives, the mens rea necessary for both primary crimes and for the conspiracy itself, the ‘agreement’ between a number of people to bring about unlawful outcomes by which people suffer wrongs, the ‘general intent’, the ‘agreement’ to act in such ways as to involve the commissioning of a criminal act, the ‘facilitation’ of such acts – all are evidenced and clear behaviours exhibited by the senior figures in the Jersey oligarchy.

That is why – when I describe the Jersey oligarchy as a ‘criminal regime’ – I do so quite specifically.

It is a literal fact.

There is no other jurisdiction in the established, democratic world – that would have embraced such overt and comprehensive lawlessness in its conduct.

No matter how one considers the evidence against the Jersey oligarchy, there is no hiding from the fact that the mens rea and the actus reus are clearly present, regardless of whether we consider motivational concurrence or temporal concurrence.

Whether the individuals involved have been the principals or the accessories – the common purpose of breaking the law in known, demonstrable ways – is established – and, so far as I am aware, no mitigation on the grounds of abandonment of the course of criminal conduct could yet be cited by any of the guilty parties.

And in this posting, I publish yet further evidence that shows the criminal conduct of the Jersey oligarchy.

That evidence is the combined third and fourth reports prepared by the Association of Chief Police Officers, who were providing professional oversight of the Jersey historic child abuse investigation. Like the two earlier ACPO reports I have published – it proves that the investigation itself – and, in particular, the overall leadership of the Jersey Police under Graham Power – was of a very high standard.

The offences – the criminal conduct – demonstrated by this evidence – are two-fold.

Not only is it clear from the report that the investigation was justified – both on grounds of many, many cases of child abuse – and the very real discovery of unidentified remains of children – but it also shows the subsequent action of suspending the Chief Constable, Graham Power – to have been without any credible justification, and therefore of itself, another criminal act, designed to sabotage a proper police enquiry.

So how and why – given the overt criminality on display – is the Jersey oligarchy able to get away with such conduct?

Because they are the senior civil service – they are the prosecution system – they are the executive – they are the legislature – they are the judiciary – they are the Fourth Estate.

Unless we win – by eventually forcing external intervention – there is not the remotest prospect of such comprehensively corrupted power in Jersey – ever holding itself to account.

Even the recently appointed Attorney General, who had an opportunity to, effectively, turn the Jersey oligarchy away from lawlessness and corruption has, instead, foolishly chosen to continue the criminal enterprises engaged in by his predecessors.

So it is going to be a long time before we can rely upon the proper protections of the law in Jersey.

In the mean time – we just have to hope that some of these oligarchs might begin to develop some ethics – or even a little common sense.

And perhaps attempting to stand back from what they have become involved in – and seeing it for the extensive amalgam of criminal offences that it is – perceiving it as a continuum of child abuse and the criminal concealment of such abuse – might assist them in coming to such recognition.

So in an effort to assist those ‘players’ in the Jersey oligarchy who have become active participants in the atrocity – I will draw the linkages between their actions – and the consequences of their actions – to show that, just as the bureaucrats and facilitators of the Holocaust may as well have been beating people into the gas chambers – Jersey oligarchs are helping today’s paedophiles to rape children and for such crimes to be concealed.

Let us say that you are a senior police officer – who has helped the oligarchy bury the child abuse investigation – by mounting the unlawful coup against the Chief Constable.

Imagine your actions as being akin to pimping young boys from Haute de la Garenne to be sodomised by old men.

Or – facilitating enforced abortions on a teenage girls who have been made pregnant through rape at HDLG – and then disposing of the foetus in the old furnace.

If you have helped the Jersey establishment bury the abuse investigation – those are the crimes you are associated with.

Let us imagine – that you are a senior civil servant – and you are aware of gross and systemic cases of child abuse – but you do not inform the police – and nor do you even alert your politicians to the generality of such a breakdown in social services.

Imagine coming home from work in a bad mood – and beating a child in your care with a wooden broom-handle – until the child is bleeding from lacerations – and does not even have the strength left to carry on screaming.

Then – once you’ve finished – locking that child in the cupboard under the stairs until midnight.

By failing to even draw such crimes to the attention of the police – you may as well have been wielding that broom yourself.

Or – perhaps you are a politician – who has denigrated the police investigation – tried to undermine the police leaders – or – as is referred to in this ACPO report – furnished manipulated and forged information to the Mail on Sunday, in a deliberate attempt to smear the enquiry.

You have misused your position – in order to protect people who take school boys out to sea on sailing boats, where there is no chance of the child being helped – and who then hold the boy’s head over the side of the boat under the water whilst anally raping them.

Perhaps you are a senior civil servant – who is aware that senior colleagues from other departments are deliberately concealing child abuse – and you choose to support and protect your friends in such conduct.

Imagine walking down a dark lane one evening – and hearing the screams of a child being molested. You know it’s happening – you even know which house it is taking place in – but you hurry on by – pretending that you didn’t hear that suffering.

Or – perhaps it comes into your knowledge – that a member of your staff – in the department you manage – has been sexually abusing a teenage girl in his care, and has caused her to become pregnant. Not only do you not inform the police – even worse – you confront the employee – but not to sack him on the grounds of gross misconduct; instead you tell him you’ll let him resign and leave quietly – in order to avoid any inconvenient fuss – thus enabling him to go and work elsewhere where he can carry on abusing other children.

You may as well have pimped under-age girls to that abuser.

Imagine you are a Data Protection Commissioner and you are abusing your powers to oppress politicians who are trying to fight against child abuse.

It may as well be you – who is knowingly protecting a middle-aged man from discovery whilst he forces little girls to masturbate him.

Or – perhaps you’re helping your establishment friends – to conceal their culpability for letting-off a man who is – obviously – an evidenced mass-murdering psychopath.

You may as well have been going around that hospital ward – at 3.00 in the morning – detaching patients’ drips – and overdosing them with heroin.

You might be a politician – who thought no further than the partisan political support of your allies – and the doing-down of your opponents – and therefore you voted to stop a colleague from exposing child protection failures.

Imagine you – yourself – being responsible for keeping a mentally ill 14 year old – locked up in solitary confinement – where he has a mental breakdown – and routinely lacerates his arms through self-harm – whilst he lays on a mattress on his cell floor for 23 hours a day.

And you keep him in those conditions – for three months.

Or perhaps you are a lawyer – and close friends with the Attorney General – who pays you with public money to politically oppress opposition politicians.

You are directly supporting and maintaining the climate of fear – and the Culture of Concealment – that will continue to embolden mass-murders – and child rapists – in the committing of their crimes.

Or – perhaps you are a judge; a judge who knows perfectly well that Jersey harbours a Culture of Concealment – in which the grossest of abuses – and of social services failures – are allowed to persist – with those responsible enjoying some kind of absolute invulnerability – which ensures they can never be held to account for their gross incompetence.

But even though you have that knowledge – you abuse your powers to participate in the overt oppression of those who were trying to combat the culture of secrecy and the lack of accountability.

Your actions are equivalent to those of a political tyrant who wishes to conceal the failures of his regime – so he sends around thugs to beat-up his opponents – to “make an example” of them – to maintain the climate of fear.

Or – perhaps you are a journalist – and you are provided with damning evidence that shows that many gross crimes against children were able to be committed over a period of years – not only without being reported to the police, but even with the victims being bullied into not complaining.

You do not take steps to have the information published – because your bosses and your friends wouldn’t like it.

You may as well have stood and watched – whilst those boys were made to become helplessly intoxicated – and then sexually molested – whilst the abusers filmed their crimes.

Actions – and inaction’s – and consequences.

And not merely abstract theorising – but a disturbingly close match to the actual events.

Cause – and effect.

It is famously written that all that is required for the triumph of evil – is for good people to do nothing.

But the dreadful reality of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster is worse than that.

The Culture of Concealment – and the climate of fear that enables all such atrocities to persist – does not come about only because “good people do nothing”. Instead – its existence is pro-actively helped and nurtured – through an accumulation of small acts of ethical bankruptcy – of evil – of cowardice – that – cumulatively – bring into existence an act of monstrous wickedness that is something greater than the sum of its parts.

Yet – how many of those contributory individuals – those culpable people – see their own weakness and solipsistic inadequacies – for what they are – component-parts in a greater atrocity which would not be able to exist if it were not for their participation?

Acts – and consequences.

As Dylan Thomas wrote:

“The hand that signed the paper
Felled the city.”

Stuart.

ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS

REPORT 3/4

Operation Rectangle: Haut de la Garenne, Jersey

Historical Child Abuse investigation and possible homicide case

Update of previous recommendations

Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and any other meetings) and a minute taker records the salient points and any decisions.

From the 4th March 2008, Vickie Ellis has been appointed minute taker and every meeting has an agenda and a record is maintained. Copies of the minutes are not yet retained on the Holmes account. This should be addressed and the deputy SIO has been reminded of this requirement.(26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting any colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.

DI Bray attends the management meetings and provides a current situation report. This is also provided to both the outside enquiry team and the MIR; a copy of all reports are held on Holmes as ‘other documents’. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting the debris.

On the 4th March 2008, a mechanical sifter was borrowed from the Counter Terrorist Command at New Scotland Yard. It was in place on the 5th March in one of the sifting areas at Haut de la Garenne. The team saw this being used and it has speeded up the process. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. ‘these are the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. ‘these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.’

The SIO has entered a policy decision on the 3rd March. The exhibits at Haut de la Garenne are retained at a secure area and the Scene Manager retains an exhibit book and log. She will provide a full statement giving account control and movement. The Exhibits Officer retains control of all other exhibits and retains a record of movement on Holmes. The documents and files in ‘the cage’ are exhibited in batches. When specific papers are removed they are sub-exhibited as required with a full record on Holmes. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).

On 20th March Duncan McGarry visited the MIR. He was apprised of the FLO policy from DS Dave Hill (the Office Manager). He gave advice on an FLO strategy, best practice and exit policy for victims. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 6: That the SIO ensure that his policy for presenting victims’ evidence to the courts is recorded in the policy log.

On 18th March the SIO recorded this policy in his policy/decision log. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be interviewed (or not)?

On 18th March, the SIO recorded the policy that not all victims will be interviewed as a matter of course. They will only be interviewed if they come forward and are victims or witnesses of material evidence. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 8: The SIO should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.

See above (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.

On 15th March the SIO met with the Force legal advisor, Lawrence O’Donnell. They discussed Wateridge. He is to be re-interviewed week commencing the 24th March regarding other allegations and offences. All parties are content with this way forward. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.

On 19th March, the SIO detailed his arrest strategy in his policy/decision log.(26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).

The head of Social Services, Tony Le Sueur, provides full access to any files required. The enquiry team has immediate access to the files and can remove any on receipt. This process is intelligence led; in that, as the intelligence cell identifies a former worker of interest a call is made and the files searched for and recovered against receipt. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.

All victims and suspects are risk assessed by the officer who has the action to deal with the individual. On 25th March, the deputy SIO has provided Special Branch with details of all suspects for tracking of movement if they attempt to leave Jersey. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Evening Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 has also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 14: That the key members of investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from this team.

This is on-going and the key members of the enquiry team have welcomed and taken the opportunity to seek advice from their respective mentors. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 15: That the SIO, deputy SOI and Office Manager have clear demarcation of their roles and adhere to them.

As of 10th March, when PNICC provided additional resources on mutual aid, the three key members of the enquiry work to their specific roles detailed within MIRSAP. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone to temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.

On 10th March, Sean Du Val was appointed Deputy Chief Officer. He undertakes all the functions within that rank leaving the SIO to concentrate on Operation Rectangle. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents of this home, could include advisors from the NSPCC or community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.

On 19th March, a Community Impact Assessment was completed. The first meeting of the Independent Advisory Group was held on 13th March 2008. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

On 7th March, an internal document was drawn up and made available to all staff. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader/OM/Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.

On 10th March, the MIR took over the two rooms of the MIR and the outside enquiry team moved into separate accommodation on the second floor of police headquarters. In three or four week’s time a new MIR will be made available in Broadcasting House – a nearby police rented building. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a ‘relevant’ number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering machine for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.

On 17th March, a dedicated Call-Centre with two staff, one a member of the enquiry team and another a member of the NSPCC was located in the enquiry team’s office. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to MIR.

From 10th March, a Receiver, Action Manager, two Readers and additional typists were dedicated to MIR. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SOP to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to ‘For Referral’ or ‘Referred’. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to ‘clear the ground’ from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.

The Deputy SIO and Office Manager now have a regular QA system in place (see recommendation 42). (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be ‘living documents’ on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence/update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.

This is now in place and the SIO is updated at management meetings regarding this action. (26.3.08)Completed.

It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattersall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.

On 17th March Andy Tattersall visited the enquiry and met with key members of the team. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account.

The non sensitive policy files were already on Holmes and are available for the team to see. (26.3.08) sensitive policy files are retained in hard copy only. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

See Recommendation 12 above. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 26: Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

A report has been submitted to the Home Affairs minister. (26.3.08)

Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to revisit any recommendations, the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.

This recommendation is complete. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 28: That the SIO considers a scoring matrix to manage and prioritise the arrests of suspects.

The SIO decided not to adopt a scoring matrix (log 8 in Persons of Interest/Suspect Policy). However in log 9, he does decide to prioritise the suspect list and to take no further action against others. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 29: That the SIO considers appointing lead officers for each suspect and they maintain a structured investigative log for each of their designated suspects.

Each Person of Interest and / or suspect is allocated to a team for research and progression. The team are also responsible for maintaining the structured investigative log that is also recorded on the Holmes account. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 30: That Detective Inspector Alan Williamson, the Family Liaison lead for States of Jersey Police, creates and implements a family liaison strategy in accordance with the advice from DC McGarry.

Detective Constable Alex le Chevalier (Jersey police) and Raymond Alexander (NSPCC) are dedicated to this role. They are putting together a FLO strategy which will be utilised on a case by case basis. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 31: That the Crime Scene Manager and SOCA for Jersey brings this issue to the attention of LGC management.

There has been confusion over the provenancing and carbon dating of this exhibit. This has been exacerbated by the Mail on Sunday article on 18th May 2008, where forensic analysts involved have spoken directly to the media. This will be subject of a further recommendation that the States of Jersey Police raises this breach of confidence with the National Police Improvement Agency. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 32: That once the provenance of the piece of skull is known, the SIO decided and decision logs the continuance or not of the homicide investigation.

Even though there is confusion regarding this exhibit, from the context in which it was found the SIO has been informed that it is from the 1920s. With regard to that item he has declared that it is not part of a homicide investigation. However, with recent finds of cut bone, charred pieces of bone and full milk teeth, he has declared this an unexplained death or deaths and once there is confirmation around the date of the death (s), he will decide whether this is a homicide case.(23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 33: If not a homicide, the SIO seeks advice as to how to deal with the piece of bone.

The SIO is retaining this exhibit. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 34: If there is no homicide at Haut de la Garenne the case remains a complex historical abuse investigation, the SIO should then consider declaring it a critical incident and instigate police supporting that decision. Discharged. (23.5.08)

Recommendation 35: A forensic strategy must be drawn up to cover all exhibits that have been recovered for comparison against victims and the UK database.

See recommendation 56 (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 36: The SIO must obtain forensic advice regarding the recovered bones from the scene.

See recommendation (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 37: Through Theresa Russell, NPIA, the SIO seeks the advice of Adrian West with regard to a sensitive media appeal for reluctant witnesses to come forward and report crimes.

The SIO has considered this recommendation and is satisfied with the strategy in place for encouraging victims to come forward. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 38: That the SIO considers a strategy to encourage workers at the home to provide evidence.

The SIO has made such media appeals. This recommendation will be reconsidered if the findings of bones and teeth lead to a homicide investigation. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 39: All risk assessments must be quality assured and supervised by the deputy SIO.

The deputy SIO is supervising the risk assessments. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 40: The SIO seeks an experienced Receiver – ideally be Monday 31st March 2008. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 41: In conjunction with the advice from Andy Tattersall, if the enquiry is a complex historical abuse investigation, the SIO considers how best to sub divide the Holmes account to address individual suspects.

This is being undertaken and the suspects have been divided and designated to teams to progress. The disclosure officer is engaged on this process and further expert disclosure advice is being sought from Devon & Cornwall Police. (23.05.08) Completed.

Recommendation 42: Within seven days, a full review of the incident actions is made to assess and prioritise the work of the enquiry team. This will identify areas of priority to provide the SIO the best evidence available against suspects. This should be completed by Keith Bray and Dave Hill. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 43: That the Receiver receives and quality assures the returning actions from the Enquiry team. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 44: The SIO seeks a Receiver at the earliest opportunity. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 45: Following the review of Actions (see recommendation 41 above) the SIO reconsiders the staff requirements. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 46: The SIO should discuss medium to long term requirements with PNICC. (23.5.08) Completed.

1 Mentoring

1.1 The team continues to mentor the senior players on the enquiry. Unless there are any issues that come to light, e.g. a media report, the team, in the main, responds to the individuals making contact.

2 The Major Incident Room

2.1 The MIR and enquiry team have now moved to more appropriate accommodation in the Major Crime Suite at Broadcasting House. There is sufficient space for the number of staff on the team and there is some room for expansion.

3 The Holmes Account

3.1 The main Action queues are at 303 For Allocation, 460 Allocated, 13 Completed, 603 Resulted, 154 Filed, 2 for Referral, 621 Referred and 2 Pended. The referred Actions will be assessed again in the near future to ensure there are none that require to be moved back for allocation. A Detective Sergeant manages the enquiry team’s Actions, ensuring they return them in a timely manner. The Actions for Allocation are reviewed on a daily basis by the Office Manager and the Enquiry team leader.

3.1 The Review team attended an office meeting/daily briefing. It was noted that no official record was kept and, therefore, no record retained on Holmes. An ongoing document on Holmes will allow staff to keep updated with the investigation and allow any new staff to read in to the investigation.

Recommendation 47: That a record is kept and updated on Holmes of all meetings.

4 Disclosure/presentation of evidence

4.1 There are complex issues in relation to the ability to isolate certain documents for specific files in relation to suspects or accused persons within the incident. The disclosure officer is to engage the support of an experienced Disclosure officer from Devon & Cornwall.

4.2 To assist with the presentation of these complex cases at court, it is recommended that computer generated graphics be used.

Recommendation 48: That the SIO considers computer generated graphics for presenting the cases at court.

4.3 Witnesses who are victims are initially interviewed on audio tape and then a written statement is prepared and signed. The deputy SIO wants to quality assure that the accounts given between the audio and written records to not differ.

Recommendation 49: That the Disclosure Officer and the teams responsible for managing the individual cases, a comparison between the audio and written records is conducted to ensure that there are no discrepancies.

5 Intelligence/Analysis

5.1 It is known that some victims were abused by more than one person and that a number of the abusers assaulted numerous victims. The analyst should interrogate all the evidence and provide charting of the abusers and abused children, together with time lines. This will assist interviews, prosecutors and presentation at court.

Recommendation 50: That the analyst prepares charts of abusers and abused children, together with timelines.

6 The homicide Investigation

6.1 Since the last visit, the sifting at the scene has unearthed some 30 fragments of bone and seven teeth. A definitive forensic analysis of all the samples is incomplete. It appears however, that one bone is a piece of a female child’s tibia. Additionally, some of the bones have been cut and some of the milk teeth have long roots, suggesting that they did not naturally fall out. The initial views from expert examinations are that these bones and teeth originate from two children. These facts indicate an unexplained death or deaths and it is appropriate that the investigation continues to pursue what happened to the children. A decision as to the enquiry being a homicide investigation (and the protocols of a homicide investigation should be adhered to until a decision is made) depends on the dates of the deaths. If they died too long ago a homicide investigation may not be pursued. The SIO has intimated that if the children died post war a homicide investigation will be undertaken. The SIO will then review the resource requirements to conduct both the homicide investigation and the on-going complex child abuse investigation.

7 Victim(s) of homicide/unexplained death

7.1 The partial bones and milk teeth will be forensically examined for many reasons, one being for identification of the children. The best advice must be obtained to ensure all forensic opportunities are pursued in this endeavour.

7.2 There will be a very demanding challenge to identify who the dead children could be, and this will require extensive work to obtain registers and records of the residents at the Home. Annually, there were 250 children in Jersey’s care system (based on annual reports). The analyst has commenced this work and he has identified that on any one day, between the period of 1957 to 1986, 55 children were resident at the Home. Residents at the Home included: runaways from the UK; children on remand; children for respite requirements; and children there for one night. If this work is required (both for a homicide investigation and or for a coroner’s hearing) additional resources will be required as researchers to assist the analyst.

Recommendation 51: That if a full list of children is required, additional researchers are identified to assist the analyst.

8 Victims of child abuse and witnesses management

8.1 The deputy SIO has overseen a review of all the victims, identifying those that had been abused within the offence parameters set by the SIO. There are now 116 victims of child abuse that meet the criteria, whom have come forward to report crimes committed against them at the Home.

8.2 The newly appointed Family Liaison Co-ordinator is being ably assisted by a colleague from the NSPCC. They are putting together a strategy to oversee the needs of the victims. This will include a risk assessment model and the Review Team will meet with them and discuss the risk models that are available and may be of value for this purpose. They are considering how to keep the victims updated throughout the enquiry and court process including, best practice from the witness care service in UK courts, refreshing the telephone helpline and they should also consider a website with secure individual passwords for victims to be updated.

Recommendation 52: The FLC and NSPCC team should consider processes for keeping victims updated throughout the investigation and court process.

9 Scene Management

9.1 The Office Manager confirms concerns with regard to the Action management of the work going on at the ‘scene’. These centre around:-

a lot of work is being done at the Home which harvests a large number of exhibits. There appears to still be a ‘disconnect’ between the MIR and the scene management of exhibits;

lack of document flow from the Home to MIR;

lack of control via Actions of work being done at the scene.

This issue is important for many reasons and even more so with the discrepancies of forensic examinations and further exhibits being found.

Recommendation 53: The SIO reviews his decision to allow the Crime Scene Manager to retain exhibits at the Home and complete one statement at the conclusion of the scene being searched. All relevant documentation regarding the enquiry (including those at the Home) must be put on Holmes. This should be further considered by the forensic reviewers as detailed at recommendation 56 below.

9.2 A potential second extensive scene has been identified by victims of child abuse. One of these witnesses has stated that they saw a child’s body in the confines of this new scene. The SIO has taken physical and technical measures to protect the area whilst at the same time ensuring that the general public are not alerted to police interest in the area. The SIO must ensure that measures are taken not to cross contaminate the two scenes and that a full strategy is undertaken to forensically search this second scene.

10 Forensic Strategy

10.1 Articles in the Mail on Sunday (18.5.08) and the Daily Mail (19.5.08) criticised the SIO and the investigation, focusing on the forensic processing. This specifically relates to the first piece of ‘skull’ found at the Home. The articles were followed by some criticism in political circles. The Review team immediately saw the damage this has caused to some of the investigation team and sapped their morale. The political criticism is extremely unhelpful and, if leaked will fuel the media comments and will divert the investigation, Of course, political players have every right in the public’s interest to question efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation but this does not include ridiculing members of the team.

Recommendation 54: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police considers raising what the politician has done with the appropriate authorities.

10.2 The article in the Mail on Sunday included quotes, interviews and a photograph of scientist employed in the forensic processing of a particular exhibit. This was without the SIO’s authority.

Recommendation 55: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police discusses this breach with LGC and they raise this issue with Tony Lake, portfolio holder for forensic issues in ACPO.

10.3 The Review Team feel it is appropriate to have an independent forensic review to look at the whole forensic process from when the exhibit is recovered through to the completion of the forensic examination(s).

Recommendation 56: That an Independent Forensic review be conducted by a team identified by the NPIA. Consideration should also be given to have all key players at a table-top forensic exercise.

10.4 Whilst visiting the Home, the Review Team was informed that Vicky Coupland, the Crime Scene Manager, was at the scene of a fatal fire. She will, no doubt, attend to many aspects of cross contamination that could be alleged or possible contamination of the charred bones found at the Home.

11 Suspects and Persons of Interest

11.1 The Deputy SIO has reviewed the list of suspects and persons of interest. There are 12 suspects and they are each managed by a pair of officers within the enquiry team and they are responsible for researching, collation of evidence, risk assessments and planning of arrests. There are some 30 other persons of interest who will be assessed as and when the weight of evidence against them becomes clearer. A decision will then be made to categorise them as suspects or listed for no further action. The deputy SIO has already reduced the list of suspects and persons of interest by undertaking the review.

12 Arrest Strategies

21.1 It is understood that one person to be arrested was possibly abused at the Home and later became an abuser whilst a teenager at the Home. The advice of a clinical psychologist must be obtained before he is arrested.

Recommendation 57: That the advice of a clinical psychologist be obtained through Teresa Russell, NPIA.

13 Resources

13.1 We spoke to a number of the enquiry team members. They are very content with the new accommodation and feel they are kept apprised of the investigation process through daily briefings/office meetings. They are not on excessive hours and are not receiving allowances under the Hertfordshire agreement.

13.2 It is understood that the deputy SIO and the Crime Scene Manager are still required to undertake on call duties in the Island. The deputy SIO was engaged over the last weekend on an allegation of serious sexual assault and the Crime Scene Manager was called out to a fatal fire on the 21st May. There are other officers available to cover on call for serious crime. The demands from Operation Rectangle on these two key individuals, is extremely high, especially so with the issues of recovery of exhibits and the need to keep a consecutive record and feed of documents to the MIR.

Recommendation 58: That the States of Jersey Police ensures that the key staff on Operation Rectangle are deployed full time on the investigation and other personnel are deployed for on-call duties in Jersey.

Recommendation 59: That the temporary Deputy Chief Officer and head of CID considers and draws up contingency plans in case another major incident occurs in Jersey.

13.3 The SIO travelled to Sheffield to meet forensic experts with regard to the recent discovery of bones and teeth. No doubt there are sound reasons for him to travel but he should empower other members of the enquiry team to undertake such roles.

13.4 The Ops Management have asked for States of Jersey police officers to be returned from operation Rectangle to other duties in the Island. They suggest as staff from the UK are deployed on the operation, their own staff should be made available for deployment on other Jersey policing requirements. The request is understandable but key roles on the enquiry must be from Jersey. They know the powers, the systems, the processes and can meet the long term requirements of such a complex enquiry. It is particularly important as they move into the arrest phase.

Recommendation 60: That key roles on the enquiry must be from the States of Jersey.

13.5 The Ops Management also have some concern that any staff ‘back filling’ States of Jersey Police Officers on everyday policing demands will not be paid for by the finances being made available for the Haut de la Garenne requirements. These are indirect costs.

Recommendation 61: That the States of Jersey Police ascertain the correct position on recompense payments for back filling staff on operation Rectangle.

13.6 Staff from the UK are seconded to the enquiry for periods of around three months or less. Issues of continuity and reading in to the enquiry are obvious. Some staff are willing to be deployed for longer periods than three months. Staff with background in child protection, homicide investigation and MIR support should be provided for the enquiry.

Recommendation 62: That States of Jersey Police discuss with PNICC, the possibility of a more flexible approach to periods of secondment to the enquiry.

13.7 The Review Team have taken the opportunity to speak to a number of the staff on the enquiry. The staff from the UK are still unclear as to their police powers whilst in Jersey.

Recommendation 63: That the States of Jersey ascertains the position with regard to police powers for seconded officers from the UK and that clarity is given to the position for each and every individual whilst they are deployed in Jersey.

14. Finance

14.1 The Review team have been asked to comment as to whether an SIO should consider financial implications of an enquiry. This has been asked as, it is understood, the SIO commented that he had considered costs and expenditure, reported in the media. This article was queried by e-mail sent to the chief officer and another party in Jersey. The SIO will be neglecting his or her duty if they did not consider costs and resources of an enquiry. This includes from the overall costs and value, against public interest of mounting an investigation, e.g. the offences are very old and dated and the public expectation may be that there is no or limited value in prolonged investigation, to unit overtime costs for administrative enquires.

Recommendation 64: The SIO must continue to consider and record expenditure, costs and resource demands of any enquiries.

15: The Independent Advisory Group

15.1 The IAG has now met on four occasions. The Review Team have seen the first three sets of recorded minutes of the meetings. Care must be taken to ensure that the minutes are an accurate record of what is said. An example being reference to ‘skull’ at the bottom of the first page in the third meeting (18th April 2008). Any inaccuracies must be corrected.

15.2 The fifth meeting is planned for next week. The SIO must ensure he brings the group up to date with all the issues that have been aired in public and any other foreseeable issue that may be raised. The IAG are there to be a community sounding board and expert advisory group of the investigation – they are critical friends and provide checks and balances for an investigation.

16 Succession planning of the SIO

16.1 The current SIO is to retire from the States of Jersey Police in September 2008. In reality he leaves the Island on the 11th August 2008. A successor is required – the investigation into the complex child abuse and possible homicide is at a crucial stage. Succession planning for the SIO must be addressed at the earliest opportunity. Some possible options for the position of SIO, includes:-

To ask the current SIO to delay his retirement or take up a contract to continue as the SIO.

To appoint the deputy SIO as the SIO.

To have the replacement Deputy Chief Officer be the SIO.

To have another senior officer in Jersey become the SIO.

To ask the ACPO HWG to appoint someone from the Review Team (their parent organisation must also be asked).

To ask the ACPO HWG to advise on a suitable SIO from the UK.

To have a retired UK or Jersey officer contracted as the SIO.

To have an SIO contracted from a company that supplies such, e.g. RIG.

16.2 The Review Team have worked on criteria and skills that a successor requires.

Recommendation 65: That the Chief Officer States of Jersey Police convenes a meeting to discuss the succession planning for the SIO, at the earliest opportunity (which this Review Team should be represented on). In the meantime, the Chief Officer should seek the current SIO’s views on his retention and his replacement.

17 Governance

17.1 The Chief Officer remains a buffer zone between the SIO and the politicians in States of Jersey. It is suggested that he retains this role for the foreseeable future.

17.2 The Attorney General has a nominated lawyer advising the investigation team. The review team are aware that files have been supplied to him seeking advice on arrests and extradition. Subject to any legal impediments, the designated lawyer must attend to the files and provide advice at the earliest opportunity. There are now two people charged and awaiting trial and 12 suspects being prepared for arrest and further enquiries. The designated lawyer has two files for consideration and will have more in the next few weeks.

Media

18.1 There is high media interest in the enquiry. The media are keen to keep the public informed and seek any new or high points for reporting. Additionally, some members of the media are keen to criticise the police, the authorities or any other aspect of the Home and Jersey. The media must be managed. Their value to keeping the general public apprised is important. The victims will be affected by what they see and hear, and the Review Team are aware that a victim of serious assaults over a prolonged period whilst resident in the Home, contacted the enquiry team to say she now wanted to make a statement. She has been reluctant in the past.

18.2 Subject to any high points of the investigation, the SIO, advised by the States of Jersey Press Officer, should consider holding press conferences in a controlled environment. The Review Team suggests that no one-to-one interviews are provided (unless the value is obvious) save for local Jersey media that a specific interest in the enquiry.

Recommendation 66: No one-to-one interviews be provided unless for Jersey media with a specific interest in the enquiry.

Andre Baker
Anne Harrison
John Mooney

23rd May 2008

ACPO HWG Review Team – Operation Rectangle

Visit – 28th June 2008 – 30th June 2008

Visit by A. Baker, A. Harrison, Jonathan Smith, Teresa Russell and Malcolm Boots.

Part of the team met with Lenny Harper, Alison Fossey, Vicki Coupland and Martin Grimes to discuss the Forensic Strategy and terms of reference for the Forensic Review.

A document was presented that details the summary for the forensic decision log. From the outset the forensic strategy was discussed at the enquiry’s management meetings and subsequently recorded in both the SIO’s logs and the Crime Scene Manager’s logs. The team have been advised on drafting a forensic strategy as a forward-looking document from the outset of an enquiry. The review team are aware there will be other scene(s) to be searched and examined for forensic opportunities and recovery.

Recommendation 67: That the management team complete forensic strategies for any further scenes identified. This should be a forward looking document that details the strategic direction for that scene examination.

2.1 The review team met with the SIO and deputy SIO and discussed the terms of reference for the forensic review. These have been agreed and presented to be signed off. Any report should be discussed with the ACPO HWG review team and the States of Jersey police. The forensic review should be made available to any full review if and when undertaken.

3.1 The SIO still awaits carbon dating and other forensic expert advice and conclusions. He is hopeful that these will be forthcoming in the near future and that he will be able to revisit the unexplained death/homicide question, and decide if the States of jersey Police are able to conduct a homicide investigation. If he is able to so decide, this will assist any successor as to the on-going strategy and conduct of Operation Rectangle.

3.2 However, the ACPO HWG team feel that a full review is commissioned to take stock and assist in the future strategy of the enquiry. Where an extensive number of staff or support has been provided by a specific force that force’s review tem should not be utilised.

Recommendation 68: That there is a full review of the investigation/enquiry. This must be conducted by a dedicated and experienced review team from either the Metropolitan Police Service or other UK police force review team. The terms of reference should be agreed by the States of Jersey Police, the new review team and the ACPO HWG team.

Recommendation 69: That once a decision has been taken with regard to the human remains – teeth and bones. The SIO must discuss a coronial hearing with the States of Jersey Coroner.

4.1 The Independent Advisory Group was set up to critically advise the SIO and enquiry team. The aim being that an independent party regularly meets the SIO and representatives to discuss the investigation and comment as to direction and value with specific aspects of community impact and considerations that affect the community.

4.2 It is understood, however that the IAG have asked the general public for their views on the investigation and general comment on such. This course of action could be reflected from both a negative and positive standpoint. Negative in that some of the respondents could have been pointed and a collective from a defendants’ group of associates – almost setting up defence ambush at trial, and positive, that the comments could have been a collective of law enforcement, politicians and the like to support the robust strategy of the investigation. The whole exercise might well be valueless, especially as the public have not been exposed to the vast majority of the lines of investigation.

4.3 The review team are also concerned that the IAG undertook this public poll without discussion and reference to the SIO.

5.1 The review team met with the Chief Officer and David Warcup – the DCO designate to discuss the options for succession planning of the SIO. The Chief Officer and DCO designate, expressed the value in retaining the expertise of the ACPO HWG. It was agreed that a seconded or contracted SIO will be selected by open advertisement and a process was agreed and is now in place. The ACPO HWG team will prepare a draft advertisement and will discuss their further involvement, in the selection and the enquiry, with David Warcup.

5.2 The line supervision of Operation Rectangle remains from the SIO directly to the Chief Officer. This will change on the appointment of the new Deputy Chief Officer – David Warcup, where he will provide the strategic direction and the acting SIO and newly appointed SIO will report directly to him.

Andre Baker
Anne Harrison