BRITISH “JUSTICE”:

How the “Law” Really “Works”    
In the Hands of the British Establishment.
[This posting was first published on 26th October 2011 – shortly before I was jailed for whistle-blowing and it remains an historically important snap-shot and insight to the kind of undisguised British judicial corruption which has enabled decades of child-abuse cover-ups.]
I’m publishing four items of evidence below.
I’m not even going to bother explaining them in detail.
For any thinking person who reads the material below – the picture should fall into view; no further explanation necessary.
Couldn’t make it up.
Stuart.
ITEM 1: A quote from the speech made by Jersey “Bailiff”  Sir Phillip Bailhache [personally conflicted – child-abuse cover-ups, brother of equally conflicted Attorney General William Bailhache – child-abuse cover-ups] when swearing-in to Office as magistrate, Bridget Shaw [personally conflicted – child-abuse cover-ups, and until being chosen as Magistrate by the conflicted Philip Bailhache was the prosecutor who failed to bring certain child-abuse cases to court whilst working for Attorney General, the conflicted William Bailhache]  on the 2nd July 2008. The “senior politician” the conflicted Philip Bailhache was attacking in such a prejudicial manner in the paragraph below, was me.
“Mrs Shaw, you take up your post at a time when the judiciary and those in public office in the Island are, for better or for worse, under greater scrutiny than has been the case for some time. No-one can object, of course, to holding individual members of the judiciary to account for their judicial conduct or indeed for their conduct outside the court room. Indeed you have become, by virtue of your office, a member of the Jersey Judicial Association which last year adopted a Code of Ethics and Conduct setting out quite clearly what is expected of judges and magistrates in this Island. But wholesale attacks upon the judiciary and suggestions that they are collectively incapable of dealing with any outcomes of the current child abuse inquiry are ignorant and unwelcome, and I deplore them. Senior politicians, should know better than to attempt to subvert public confidence in our judicial institutions in pursuit of a personal agenda.” [emphasis added]
I was not following “a personal agenda”. Philip Bailhache – like his equally conflicted brother William Bailhache – is a liar. I was, in fact, “in pursuit” of the lawful duties I’d had as Minister for Health & Social Services – and on behalf of my then constituents who’d been victims of child-abuse. I had written a detailed report to then Justice Secretary Jack Straw, pointing out that Jersey’s prosecution and judicial functions were plainly structurally ultra vires – and wholly incapable – in law – because of the direct conflicts of interest of people like Philip and William Bailhache and Michael Birt – in dealing properly with the child-abuse scandals. I was right.
Some months after the conflicted Bridget Shaw was appointed as magistrate by the conflicted Philip Bailhache – his brother, the equally conflicted William Bailhache – having played a key-role in the illegal high-jacking of the police via the illegal  suspension of the good Police Chief Graham Power – ordered an illegal massed police raid on me for whistle-blowing – and then prosecuted me for whistle-blowing – and the ‘trial’ was heard by the conflicted Bridget Shaw – who had been one of William Bailhache’s prosecutors – before being appointed as one of Philip Bailhache’s judges – by Philip Bailhache – who expressly attacked me when swearing Shaw into office.
Yes. This is the British “judiciary” – in the 21st century.
ITEM 2: Two paragraphs extracted from the 94 page statement made to the Wiltshire police force by Graham Power, Queens Police Medal, the then Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police Force, who had been illegally suspended in a criminal conspiracy – involving people like William Bailhache – so as to sabotage the 2008 child abuse investigations.  The ‘Stephen Baker’ referred to – who was obstructing the Police in their wish to charge child-abusers – is the same Crown Advocate Stephen Baker who is paid with tax-payers money by William Bailhache and Tim Le Cocq to prosecute me, the then politician who led on exposing the child-abuse cover-ups:
“208. It might be useful to offer some comment on the role of Stephen Baker. Mr Baker is a highly regarded lawyer who is experienced in working with the police. He is liked and respected by police officers. From his evidence the impression may have been given that he was a lawyer dedicated to Rectangle whose efforts at engagement were frustrated. This is not entirely the case. He is a busy criminal lawyer with a heavy and varied workload. I see from the disclosure documents he was first appointed to the case in late January and had some involvement in issues around the charging of the accused Wateridge. I will return to that matter in more detail a little later in this statement. The point I wish to make at this time, is that in the period which followed his appointment the force was having exchanges with Mr Baker of an entirely different nature. He was at that time representing a man called Curtis Warren who had a few years previously, been described as the U.K.’s leading criminal. Warren was in custody locally, having been arrested in Jersey following a covert operation by the force. Warren, who at one time appeared in the Sunday Times Rich List, was reported to have substantial criminal wealth, which he had successfully hidden from the various agencies which had sought its recovery. This led to an interesting exchange of correspondence between David Minty and Stephen Baker. David asked if Baker was being paid for his services, and if he was, whether he proposed to make a disclosure to the financial crime unit. I think that this was eventually resolved in favour of Baker, who successfully argued that he did not have to do so.”
*******
“214. The core of the story is that Wateridge was in the process of being charged, when Stephen Baker attempted to intervene but apparently was too late to change matters. My notebook for that day records that in my briefing from Mr Harper I was told that there had been an “issue regarding charging. JJ (Notebook 07/358 page 68.) Stephen Baker’s intervention came at a time about which he states “At that stage I knew nothing about the cases. JJ (Statement of Stephen Baker paragraph 7.) He had clearly been retained by the Attorney General to work on the abuse enquiry. He knew that, and obviously the Attorney General knew that.”
ITEM 3: A quote from the Jersey Evening Post – Jersey’s only “newspaper” [very seriously conflicted for profound reasons] of the 13th October 2011, in which the paper reported my appearance on the 12th October, before the conflicted magistrate Bridget Shaw. The quote – from Jersey’s only “newspaper” – should be borne in mind, and then contrasted with the actual facts as evidenced in the actual transcript, published further below:
“Throughout yesterday’s 70 minute hearing the 45 year old repeatedly interrupted the magistrate or spoke over her as she repeatedly asked him to be concise and relevant with his argument.”
ITEM 4: The actual transcript from the appearance before the conflicted Bridget Shaw on the 12th October – in which hearing I was repeatedly interrupted and shouted-down by her so as to prevent me from making my case and prevented from enjoying my Article 6 right to a fair hearing.  I had to force this court hearing because it was the only chance I had to attempt to use evidence that had been unlawfully concealed from my defence during the prosecution and the appeal. (I was prevented from using that evidence – as the grimly amusing transcript shows.) Key amongst that evidence is the 94-page statement by Graham Power – the importance and relevance of which I’ve scarcely yet touched upon. That key evidence was unlawfully concealed from me by William Bailhache’s prosecuting lawyer, Stephen Baker. The person who refused to give me access to court to raise this fresh evidence – until after the election – in which his brother the conflicted former “Bailiff” Philip Bailhache was a candidate – was William Bailhache.
“In the Magistrate’s Court of Jersey
12th October 2011
Before: B. Shaw, Magistrate
HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY GENERAL
-v-
Stuart Syvret
Centenier Huelin
Crown Advocate Stephen Baker
Defendant representing himself
Verbatim Transcript of recorded proceedings
 AG v Syvret: 12/10/11
 MAGISTRATE: Good afternoon.
CENTENIER HUELIN: Good afternoon.
GREFFIER: Be seated, please.
CENTENIER HUELIN: Thank you, Ma’m. Stuart Syvret.
MAGISTRATE: Good afternoon. Will you confirm your name is Stuart Syvret?
DEFENDANT: Yes, yes, that’s correct.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you very much, date of birth 30th of July ‘65?
DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s correct, Madam.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you.
DEFENDANT: Obviously before these proceedings begin, I want to begin by making a  recusal application concerning yourself.
MAGISTRATE: Well, I am going to—-
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, there has been a recusal application previously.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: It has been rejected as far as the Court of Appeal. There should be no recusal application.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: Well, with all due respect, if I may be—-
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret, is there any different from anything you’ve said to me before on this issue?
DEFENDANT: Oh indeed there is, absolutely. (Magistrate conferred with Deputy Greffier)
MAGISTRATE: I want to get these proceedings started, Mr Syvret. I am going to ask that the Representation is put first and then we will deal with any substantial matters.
CENTENIER HUELIN: Centenier Huelin of the Parish of St Helier, on behalf of the Constable of the said Parish, has the honour to present to the Court that, in virtue of the terms of the Criminal Justice (Community Services Orders)(Jersey) Law 2001, he is of the opinion that, for the reasons given in the attached statement submitted by the Community Service Officer, it is necessary for the Magistrate’s Court to re-examine the conditions imposed on Stuart Syvret, who, by Act of the said Court, dated 17th of November 2010, was convicted of the offence of Contempt of Court by failing to attend a hearing at the Magistrate’s Court on the 9th of November 2009, and sentenced to a term of eight weeks’ imprisonment. The said Stuart Syvret made an appeal to the Royal Court of Jersey against the said conviction of the Magistrate’s Court and, on the 8th of August 2011, the appeal against conviction was dismissed, but the appeal against sentence was allowed, in part, by ordering that the term of imprisonment be substituted with a Community Service Order of 80 hours or eight weeks’ imprisonment. The said Stuart Syvret has failed to conform to the conditions of the Community Service Order. Therefore, the said Centenier, on behalf of the said Constable, presents the aforementioned information to the Court in order that it may ordain on the facts contained in the above mentioned statement; the whole in accordance with the terms of Article 7 of the said Law.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you very much. Mr Syvret, do you understand what has been said and why you are here?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you very much.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, the Defendant has said that he intends to apply for you to recuse yourself. You spent a considerable period listening to recusal applications some 18 months ago now, I anticipate. The complaints went in that regard as far as the Court of Appeal and were entirely rejected. The complaints as to bias and recusal were rejected by Commissioner Pitchers. There has been a full hearing of these allegations, these repeated allegations. The last time that they were repeated was before Commissioner Pitchers in the middle of August this year and, if you are minded to ask the Defendant whether he has anything new to add from that which was said to the Court in the middle of August 2011, then that is understandable, but he should immediately identify what it is that is new.
MAGISTRATE: Yes. Yes, Mr Syvret, if there is anything new, I want you to say very concisely what is new. If I don’t hear anything new within the first couple of minutes, then I am going to stop you.
DEFENDANT: Yes, Madam, there are new grounds. Obviously I remain of the view that the old grounds were valid.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: And indeed I think the events showed that that was the case, but Advocate Baker has referred to the Judgment of the Royal Court, which is before you, I believe.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: And if one looks, for example, at paragraphs 59 and 60, it does there describe how the inappropriateness of your conduct on the day of sentencing and the way you applied contempt of Court charges against me without proper due notice and without proper due process against me; and indeed the Royal Court found that these were plainly so insupportable that they were, these particular charges were thrown out by the Royal Court.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, thank you.
DEFENDANT: The conduct that you exhibited on that day, Madam, on that ground, does show very clear, powerful and dramatic actual bias. One doesn’t even need anything approaching a complex or well versed understanding of law to know that, if you lay a charge before a person, if you accuse them of a criminal offence of some description, especially one that is so significant you’re going to impose a significant sentence upon it, you have to allow that person an opportunity to defend themselves. You have to give them a reasonable notice of the charge, allow them some time to prepare their defence case and to make their defence. You did not on that occasion, Madam, do any of that. Your decisions concerning me were wholly extraordinary, wildly, massively at variance with even the most rudimentary and simple understandings of how the administration of justice operates in a clear and fair and impartial manner. Clearly your conduct was not compliant with Article 6 on that day; and I make the point that this was such a very, very clear matter because it is not as though it could be argued that this was some complex consideration, perhaps an error in law of the kind that can get made or perhaps a misunderstanding of some factual item. This was an extremely aggressive, overtly actually biased decision/decisions on your part on that day and quite extraordinarily so. I mean, I am not aware of another case where a person has been faced with charges of that nature, even contempt of Court charges, when the matter normally can be dealt with summarily of course, but that is in the cases of contempt, direct contempt, in the face of the Court. I have not been able to locate a similar case anywhere that corresponds to your conduct, your attitude towards me as displayed on that day.  The charges I had less than 24 hours’ notice of. I applied to reserve my plea. You wouldn’t even allow me to do that. You then entered a not guilty plea on my behalf and I then applied for time to then prepare some defence, some defence argument or possibly some mitigation argument to the charges in question and you absolutely refused an adjournment to me to do that, which was quite extraordinary given that these charges had only been notified to me less than 24 hours beforehand. You then proceeded to find me guilty of these charges and I then sought another adjournment in respect of sentence and sentencing so that I could appeal, and you refused that too and you also pretty much instructed the Prosecution to prepare further charges on the day, which were worked into the proceedings.  Now, these are absolutely very clear crystallisations of the bias that you displayed to me throughout the whole proceedings and it was very powerfully and dramatically overt and on display in your conduct in that particular instance, and these were, indeed so insupportable was your conduct on that occasion that not even the Royal Court could uphold it.
Now, the conduct that you displayed towards me, the attitude that you displayed towards me on that occasion in that kind of kangaroo court approach that you took does display actual bias, very clearly evidenced actual bias. There is no other word for it. We are not even talking about potential bias here or conduct that might risk appearing to be biased. This was overt, aggressive, biased conduct and one has to also read the Judgment that you delivered on that day and see that there are various passages in it, various observations that depart considerably from consideration of the verdict and the law and so on and effectively amount to a Jersey establishment press release condemning me in all kinds of ways, calling me a liar and things of that nature for having tried to protect my constituents by making the public interest disclosure that I did. Indeed, the evidence that you refused to allow me to use in my defence case is now published so that the public can see for themselves how serious that matter was. You brought, as it were, the Prosecution argument that somehow it had been wrong of me to have published that information, the original information, with some kind of a political commentary alongside it.
Now, that may or may not have been a legally correct decision. I don’t believe it was a legally correct decision judgement or yours, nor of the Royal Court consequently, but it is quite one thing, even if I were wrong to have published that material, for me to have published it in a way that didn’t suit your particular interpretation of the law, but then to write at great length of how I was some kind of malicious liar in what I have written—-
CROWN ADVOCATE: This can’t be relevant.
MAGISTRATE: Is there any … the Royal Court has ruled on my previous Judgment, Mr Syvret. The Royal Court has upheld it and I am not going to reopen anything regarding that. Have you anything else directly to say to me that you haven’t said to me before about why I shouldn’t sit?
DEFENDANT: Yes, the, the case uhm that, of the uhm, the uhm, sorry the contempt of Court matters that you put before, that you put before me, this does demonstrate very clearly and dramatically actual bias on your part.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, you said that.
DEFENDANT: As did a lot of the other proceedings. It is also since those events occurred, which takes me onto the second plank of the argument, and that is really why I am here today, because I obtained some evidence recently from a source in the—-
CROWN ADVOCATE: This can’t be relevant to recusal.
MAGISTRATE: I don’t think fresh evidence can be relevant to why you are here before the Court or why I shouldn’t sit in the case.
DEFENDANT: Well, I think it is. Perhaps you would care to listen to the explanation before coming to a judgement?
MAGISTRATE: Well, we’re talking about fresh evidence and the evidence in the case has been heard and that stage of the case is over.
DEFENDANT: The evidence in question is a 94 page statement to the Wiltshire Police Force by Graham Power. Now, clearly in a variety of different ways that evidence is of dramatic and central—-
 CROWN ADVOCATE: I am sorry to—-
 MAGISTRATE: I just don’t follow this.
CROWN ADVOCATE: I did not interrupt Mr Syvret at all—-
 MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–in the substantive proceedings, but it is my intention to interrupt him if it is apparent and obvious that he is going to address the Court on matters which are utterly irrelevant to the issue before it. What you are being asked to do at present is to recuse yourself because of actual bias. A 96 page statement by Mr Power to Wiltshire can have nothing to do with that whatsoever and was canvassed in the Royal Court on appeal and dealt with on appeal by the Royal Court and unless—-
DEFENDANT: That’s not true.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–and unless Mr Syvret can show that it has anything to do whatsoever with the recusal application, you shouldn’t hear him. He shouldn’t be given any more indulgence than any other citizen in this position.
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: The—-
 MAGISTRATE: —–I don’t see on the surface of it what the 96 page statement by somebody else will have to—-
 DEFENDANT: It is 94 pages actually.
MAGISTRATE: Will you tell me in two sentences what the link is between my sitting and this statement?
DEFENDANT: Certainly. You, Madam, are mentioned in the document, I think in a couple of points, in your previous capacity as being involved as a legal adviser with the police force in respect of the child protection issues and investigations and that does have a bearing on the recusal application. This was not evidence or knowledge that was in my possession before and this is not an argument that has been advanced before.
MAGISTRATE: But I don’t see what that can have to do with breach of a Community Service Order.
DEFENDANT: This is in connection with the recusal application, Madam. You have—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes, but what I am sitting on is a Representation to do with a breach of a Community Service Order. I’m not sitting on the trial. Mr Syvret, you haven’t raised anything else.
DEFENDANT: But this is a part of the recusal application—-
 MAGISTRATE: Which can be—-
DEFENDANT: —–this is evidence that I was not aware of previously that I am now aware of which goes further to the fact that you have a history, as it were, of involvement in the background issues and that goes further to the strength of the argument that you must recuse yourself from this case. Your past involvement with these matters and your acquaintance with a number of the individuals involved, of the interested parties as it were, is magnified and made even clearer by the fresh evidence.
MAGISTRATE: Okay, well—-
DEFENDANT: That is fresh evidence that goes to—-
MAGISTRATE: —–well that is your point, right.
DEFENDANT: —–the recusal ap—-
MAGISTRATE: I hear what you are saying. Thank you very much.
DEFENDANT: —–the application.
MAGISTRATE: Right.
DEFENDANT: The evidence is of further relevance, and I must address this because Advocate Baker raised the point, I did not. Advocate Baker suggested, and he used the word “canvassed”, he suggested that the matter of the 94 page statement of Mr Power had been dealt with in detail in the Royal Court. It in fact had not. That is simply incorrect and that is another one of the numerous untruths uttered by Advocate Baker throughout these proceedings. I repeatedly, indeed before you and before the Royal Court, sought disclosure of this document. Advocate Baker throughout most of the proceedings repeatedly asserted that this document would not be disclosed because, in his judgement, it was of no relevance to the Defence arguments of things like abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret, thank you very much. I have heard enough about that.
DEFENDANT: But—-
MAGISTRATE: I don’t see that—-
DEFENDANT: Am I allowed to actually make my case?
MAGISTRATE: I have heard enough, thank you very much. Would you, would you sit down?
DEFENDANT: I haven’t finished making my case.
MAGISTRATE: Well, you might not have finished, Mr Syvret, but you’re saying there is something in this statement to say that I worked for the Law Officers and had some involvement in child abuse cases in the past. From what you’ve been telling me, I cannot see that this can have any possible relevance to whether I should sit on a breach of Community Service Order in the Court now, so would you just take a seat for the moment?
DEFENDANT: Well—-
MAGISTRATE: No.
DEFENDANT: —–well, Madam, I must respond to that. What you are hearing today, whether it is a breach of Community Service Order or any other matter, the nature of the case you are hearing is immaterial. You are sitting in the capacity of a judge and, if I have grounds for considering that you are conflicted or that you have exhibited bias towards me, I am entitled to make that argument. The particular nature of the case you are hearing is immaterial. If there is a credible argument that you have exhibited actual bias, then you have exhibited actual bias and the nature—-
MAGISTRATE: You have made that point—-
DEFENDANT: —–the nature of—-
MAGISTRATE: —–in relation to the contempt of Court. Now you are bringing in something that doesn’t seem to me to be directly relevant.
DEFENDANT: Madam, this is of relevance as to whether you are capable of being an objective judge in any matter concerning me and I do not believe that you are capable of being an objective judge in this matter before the Court today or, frankly, in any other matter concerning me. That is the argument I am making and now if I could please—-
MAGISTRATE: Right, thank you. No, I understand the argument you are making, Mr Syvret. Would you sit down, please?
DEFENDANT: But I haven’t—-
MAGISTRATE: I want to hear from Mr Baker.
DEFENDANT: But I haven’t finished making—-
MAGISTRATE: No, I don’t wish to hear any more, Mr Syvret.
DEFENDANT: Well—-
MAGISTRATE: I understand the nature of what you’re saying.
DEFENDANT: But—-
MAGISTRATE: If what you’re saying is right, then—-
DEFENDANT: With respect, Madam, there—-
MAGISTRATE: —–you’ve said sufficient already on the contempt matters.
DEFENDANT: There are entire strands of the argument that I have not yet addressed.
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret, I just don’t see that you’re saying anything to me that I can see is relevant to the proceedings today.
DEFENDANT: Any matter that demonstrated conflicts of interests or bias on your part—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: —–is of relevance.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, but you have raised it and I understand that you’ve raised it.
DEFENDANT: I haven’t yet—-
MAGISTRATE: And, therefore, I shall take it into account—-
DEFENDANT: I haven’t yet finished.
MAGISTRATE: —–when I consider what to do.
DEFENDANT: But I haven’t yet finished making the argument.
MAGISTRATE: You have raised the matter and said that I was involved in child abuse cases when I worked for the Law Officers’ Department. Where does that take you?
DEFENDANT: Well, we go back to the earlier considerations and they do have to be put forward again in that—-
MAGISTRATE: No, no, you have said the earlier considerations.
DEFENDANT: Madam—-
MAGISTRATE: Can we go back to the—-
DEFENDANT: —–when you—-
MAGISTRATE: —–to what you are saying to me now because I really don’t follow what you’re saying.
DEFENDANT: When you made the earlier decision not to recuse and you considered yourself able to hear this case, you did on that occasion refuse, as you did on several occasions throughout the proceedings, you refused to itemise and declare openly who your particular acquaintances were, who you knew and so on and the extent to which you may have worked with them. Now, if you worked further with these people, as indeed is indicated by this statement, then that is further grounds for me, new grounds for me, arguing that for you to meet the test of coherence of objectivity, you must declare quite openly the full extent and nature of your acquaintance with any of these interested parties. That is a perfectly reasonable test of openness and transparency. If you do not declare openly each such acquaintance, then you can’t meet the test of the appearance of objectivity.
MAGISTRATE: Right.
DEFENDANT: And the recently obtained evidence adds weight to my previous argument that there is a requirement for you to declare quite openly your acquaintances with any of the involved parties.
There is another dimension to this argument too, which I advance against you hearing any case concerning me, and—-
MAGISTRATE: What is that?
DEFENDANT: That is the question of judicial, simply professional competence. Anyone has a right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the ECHR—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: —–and part of a fair hearing has to be competency. If a judge isn’t fully competent, then they are not capable of presiding over a hearing in an effective manner.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: Now, you, Madam, agreed with the Prosecution throughout that they not be required to disclose to me any of the evidence I sought that was of relevance, obviously central relevance, to what were in many ways the very key foundation stones of the Defence argument. Those arguments were abuse of process, malicious prosecution, politicised prosecution and personal conflicts of interest on the part of the prosecutor. Now that was, if you like, the very centre, in many ways the foundation stone of the defence case throughout. You repeatedly refused, quite remarkably, to disclose any of that evidence, in particular and expressly and directly the evidence provided by Mr Power to the Wiltshire investigation. That was never a decision I accepted. I always knew perfectly well that there would be, quite obviously, material within that evidence that would, could not be anything other than of relevance to the Defence arguments, but you refused and that evidence was not disclosed to me.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: I have now obtained the evidence and I will be exploring it in some detail and it shows in fact, precisely as one would expect, I think as any reasonable person even without legal training would expect, and fully as I expected, that in fact substantial parts of that evidence do without question go absolutely directly and most powerfully to the Defence case I was running—-
MAGISTRATE: Hmm hmm.
DEFENDANT: —–namely abuse of process, malicious prosecution and essentially a structural set of proceedings by the prosecution authority in Jersey that were wholly non-compliant with the ECHR. Now that Defence argument now is effectively proven and Mr Power’s statement proves it, as it was probably always going to do. I believe that so extraordinary was your decision not to order the disclosure of that  evidence to me and indeed some other similar decisions that it has to raise very serious questions about your basic competency as a judge.
MAGISTRATE: Right, okay, that’s your third point.
DEFENDANT: And there are also other questions that have to go towards the whole consideration of competency. It is entirely right that when considering whether judicial proceedings are Article 6 compliant, the person before the tribunal has a right to consider that everyone taking part in it is fully competent and to understand what the methodology and the standards are of the proceedings taking place. Further to that end, I repeatedly sought disclosure from you of whichever third party or parties you’ve taken advice and guidance from during the course of the proceedings against me and during adjournments and so on and again you have refused to disclose that information, much like—-
 CROWN ADVOCATE: This must be a repeat.
DEFENDANT: —–much like you refused to disclose … well, it is a different argument if you don’t mind.
CROWN ADVOCATE: It is a repeat.
DEFENDANT: You refused to disclose—-
MAGISTRATE: All right.
DEFENDANT: —–the acquaintances you had.
MAGISTRATE: So you are saying for various reasons I am incompetent, yes?
DEFENDANT: Yes, Madam, I think you are on the evidence, and this is not merely an assertion of mine.
MAGISTRATE: Right.
DEFENDANT: And this is an important point because obviously it is very easy for any accused person just to stand up and cast condemnations upon the Court that is hearing them and, you know, justice would not function if such claims were to be  taken seriously without any kind of evidential background to any kind of robust grounds for making such claims, but in this particular case I do have such robust claims. I am able to argue in powerfully evidenced detail that you have in fact made many decisions in this case certainly concerning me and possibly in other cases too that do cast the most telling light on your basic competency as a judge. Now that is an entirely legitimate argument. If it is true, then the proceedings you preside over will not be Article 6 compliant, so, if I can show to the tribunal, if I can demonstrate that you have made basic errors and that you’ve been incompetent in some regards as a judge, then your capacity in the past tribunal and indeed any other tribunal hearing matters concerning me becomes vitiated.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you.
DEFENDANT: So—-
MAGISTRATE: I understand what you’re saying.
DEFENDANT: —–that is an argument I am entitled to make and to make on an evidenced basis.
MAGISTRATE: No, you can make representations—-
DEFENDANT: I want to tell you—-
MAGISTRATE: —–which you have just have done. Mr Baker?
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, the Defendant has, as he so frequently does, utterly overstated his case. He accuses you of actual bias and incompetence and what the material that he has drawn to your attention shows is only this, that the Appellate Court concluded that you had made errors in procedure. It makes no comments whatsoever on the merits of the conduct which was under consideration. By that I mean merits of the conduct by the Defendant, which was under consideration. There is absolutely nothing to suggest actual bias. There is nothing to suggest apparent bias and any reasonably or properly informed independent observer would come to  no conclusion other than the Appellate Court had concluded that you followed the wrong procedure in what is a difficult area and an uncommon area of law to have to deal with.
His attacks upon your competence are wholly misplaced. Your Judgment at first instance was upheld in its entirety effectively by the Appellate Court. The Court had no criticism whatsoever of your conclusion that the Defendant had lied to you. It concluded that the convictions on the main charges were entirely justified. In fact, the proper reading of the transcripts and the whole of the case shows that you have demonstrated remarkable patience with the Defendant, as in fact have all the judges who have had to deal with this Defendant’s case, and you have shown remarkable patience in the face of unprovoked and unsustainable and (in the words, in the mouths of a lawyer) utterly improper allegations against you. There is nothing whatsoever in this application that you recuse yourself and you should sit.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you very much. Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: I haven’t actually finished.
MAGISTRATE: Well, I have heard four headings under which I shouldn’t sit. Is there a separate heading?
DEFENDANT: Well, I mean, I am dealing with the evidence under those headings.
MAGISTRATE: No, no. I have heard those headings. I have heard you outline what your arguments are. It is not an occasion on which to bring evidence. I will deal with this matter by way of submissions. I have heard submissions from you and I have heard them from Mr Baker. I would say I am not going to recuse myself in this case.
DEFENDANT: But—-
MAGISTRATE: I do not have actual bias against you and any informed bystander I believe would not think that there is an appearance of bias.
DEFENDANT: No informed bystander—-
MAGISTRATE: The case against you was taken on appeal to the Royal Court. The Royal Court found that I did make procedural errors in dealing with your contempt. The Court has dealt with that. That doesn’t mean that any judge who is overturned by a superior Court bears malice towards a defendant in that case. Nor does the procedure I adopted on that occasion demonstrate actual bias towards you. In terms of my competence, the vast majority of my decision at first instance was upheld by the Royal Court. I was right, they said, on the disclosure issue and I don’t think my competence is being, can seriously be called into question.
DEFENDANT: Well—-
MAGISTRATE: So, Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: —–with respect—-
MAGISTRATE: —–I intend to—-
DEFENDANT: —–I haven’t yet finished.
MAGISTRATE: No, that is the recusal matter over with.
DEFENDANT: Well, I have to state that it is not the recusal matter over with as far as I am concerned because you have not permitted me to explain the facts properly.
MAGISTRATE: No, you have brought up the planks of your argument, Mr Syvret. I don’t think they are sustainable.
DEFENDANT: We have not seen, we have not examined, we have not considered the evidence.
MAGISTRATE: No, well we’re not going into the evidence. We don’t go into the evidence in cases like that.
DEFENDANT: But there is—-
MAGISTRATE: We deal with the matter by way of representation.
DEFENDANT: There is ample evidence available which could be explored and argued about here and now that would indeed seriously challenge your competency. Indeed, one of the factors that makes that relevant to be dealt with at this particular time is the fact that that evidence was not in fact before the Royal Court and was not in fact heard or considered by the Royal Court, largely due to the mendacity of Advocate Baker; and that evidence does in fact now, as it is before this Court at the moment, does in fact go powerfully to questions of your competence, and this is not a matter that has been dealt with in any other Court—-
MAGISTRATE: Right.
DEFENDANT: —–because of the failure to disclose the evidence. It is now before this Court for the first time and it does indeed form a substantive argument, evidenced grounds for exploring whether you are competent as a judge and I have a right to make that argument. For example—-
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret, we are here to deal with an allegation of breach of a Community Service Order.
DEFENDANT: Well, with respect, we’re here first of all to—-
MAGISTRATE: No, no, Mr—-
DEFENDANT:  —–we are here first of all to deal with—-
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT:—–the question of whether your presiding—-
MAGISTRATE: No, we are not.
DEFENDANT: —–over this Court case—-
MAGISTRATE: I have ruled on that matter, Mr Syvret.
DEFENDANT: —–is Article 6 compliant.
MAGISTRATE: I don’t wish to ask, I don’t wish to hear any more.
DEFENDANT: So you’re not—-
MAGISTRATE: That matter is, that matter is closed.
DEFENDANT: So you’re not prepared to hear the evidence?
 MAGISTRATE: Mr Baker, can we carry on?
DEFENDANT: You’re not going to permit me to explain the evidence?
MAGISTRATE: No, no.
DEFENDANT: No?
MAGISTRATE: I’m not.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, before I do, can I just say that the suggestion that the “mendacity of Advocate Baker” could in any way persuade a High Court Judge not to look at something is utterly ridiculous and it should be dismissed for the piffle that it is. Can I then move on to the breach of the Community Service Order?
DEFENDANT: I can bring the transcripts up.
MAGISTRATE: No.
CROWN ADVOCATE: This matter is listed before the Court today because the Defendant has been ordered to serve 80 hours’ community service. That 80 hours’ community service was imposed for an offence of contempt of Court. The contempt of Court was his absconding from Jersey for some six months and thus not being available for his trial. In England, the matter would have been dealt with under the Bail Act in all likelihood, but in Jersey by our law it is dealt with as a contempt of Court and it is dealt with frequently as a contempt of Court in this Court. He was convicted and sentenced by you for contempt of Court on the 17th of November 2010. A transcript of what transpired is in the bundle before you and will be easily in your recollection in any event, Madam, but he was sentenced to eight weeks’ imprisonment for that contempt of Court. The reason that he was sentenced to eight months’(sic) imprisonment—-
MAGISTRATE: Eight weeks.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Eight weeks, I do apologise, eight weeks’ imprisonment that day was because he refused the offer of community service as an alternative. You specifically gave him the opportunity of undertaking community service and he declined it and you therefore sentenced him to eight weeks’ imprisonment, which was inevitable. He thereafter, as soon as he could, applied for bail from the Royal Court and he was granted bail by the Royal Court pending his appeal in regard to a series of convictions and sentences which had been passed, but it is only the contempt for absconding which concerns you today.
His appeal against conviction was rejected by the Royal Court on the 11th of August of this year and, as to sentence, the learned Commissioner and Jurats offered him the opportunity of doing community service and he accepted that opportunity. Commissioner Pitchers told him on that occasion that he had no doubt that he could do community service and asked him whether he was willing to do it as an alternative to prison. The Defendant said that he was. The Commissioner then substituted 80 hours’ community service for the contempt and told the Defendant that, if he failed to comply, he could be resentenced and made it clear “This is the sentence that the Magistrate wanted to pass the first time round”, so he was left in no doubt as to what the consequences might be should he fail to co-operate and carry out his community service.
It is alleged that he has failed to comply with the requirements of the Community Service Order. He has refused to attend a single appointment for work. He attended one meeting at the Community Service, at the Probation and was largely offensive and insulting at that meeting. You have before you a report prepared by Mr Le Marrec, who sits behind me, dated the 12th of October 2011 and who is available to give evidence or answer questions, as is the normal course in this Court. I hope I can encapsulate the Probation Service’s position, but they can speak for themselves if and when you have questions for them, Madam, but that they consider that the Defendant has been dismissive of them and has effectively been contemptuous of them in the casual use of the word. You will see that in paragraph 4 of the report “You don’t really expect me to take this seriously” is what he says to Community Service, and this days after he has been sentenced to community service as an alternative to custody. (Pause)
MAGISTRATE: Carry on.
CROWN ADVOCATE: As I say, the Probation Officers can speak for themselves, but arrangements had been made for him to attend Community Service on a Wednesday morning, on a day when lighter work and more vulnerable prisoners – sorry, not prisoners, more vulnerable convicted persons – are carrying out their order. They tend to carry out tasks at the zoo, at Durrell, sweeping up leaves and the like. What I submit to you – and you should ask the Probation Officers some questions – but what the report which the Probation Service has prepared for you reveals is just exactly the same type of conduct as you have faced for 18 months and which the Royal Court faced, with him playing a medical card when he thinks its suits him, being dismissive of people when it suits him and not engaging and then making allegations against people when it suits him. So that when he comes across people who don’t see the world as he does, or who want him to do something he doesn’t want to, he seems incapable of engaging with them and, rather than engaging in reason and reaching compromise with them, he accuses them, makes wild allegations with virtually no evidence or no evidence at all to back it up. What you see in the report, I repeat, is what you’ve seen throughout these proceedings and he is “swinging the lead. “
Commissioner Pitchers was in no doubt in the middle of August that he was capable of doing community service. He is Exhibit A as to why he is capable of doing community service. He is a man who will argue with you until he is blue in the face. He will talk across you. He will insult you and he is more than capable of  engaging with things when he wants to. It is just when he doesn’t want to, when it doesn’t suit him that he decides that oh he’s too ill, “I’ve got a doctor’s report saying that I’m unfit for work” and he resorts to insults and excuses as to why he can’t comply with something he has been ordered to do; this in circumstances where a retired High Court Judge says that he is certain that he can carry out community service. Again, you doubtless will ask some questions of the Officers, but 95% of people who are ordered to do community service in Jersey carry it out, and in the Wednesday working group at the moment there are several people who have doctors’ certificates saying they are unfit for work, who carry out community service. It is about seven hours on a Wednesday. It can be as low as four and a half hours and any sensible engagement with Probation leads to persons being able to carry out community service.
Madam, you have power to deal with the alleged breach under Article 20(3) of the Magistrates’ Courts Law. I don’t intend to take you to it unless you wish me to.
MAGISTRATE: Article 23?
CROWN ADVOCATE: I have got 20(3).
MAGISTRATE: Yes, sorry 20.
CROWN ADVOCATE: It is behind divider 8—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–of the bundle I have put before you.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Do you wish me to read it?
MAGISTRATE: Yes, the Royal Court has effectively varied a decision of the Magistrates’ Court. Is that what you’re saying?
CROWN ADVOCATE: Yes, that is right.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: The Defendant claims to have material which affects the safety of his conviction on one of the data protection offences. Any such material is entirely irrelevant to this Community Service Order, which he has been ordered to complete for contempt of Court, not for the data protection offence, about which he says there is evidence which may affect the safety of that conviction. It is plain that he has been told that in terms by Commissioner Pitchers, and there is an email behind divider 6.
MAGISTRATE: Hmm hmm.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Mr Syvret wrote to the Bailiff’s Judicial Secretary saying he needed an immediate injunction, or something of that type, to suspend the orders which had been made against him, and Commissioner Pitchers replied through the Bailiff’s Judicial Secretary, saying that he had read the documents submitted by Syvret, “he wishes to seek a stay of the orders made on appeal, applications properly made to me, he argues a new witness is relevant in the defence of public interest under Article 55 of the law” – that is the offence I was referring to.
MAGISTRATE: Hmm hmm.
CROWN ADVOCATE: “Accordingly whatever the outcome of this application for convictions and sentences to do with the data protection offences, the two motoring offences and the contempt of Court offence will be unaffected. The fines and the community service for those offences will remain.” So he knows, because Commissioner Pitchers has told him, that any material which might be relevant (and there will be a dispute as to that doubtless) to the data protection offence is not relevant to this.
Madam, if the breach of Community Service Order is proved or admitted by the Defendant, then you have various options. One option is to allow the order to run with a final warning to the Defendant that, if he does not complete community service, then you will have no option but to send him to prison. That is entirely your decision and the Crown in this Court has no role in submitting as to what it believes you should do, but, should the Defendant refuse to undertake community service, then the likelihood is that the Court will be left with no option but to send him to prison to serve the eight weeks’ imprisonment. The Prosecution indicates that it has no desire that the Defendant be sent to prison. It is in highly unusual circumstances, that people get themselves into a position where a Court has to send them to prison where they have been sentenced to community service. If he is sentenced to imprisonment, it will be entirely a consequence of his own acts and he would effectively have chosen to be imprisoned. It is all his doing. It is all his choice.  Madam, I have told you that there is a report from the Probation Services dated the 12th of October 2011. Mr Le Marrec is here behind me, as is his boss, if you will excuse the colloquialness, and they are here to answer any questions you might have.
MAGISTRATE: Has that report from Mr Le Marrec been supplied to Mr Syvret?
CROWN ADVOCATE: Yes.
MAGISTRATE: Thank you. Mr Syvret, you’ve—-
DEFENDANT: Can I make my—-
MAGISTRATE: Sorry?
DEFENDANT: Can I make my case now?
MAGISTRATE: No, I’m going to ask you some questions about what Mr Baker has just said. Firstly, he said that there is an allegation of a breach of a Community Service Order, and the details of what is alleged to amount to the breach is contained in a report by Mr Le Marrec. Have you read the report by Mr Le Marrec?
DEFENDANT: I only received the report, it was handed to me in a physical copy today. I’ve glanced at it briefly. I haven’t had time, sufficient time to absorb it, properly read it and absorb it all.
MAGISTRATE: Has that been emailed to you before?
DEFENDANT: No, it has not. The first I have seen of this was today.
MAGISTRATE: Right.
CROWN ADVOCATE: As for me, as with me.
MAGISTRATE: You saw it for the first time today?
CROWN ADVOCATE: Yes, I did.
MAGISTRATE: The report.
DEFENDANT: With respect, Advocate Baker is a trained lawyer. I am a lay person.
MAGISTRATE: I beg your pardon?
DEFENDANT: I said, with respect, Advocate Baker is a trained lawyer. I am a lay person. I haven’t had sufficient time to consider this.
CROWN ADVOCATE: You have had all day. He has had all day. He has had from ten o’clock to read this.
DEFENDANT: No.
MAGISTRATE: Well, Mr Syvret, this isn’t so much a matter of law but a matter of fact. All the law requires for you to do is to do the work as directed and to keep appointments and Mr Le Marrec’s report is saying what he says happened. So have you actually read the report?
DEFENDANT: I have glanced through it briefly. I haven’t had a chance to study it or absorb it, no.
MAGISTRATE: At this stage are you able to say whether you agree or disagree with the basic allegations that Mr Baker has just—-
DEFENDANT: I can’t, no.
MAGISTRATE: —–enunciated, that you failed to keep appointments?
DEFENDANT: Well, I failed to keep the appointments, but I have been signed, signed off ill. I mean, that is, that is the case. I mean, as far as the specific detailed allegations, I have not yet had time to consider them.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, it is entirely a matter for you, but let’s give him 15 minutes to read it.
DEFENDANT: Well, with all due respect, I haven’t yet—-
CROWN ADVOCATE: He has had all day. He has had all day and it is not acceptable to be in Court for breach of community service, to be given the report and not to bother reading it.
DEFENDANT: But with all due respect—-
CROWN ADVOCATE: He knows he is here for breach of community service. This is the report and to tell you that he has skimmed it is utterly unacceptable.
DEFENDANT: Madam, this, this, this grandstanding and this PR speak by Advocate Baker playing to the gallery is really quite transparent and quite tiresome.
MAGISTRATE: Well, what I want to know—-
DEFENDANT: If people are being thrust documents upon them that they are then being expected to comment upon in a case that day, it isn’t adequate. It is simply basic rudimentary due process that people are given adequate time to reflect upon documents. People might want to take advice on documents. This is not unreasonable. This is a perfectly proper approach and—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes. Mr Syvret, can I just stop you there? The other question that I wanted to ask you is whether you wish to be legally represented in these proceedings and have you thought about applying for Legal Aid?
DEFENDANT: Well my view on that remains the same as it has always been. I would like to be legally represented by a paid lawyer of my choice, but, as that is not going to happen, then I have to represent, I have to try.
MAGISTRATE: So you accept that you are going to represent yourself in this matter?
DEFENDANT: With reluctance, yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, this matter has been dealt with in entirely the usual way.  He has been treated exactly as any other citizen.
MAGISTRATE: Well, yes. Mr Baker, I was just going to make the point that it is the usual practice in this Court to ask a defendant whether they wish to seek legal advice and, if they do, to grant a two week adjournment. That is perfectly standard practice and Mr Syvret will be afforded that opportunity should he wish to take advantage of it. From what you’ve just said, you don’t seem to want an adjournment to seek legal advice. Is that correct?
DEFENDANT: Well, I may well try and take some pro bono legal advice on these matters, yes, I may well do that.
MAGISTRATE: Well, I—-
DEFENDANT: But, you know, the question you put to me was whether I would be represented by a lawyer.
MAGISTRATE: Well—-
DEFENDANT: And my answer to that is no. If the question is will I, would I like an opportunity to seek some pro bono advice on these matters, the answer is yes.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: They are two different questions.
MAGISTRATE: Well, right. Can I just stop—-
DEFENDANT: But, but—-
MAGISTRATE: —–can I just stop you there, because this matter, if the Court is, if the matter is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that you were to be in breach, then clearly you would be at risk of going to custody. You understand that, don’t you?
DEFENDANT: I do.
MAGISTRATE: Very well. In that circumstance, the Court would normally make an adjournment available for someone to seek legal advice. Now, whether that is pro bono advice or whether that is advice that you pay for or that is advice under the Legal Aid Scheme, that is a matter for you, but you can face custody if this matter is found against you.
DEFENDANT: Yes, I fully understand that.
MAGISTRATE: You have been given this report from Mr Le Marrec today. I would have thought that you would have been able to read that in some detail because you have had several hours today, but I want to give you an opportunity, if you wish to take the opportunity, to take legal advice as to your situation—-
DEFENDANT: Well, I—-
MAGISTRATE: —–including any matters raised in the report and any matters you would like to raise if you want to say that you are not in breach of this Community Service Order.
DEFENDANT: Yes, indeed. I would indeed want to take advice on those points because there are—-
MAGISTRATE: Well, yes, I don’t really need to know why—-
DEFENDANT: Well—-
MAGISTRATE: —–but that is the normal procedure of the Court. So—-
DEFENDANT: I’m trying to, well, to answer you, and I am trying to assist the Court, Madam. To answer your question, would I wish an adjournment to take advice on the report and the options in it and what arguments I might make—-
 MAGISTRATE: And what arguments? Because what would happen if I did find—-
 DEFENDANT: The answer to your question—-
MAGISTRATE: —–if the Court did find—-
DEFENDANT: —–the answer to your question is yes.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, because, if the Court did find that you were in breach, then the Court has various options, and sentencing, re-sentencing for the original offence is one of them, for which you might like to take advice.
DEFENDANT: If—-
MAGISTRATE: —–and you might like to take advice as to, and sit back and think about what position you’re in and what your approach to the Community Service Order is in the cold light of day.
DEFENDANT: Well, if—-
MAGISTRATE: So what I am going to do, Mr Syvret, is adjourn the case for two weeks. That is the standard adjournment.
DEFENDANT: But before—-
MAGISTRATE: Is that a convenient date for the Court? (Magistrate conferred with Deputy Greffier) Tuesday the 25th?
DEFENDANT: Before the, I am trying to assist the Court here—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: —–so as not to have be accused of raising these issues again in the future. I am trying to be helpful. I was going to apply for an adjournment in any event because I want to subject your decision today to a judicial review. You are, that is your decision to refuse to recuse.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: You are a public authority exercising a statutory power.
MAGISTRATE: Well—-
DEFENDANT: Exercising a discretionary power. All public authorities bar statutory waiver are susceptible to judicial review.
MAGISTRATE: Well—-
DEFENDANT: Now, there is no appeal of course that lays from interlocutory decisions in the Magistrates’ Court. I think we have established that on past procedures. There are, however, grounds, and this does relate to the matter that we have just discussed actually, the question as to whether I have breached the order, there are matters that I need to take advice on and there are grounds upon which I would seek judicial review of your decisions in this matter.
MAGISTRATE: I think the 25th of October should be sufficient, Mr Syvret.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, I am not available on the 25th of October. It is a half term week—-
MAGISTRATE: Oh yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–and I have arranged to be away for some considerable time.
MAGISTRATE: Yes. What about the beginning of the following week?
CROWN ADVOCATE: I am in Court on the 1st of November.
DEFENDANT: Madam, could I finish the point I was making, because it may help the Court in making its arrangements?
MAGISTRATE: Hmm hmm.
DEFENDANT: Advocate Baker made a number of assertions which are untrue. For example, he accused me of not engaging with these procedures.
MAGISTRATE: Hmm hmm.
DEFENDANT: Well, I am more than happy to engage with the full range of judicial procedures and I am more than happy to use those, and I am entitled to use them in ways that meet my human rights. Advocate Baker also asserted quite volubly that I make “wild allegations” that are not substantiated with evidence. Well, as I think  today’s proceedings have demonstrated, as indeed did a lot of the other proceedings, I do have in fact ample evidence that does prove my concerns, but I am repeatedly prevented from using that evidence in Jersey’s courts.
Now, one of the reasons that I wish to judicially review this matter is that the key argument I am bringing forward – and this does address a point that was advanced by Advocate Baker in his arguments a moment ago – he suggested that this matter was simply a question of whether I had complied with the order in respect of the contempt of Court charge. Advocate Baker asserted, therefore, that any matters I might raise or bring before this Court or other courts were, or this Court, were of no relevance. The other charges, for example, were of no relevance.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: Well, that isn’t the case because my key argument is that the entire proceedings against me dating from the very original decisions of the Attorney General to have me investigated, raided, arrested, charged and prosecuted, right back from that day forward, the entire proceedings against me are structurally unlawful and evidencedly so an demonstrably so. Now, the case, if I had access to a higher Court where I could run these arguments, let us suppose hypothetically, I know you don’t share my views on this matter, but it must be regarded as a hypothetical consideration. Let us suppose hypothetically I were to win that argument which did show and did prove that the basic fundamental administrative decisions and decisions of the Attorney General concerning all of the actions taken against me in the first place and all of the charges and so on, were structurally unlawful, then all of the proceedings against me and all of the charges and all of the convictions would fall away.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: And that would—-
MAGISTRATE: You have—-
DEFENDANT: —–true of all of them.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, but—-
DEFENDANT: Now—-
MAGISTRATE: —–but you have exhausted those remedies, Mr Syvret.
DEFENDANT: With respect, Madam, no, I have not. Since the decision in the Royal Court to reject the appeal, two things have occurred. A witness came into my knowledge who could well have placed an entirely different complexion upon the whole public interest disclosure argument I ran, and in fact that witness was known to the Court Greffier, Mr Le Heuze, yet the identity and the existence of that witness was not informed to me, not notified to me and I came, I had no knowledge of this witness until after the appeal when the witness themselves approached me. The second factor that has changed is of course I have come into the possession of the 94 page statement of Mr Power.
Now, both of these dramatic bits of evidence do clearly at the very least more than justify the reopening of the appeal. These clearly are matters that should have been considered and I should have had access to as evidence to enable the working of these considerations into at least my appeal and frankly probably the proceedings beforehand. Now, had I been able to do so, it is conceivable, it’s possible that such evidence, particularly for example the report of Mr Power, would have demonstrated sufficiently to the Court indeed my argument that I have always made, the actions of the Attorney General were unlawful, would be upheld, in which case all of these proceedings would be overthrown. Now the difficulty I face from a legal perspective is that I sought—-
MAGISTRATE: I can’t see that, Mr Syvret, at all.
DEFENDANT: Sorry?
MAGISTRATE: I can’t see that as a matter of law is possible.
DEFENDANT: It is.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, the—-
DEFENDANT: Well, it is possible—
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, his comments are legally illiterate. He is being sentenced for contempt of Court, namely absconding.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: That is what you are dealing with.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, I entirely take your point, Mr Baker.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, I am not going to suggest that you depart from your normal procedure and an adjournment for legal advice.
DEFENDANT: Madam—-
MAGISTRATE: No, no, no.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Excuse me, I am speaking.
DEFENDANT: Well, I was speaking actually.
MAGISTRATE: No, I want to hear Mr Baker at the moment. I just want a date.
CROWN ADVOCATE: If that is the normal, if that is the normal procedure, then I don’t in any way suggest—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes, yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–that you should not follow it, you should, but I do make it plain that, on 16th September, a month or so ago now, Mr Le Marrec wrote to Mr Syvret saying “It has been decided to return your case to Court because, in the opinion of the Community Service Officer, you have failed to comply with the conditions of the Community Service Order. This is known as breaching the order. You will be notified when a Court date has been set—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: —–You are strongly urged to seek legal advice. If you wish to apply for Legal Aid, then you should call the Legal Aid Office or email the current Acting Bâtonnier. You may then be given a personal appointment.” So what you have here, you should of course follow the normal procedure, but what you have here is this man again manipulating events to his benefit.
MAGISTRATE: Well, I am afraid that the experience of this Court, Mr Baker, is a lot of people appear before this Court without having taken legal advice first when they perhaps should have done.
CROWN ADVOCATE: I am sorry, Madam, I didn’t mean to sit down, yes.
MAGISTRATE: All I want to do at this stage—-
DEFENDANT: In response—-
MAGISTRATE: Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: May I respond?
MAGISTRATE: No, Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: Well, Madam—-
MAGISTRATE: —–the things you are telling me—-
DEFENDANT:  —–you have just allowed—-
MAGISTRATE: —–no, Mr Syvret, the things that you are telling me—-
DEFENDANT: —–you have just allowed Advocate Baker—-
MAGISTRATE: —–are not—-
DEFENDANT: —–to lie. You have just allowed Advocate Baker—-
MAGISTRATE: No.
DEFENDANT: —–to make a misleading assertion.
MAGISTRATE: I am—-
DEFENDANT: I received that email that he has—-
MAGISTRATE: I am not interested in that email, Mr Syvret.
DEFENDANT: —–referred to. The report in question that I was given today—-
 MAGISTRATE: I am saying I am not interested in it.
DEFENDANT: The report in question—-
 MAGISTRATE: A lot of people don’t—-
 DEFENDANT: —–that had the detail I was only—-
 MAGISTRATE: —–get the Legal Aid that they need.
DEFENDANT: —–handed today.
MAGISTRATE: I am adjourning this case for you to seek Legal Aid and I am asking for a date from the Greffier—-
DEFENDANT: But—-
MAGISTRATE: —–which is convenient to the parties.
DEFENDANT: But, Madam, I was in the middle of speaking when Advocate Baker interrupted.
MAGISTRATE: But you’re in the middle of saying things, Mr Syvret, that really don’t make a great deal of sense. You’re hypothesising that you might have a third route of appeal, sorry a second route of appeal beyond the Royal Court and hypothesising that a number of not only the case to which you think you might have a route of appeal would be thrown out but everything else besides. I really don’t think that that is tenable in any way. Therefore—-
DEFENDANT: But, Madam, with respect, you—-
MAGISTRATE: —–I am going to allow an adjournment for you to seek legal advice.
DEFENDANT: —–you have just expressed a prejudiced view and you haven’t even considered the evidence yet.
MAGISTRATE: It is not a question of evidence, Mr Syvret, at this stage—-
DEFENDANT: Well, if Court cases are not questions of evidence—-
MAGISTRATE: —–it is a question of allowing you an adjournment for legal advice and, therefore, I am asking for a date from the Greffier.
DEFENDANT: May I finish what I was saying when Advocate Baker interrupted?
MAGISTRATE: No, you may not.
DEPUTY GREFFIER: Madam, if Mr Baker is not available on the 1st, if Mr Syvret is also available, the 2nd in the afternoon. Might I suggest Wednesday the 2nd pm?
MAGISTRATE: 2nd of November.
DEFENDANT: Can I finish what I was saying?
MAGISTRATE: Well, no, you can tell me whether you are available on the 2nd of November.
DEFENDANT: Well, this was the point I was attempting to address.
MAGISTRATE: No, you are saying that you would like to take my decision on recusal to judicial review. 2nd of November would give you time to make an application should the Court entertain that and, if you wish to take legal advice you can do so and, if you don’t have any other reason why you shouldn’t attend on 2nd November, then I shall adjourn the case until that date.
DEFENDANT: Well, if I may continue with the explanation I was making before Advocate Baker interrupted—-
MAGISTRATE: No, no, Mr Syvret, I just don’t see the relevance of what you are saying. I am going to adjourn the case—-
DEFENDANT: With all due respect, Madam—-
MAGISTRATE: —–until the 2nd of November.
DEFENDANT: —–you’ve not yet heard what I was going to say, so how can you gauge whether it is going to be relevant?
MAGISTRATE: Well, you have prefaced it with a long introduction relating to additional evidence that you might have in other cases. I just don’t see how they can impact on the case that we’re dealing with at the moment.
DEFENDANT: Well, admittedly—-
MAGISTRATE: 2nd of November—-
DEFENDANT: —–admittedly I’m not a lawyer, but let me try and explain my thinking—-
MAGISTRATE: —–at 2.30pm.
DEFENDANT: —–on the question. My thinking is that if, as I believe it does, the statement of Mr Power demonstrates structural unlawfulness of the office of Attorney General in respect of me, then all of the decisions of that office in respect of me are vitiated.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, yes, I understand that that is what you think.
DEFENDANT: That is, well it is not a question of what I think, Madam. There are, there is substantial case law on the requirement, the very strict requirement from public authorities when making discretionary decisions such as those to prosecute. There is a very clear body of evidence that such public authorities must not be conflicted—-
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
DEFENDANT: —–and that officers within them must not have direct personal conflicts of interest. Now, this is rock solid, uncontroversial, English jurisprudence.
MAGISTRATE: Yes, I understand you want—-
DEFENDANT: I am pointing—-
MAGISTRATE: —–to raise these matters, Mr Syvret—-
DEFENDANT: —–I am pointing to that.
MAGISTRATE: —–but now is not the time or the place. It is the 2nd of November at 2.30 in the afternoon.
DEFENDANT: Well, Madam, you were fixing the date and that date might not be possible because of the proceedings I am going to bring—-
MAGISTRATE: Well, then you will have—-
DEFENDANT: —–in the other Court.
MAGISTRATE: —–to come back to the Court and say so, Mr Syvret, but for the time being it is the 2nd of November at 2.30 in the afternoon. (Magistrate conferred with Deputy Greffier) Is there any need for conditions on the bail?
CROWN ADVOCATE: No, I don’t think he is on bail. Is he on bail?
MAGISTRATE: Well, he will be on bail from now on. The Court will grant bail to that date. Mr Syvret, you are under an obligation to attend.
DEFENDANT: Madam, may I—-
MAGISTRATE: —–and you know you will be arrested if you don’t.
DEFENDANT: —–may I point out at the end of these proceedings that I consider your conduct today to again exhibit actual bias.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Madam, I do apologise, the Probation have raised this with me. The Probation have prepared a report upon this man. I have referred to it. It has been prepared for the purpose of these Court hearings.
MAGISTRATE: Yes.
CROWN ADVOCATE: And they are concerned to ensure that it doesn’t get published to the world on a blog or something of that type and they invite me to invite you to remind Mr Syvret that there are conditions upon him being given a copy of that report, namely that it is used for this.
MAGISTRATE: Yes. Mr Syvret, you know the obligations. You are familiar with the Data Protection Law.
DEFENDANT: Yes.
MAGISTRATE: And there has been a report given to you in connection with these proceedings and, apart from your legal adviser, if you have a legal adviser, then that report should otherwise remain confidential.
DEFENDANT: Can I just be clear about this? Does that mean that I can’t publish it on my blog, but it’s okay for it to be given to Channel Television by the Probation Department and they can publish it?
MAGISTRATE: No.
CROWN ADVOCATE: Of course it is not.
MAGISTRATE: Of course it is not.
CROWN ADVOCATE: That is an absurd suggestion.
MAGISTRATE: Very well.
Court adjourns.”

 

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